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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study was to develop a framework to understand how coping 
mechanisms and livelihood diversification strategies were used to mitigate the coffee 
leaf rust’s (CLR) effects on the food security and livelihoods of Guatemalan smallholder 
coffee farmers. This research used a qualitative instrumental case study methodology to 
develop a grounded theory based on the rich description and analysis of how one 
Guatemalan smallholder coffee cooperative was affected by the 2012-2013 CLR 
epidemic.  
The cooperative members perceived the CLR epidemic as one crisis of many 
they faced in their lives. The CLR epidemic brought significant changes to the members’ 
livelihoods strategy and increased food insecurity. Members reported production 
declines of 50 to 90 percent. Members chose to forgo organic production, borrow 
money, seek off-farm employment, diversify into food crops, and make major 
investments into renewing coffee fields infected with the CLR. The cooperative 
members reported ameliorating the effects of food insecurity by eating less food, 
skipping meals, eating less desirable foods, generating income from off-farm 
employment to purchase food, and borrowing money to purchase food. 
Despite continual crises, and the threat of another CLR outbreak, the cooperative 
remained committed to producing high quality Arabica coffee. Members perceived using 
non-productive land to grow food crops as beneficial to improve food security. 
Diversifying coffee fields to produce other cash crops was not perceived as an 
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advantageous strategy to strengthen food security or livelihoods. Despite a history of 
assistance from external organizations before, during, and after, the CLR epidemic, 
members’ livelihoods remained vulnerable. In light of the damaging effects that the CLR 
had on incomes, livelihoods, and food security, the cooperative’s main objective 
remained exporting high quality Arabica coffee.  
The smallholder coffee producer vulnerability framework was developed during 
the course of the research. The framework is intended to be used to understand coping 
mechanisms and analyze changing livelihood strategies resulting from coffee production 
disruptions. It is recommended that future research further explore perceptions of crop 
diversification, coffee production, and the CLR. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Coffee (Coffea arabica; Coffea canephora) is one of Guatemala’s most 
important export commodities and supports the livelihoods up to 30% of the country’s 
rural workforce (Lyon, 2011). Out of Guatemala’s 22 administrative departments, 19 
produce coffee; 80% of Guatemala’s coffee is produced on small to medium sized farms 
(Tay, 2010). Coffee rust (Hemileia vastatrix) is a leaf-based fungus that can decrease 
coffee yields by up to 90% (Arneson, 2000). Coffee leaf rust (CLR) first entered Latin 
America from Asia in the 1970s. The most recent outbreak, detected in 2012, has cost 
Guatemalan producers hundreds of millions of dollars and affected the livelihoods of 
hundreds of thousands of coffee farmers and laborers (Dardon, 2013; Sanchez, Rizzo, & 
Ortiz, 2013; World Coffee Research, 2013).   
World coffee prices steadily decreased throughout the 1990s. Prices experienced 
an exceptionally steep decline from 1999 to 2002; this period came to be known as the 
“global coffee crisis” (Gresser & Tickell, 2002; International Coffee Organization, 2014; 
Jha et al., 2011, p. 162). During the global coffee crisis, employment in Guatemala’s 
coffee sector decreased by 41%, while across Central America 400,000 temporary and 
200,000 full time coffee laborers lost their jobs (Gresser & Tickell, 2002). There were 
widespread reports of malnutrition and hunger in coffee producing areas, unauthorized 
migration to North America increased, primary school attendance rates dropped, and the 
World Food Programme declared a food security emergency in El Salvador (Bacon, 
2010; Eakin, Tucker, & Castellanos, 2006). 
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Some worry Guatemala is on the verge of experiencing another coffee crisis 
brought on by the CLR epidemic (Kahn, 2014). Whereas coffee production in 
Guatemala used to largely take place on large estates or fincas, Guatemalan smallholder 
farmers now lead coffee production in the western highlands (Fischer & Victor, 2014). 
Coffee prices stabilized in the mid-2000s and Guatemalan smallholder coffee farms 
sprang up to meet the demand for lower yielding, but higher quality Arabica beans, that 
can only be grown in higher altitudes. Farmers usually grow these high altitude beans on 
small plots of land. 
While there is a lack of knowledge about how food insecurity interacts with 
coffee production, several recent studies have shown that food insecurity in Central 
American coffee-growing communities remains a serious problem (Caswell, Mendez, & 
Bacon, 2012; FEWS NET, 2014; Mendez, Bacon, Olson, Morris, & Shattuck, 2010). In 
one survey of almost 500 smallholder coffee farmers in four Central American countries, 
63% of respondents reported being food insecure during at least one part of the year 
(Mendez, Bacon, Olson, Morris, & Shattuck, 2010). Fujisaka (2007) found 67% of 
coffee producing households surveyed in Mexico, Guatemala, and Nicaragua were food 
insecure at least three months each year. Bacon et al. (2014) found smallholder 
Nicaraguan coffee producing households experienced on average 3.15 months of food 
insecurity per year. 
CLR (Hemileia vastatrix) is a fungus that affects the health and production 
capability of coffee (C. Arabica is affected much more than C. canephora). Infection 
sites first appear as yellow spots on the underside of a plant’s leaves. These spots 
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increase in diameter and turn a darker yellow or orange-red as the spots begin to produce 
spores (Arneson, 2000). CLR causes defoliation, which reduces yields on average 30% if 
left unmanaged, however losses on individual farms can reach 100% (Arneson, 2000; 
Cristancho, Rozo, Escobar, Rivillas, & Gaitán, 2012; Ferreira & Boley, 1991; Monaco, 
1977). As of 2013, 70% of Guatemala’s coffee farms were infected by CLR (ACAN-
EFE, 2013). Applying copper-based fungicide has traditionally been the principal 
method for controlling the spread of CLR, however fungicides are costly and must be 
applied within specific weather conditions to be effective (do Céu Silva et al., 2006). 
CLR has been present in Guatemala since 1984, however the prevalence of the 
recent outbreak has raised alarm within scientific and policy communities (Schieber & 
Zentmyer, 1984). The Guatemalan government declared a state of emergency to stem the 
financial losses incurred from the CLR outbreak in February 2013. The national 
association for the Guatemalan coffee industry (ANACAFE) and international 
governmental and non-governmental aid agencies pledged financial and technical 
support during an emergency summit meeting in April 2013 (World Coffee Research, 
2013). Much like the global coffee crisis of 1999-2001, anecdotal reports have indicated 
that coffee production disruptions from CLR led to increased poverty, food insecurity, 
and migration of Guatemalan coffee farmers, laborers, and their families (Agren, 2014; 
Castillo & Aleman, 2014; Malkin, 2014; Tran, 2013). However, no peer-reviewed 
studies have been published verifying these reports. 
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Statement of Problem 
While most acknowledge that food insecurity exists in Central American coffee 
producing regions, little is known about how this food insecurity affects coffee 
production modalities (Bacon, Mendez, Gliessman, Goodman, & Fox, 2008; Jaffee, 
2007; Morris, Mendez, & Olson, 2013). Coffee production remains an important 
livelihood activity for millions of Guatemalans. The Guatemalan government and 
international aid agencies made a renewed commitment to reduce Guatemala’s high rate 
of food insecurity (Feed the Future, 2011; Secretaría de Seguridad Alimentaria y 
Nutricional, 2013). While the phytopathological effects of coffee rust is well known, 
little is known about how the CLR epidemic affects the food security and livelihoods of 
coffee farmers, laborers, and members of their households. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study was to develop a theory about how the CLR affects the 
food security and livelihoods of members from one Guatemalan coffee cooperative. 
Research Objectives 
1. Describe the effects of the CLR epidemic on the cooperative members’ food
security. 
2. Describe the effects of the CLR epidemic on the cooperative’s livelihoods (e.g.
employment, social networks, health, and education). 
3. Describe and analyze coping mechanisms that the cooperative members employ
to preserve their livelihoods from the CLR’s effects on coffee production. 
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4. Develop a grounded theory to explain how the food security and livelihoods of
the cooperative are affected by the CLR epidemic. 
5. Develop a smallholder coffee producer vulnerability framework that could be
used to forecast how the food security and livelihoods of smallholder coffee 
producers may be affected by future production disruptions. 
Theoretical Framework 
This research examined the food security, livelihoods, and coping mechanisms 
(Figure 1) of one Guatemalan coffee cooperative. 
Figure 1. Theoretical framework. 
Most scholars agree on the basic elements of the FAO’s 1996 World Food 
Summit food security definition, which stated food security exists “when all people, at 
all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to 
meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.” (Barrett, 
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2010; Caswell, Mendez, & Bacon, 2012; FAO, 1996, para 12; Maxwell et al., 1999; 
Morris, Mendez, & Olson, 2013; Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009). This study focused on the 
element of economic access that coffee laborers, smallholder producers, and members of 
their family have to acquire food. Sen’s (1981) theory of food entitlement decline (FED) 
was used to frame food security access. Sen’s (1981) theory of FED stated that food 
insecurity is not caused by food unavailability, but instead by the inability to 
economically access food by the production, purchase, trade, or the transfer of resources. 
Scoones’ (1998) diverse livelihoods framework, consisting of human capital (e.g. 
health, education), physical capital (e.g. farm inputs, equipment), social capital (e.g. 
cooperatives, social networks), financial capital (e.g. credit, savings), and natural capital 
(e.g. forests, water) was used to frame this research. It was hypothesized that CLR would 
increase the food security-related vulnerabilities of coffee laborers and smallholder 
producers. As a response, coffee laborers and smallholder farmers would react with 
long-term adaptations and short-term coping mechanisms to preserve their livelihoods. 
These adaptations and coping mechanisms would lead to evidence of change in the 
nature of coffee production or livelihood activities. A livelihoods analysis takes into 
account all assets, resources, and most importantly, the capabilities people have to 
overcome food security-related vulnerabilities (Bebbington, 1999; Scoones, 1998). 
Integrating a food security-related vulnerability framework provides a prescriptive 
method of analyzing food security’s causes and reduction methods (Lovendal & 
Knowles, 2006). Chambers (1989) defined food security-related vulnerability as 
consisting of external risks, shocks, and stresses, and internally, the difficulty in coping 
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with the risks, shocks, and stresses (Dilley & Boudreau, 2001; Frankenberger, 1992; 
Watts & Bohle, 1993). 
Conceptual Framework 
Prior studies of vulnerable Central American households involved in coffee 
production revealed that households responded to food insecurity by developing short-
term coping mechanisms and long-term adaptations (Bacon et al., 2014; Eakin, Tucker, 
& Castellanos, 2006; Fischer & Victor, 2014; Morris, Mendez, & Olson, 2013; Tucker, 
Eakin, & Castellanos, 2010). Furthermore, smallholder coffee farmers in Central 
America responded to agricultural challenges such as climate change, market 
fluctuations, and disease/pests by shifting production toward lower risk subsistence food 
crops and other livelihood activities (Baca, Läderach, Haggar, Götz, & Ovalle, 2014; 
Bacon et al., 2014; Eakin, Tucker, & Castellanos, 2006; Fischer & Victor, 2014; Tucker, 
Eakin, & Castellanos, 2010). It was hypothesized that coffee laborers and smallholder 
producers would respond to the CLR epidemic in similar ways than they do when 
experiencing food insecurity and agricultural challenges caused by other stimuli (Figure 
2). 
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Figure 2. Conceptual framework. 
 
Research Questions (RQs) 
1. How has the CLR epidemic affected the food security of one Guatemalan coffee 
cooperative? 
2. How has the CLR epidemic affected the livelihoods (e.g. employment, social 
networks, health, and education) of one Guatemalan coffee cooperative?  
3. What short-term coping mechanisms are cooperative members employing to 
address the effects of the CLR epidemic on their livelihoods? 
4. How are the coping mechanisms contributing to the cooperative members’ 
livelihoods? 
Need for Study 
 This study provided an analysis of the CLR’s effects on household food security 
and livelihoods of a Guatemalan coffee cooperative. Anecdotal reports indicated that the 
loss of production and labor opportunities from the 2012 CLR outbreak affected the food 
security and livelihoods of vulnerable Guatemalans (Agren, 2014; Castillo & Aleman, 
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2014; Malkin, 2014; Tay, 2014; Tran, 2013). However, no peer-reviewed published 
studies have investigated these claims. The 1999-2001 global coffee crisis created a 
socio-economic upheaval in many Guatemalan rural communities and changed the 
Guatemalan coffee industry (Fischer & Victor, 2014). In light of the CLR crisis, this 
study provided recommendations on how to strengthen the resilience of smallholder 
coffee producing communities in Central America. 
Delimitations 
1. This study was delimited to one coffee producing community in the Quetzaltenango
department of Guatemala. 
2. Data were collected on one selected dimension of food security: the economic access
(ability to acquire through trade, production, purchase, and transfer) to food. 
3. Data were collected on members’ livelihood strategies that included agricultural
production, off-farm employment, and on-farm non-agricultural income generation. 
4. Data were collected from November 2014 to December 2014.
5. Data were collected primarily from cooperative members who were (a) dependent
upon coffee production for their livelihoods; and (b) whose production was affected 
by the CLR outbreak. 
6. Qualitative data were collected using semi-structured interviews of community
members, focus group interviews, passive and active observation, key informant 
interviews, document analysis, and site visits. 
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Limitations 
There were three main limitations to the study. First, data were collected over a 
relatively short period of time. The researcher collected data during three visits, 
consisting of 15 complete days from November 2014 to December 2014. The data 
reflected the interviewees’ perceptions and the researcher’s observations during that 
time. The researcher attempted to maximize the time spent in the community (e.g. 
sharing meals with interviewees) as much as possible. The researcher also attempted to 
ask questions, acquire documents, and triangulate findings with key informants about 
other months of the year and/or periods of time. 
Second, the sources of almost all of the data were from the members of one 
cooperative. Data were collected primarily from in-depth semi-structured interviews of 
cooperative members. The researcher used observations and reflections that were based 
on experiences (e.g. harvesting coffee; traversing coffee fields) facilitated by cooperative 
members. Cooperative members could have intentionally or unintentionally concealed 
information from the researcher. The researcher gathered data from key informants and 
documents to triangulate interview and observation data. The researcher provided copies 
of past interviews to interviewees (i.e. member checks) to provide the interviewees a 
chance to clarify or change information. 
Third, cooperative members had difficulty providing precise information on 
dates, prices, and measurements. One example of imprecise information was the 
conflicting information about the date that the cooperative members split from other 
producers in the same community. The researcher was unable to obtain primary 
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documents (e.g. export agreements) from cooperative members. The researcher 
attempted to cross-check interview data with documents and key informants. When data 
were in question and the researcher was unable to verify through other sources, the 
researcher acknowledged conflicting data in the results.  
Basic Assumptions 
1. Study participants answered the researcher’s questions truthfully. 
2. Study participants did not materially modify their behavior in the researcher’s 
presence. 
3. Study participants did not materially modify physical conditions (e.g. dwellings) 
because of the researcher’s presence.  
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CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Coffee Production in Guatemala 
Early history of Guatemalan coffee production 
 Jesuit priests first introduced coffee in Guatemala in 1773, but it did not become 
a significant agricultural export until the 19
th
 century (Eakin, Tucker, & Castellanos, 
2006). In the 1830s and 1840s, Guatemalans began planting coffee in the western 
highlands for export (Fischer & Victor, 2014). Coffee went from representing one 
percent of exports in 1860 to 44 percent by 1870 (Woodward, 1990). In 1873, the coffee 
farmer and military general Justo Rufino Barrios became president. Barrios passed a 
series of land reform and export laws to facilitate coffee production and by the mid-
1880s, Guatemala was a leading world exporter of coffee (McCreery, 1976; Prendergast, 
2010). The economic and land reforms favoring the exportation of coffee under Barrios 
were sustained by successive Guatemalan governments. In only 20 years, coffee went 
from a relative unknown crop in Guatemala to a commodity dominating the country’s 
economy, politics, and social development.  
 Coffee can only be grown in certain climatic conditions and its production 
requires a relatively large labor force (McCreery, 1976). Guatemala government policies 
helped increase coffee production through land appropriation and through informal and 
formal (i.e. legal) systems of forced labor. Nearly one million acres of Mayan 
collectivized land was privatized between 1871 and 1873 (World Bank, 2004). In the 
1870s the government began the mandamiento system of forced labor requiring rural 
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communities to send peasants to work a certain number of days per year on public works 
projects or in other sectors (i.e. agriculture) that the government considered important; 
many were assigned to work on coffee estates (Fischer & Victor, 2014). The best land 
for growing high quality Arabica coffee in Guatemala was (and still is) mountain 
hillsides populated by the Mayan indigenous.  
Initially, the mandamiento system was a very inefficient way to allocate labor. 
The indigenous Mayan would frequently flee back to their village as they had little 
incentive to work for wages on coffee estates when they could farm land communally in 
their villages (McCreery, 1976). The government gradually forced smallholder 
subsistence farmers off prime coffee growing lands and into bonded labor schemes on 
large coffee estates to shift the land to coffee production and to break the tradition of 
farming communal land by the Mayan indigenous (Brockett, 1990; Eakin, Tucker, & 
Castellanos, 2006; Fischer & Victor, 2014; Jha et al., 2011). While the government 
formally ended the mandamiento system in the 1920s, informal bonded labor of 
indigenous Mayans was common on large estates up through the 1960s and still exists 
on a smaller scale today (Fischer & Victor, 2014). The land and labor needs of the coffee 
industry in the 19th and 20th centuries has been cited as one of the main causes of 
inequality that favor and protect a small Guatemalan elite (Gallardo, 2001; Gauster & 
Isakson, 2007). McCreery (1976) argued, that “development’ for the ruling coffee elite 
necessitated the active ‘underdevelopment’ of the economic and social position of the 
indigenous majority” (p. 460).  
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The 1999-2002 coffee crisis: How it changed Guatemalan coffee production 
 Coffee’s dominance in Guatemala’s economic, political, and social development 
spheres continued unabated until the late 1980s. The International Coffee Organization’s 
(ICO) International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in 1962 helped stabilize frequent 
fluctuations in coffee prices. The ICA established a quota system by country accounting 
for 99 percent of the world’s coffee production (Fischer & Victor, 2014). However, after 
the agreement ended in 1989 and as economic liberal (i.e. The Washington Consensus) 
policies dominated many coffee producing-countries, Arabica coffee prices began to 
collapse. Additionally, new export countries increased production (e.g. Brazil; Vietnam 
went from the 17th largest supplier in 1990 to the 2nd largest in 2001), coffee 
consumption dropped in the developed world, and new processes improved the market 
for Robusta at the expense of Arabica varieties (Bacon, 2010; Eakin, Tucker, & 
Castellanos, 2006; Fischer & Victor, 2014). Central American coffee production was 
also affected by extreme weather events (e.g. Hurricanes Mitch and Stan) and an unusual 
dry period between 1999 and 2003 (Tucker, Eakin, & Castellanos, 2010).  
Coffee prices continued to fall in the 1990s, and reached a low in 2001 of .45 
cents per pound. Coffee prices dropped 50 percent from 1999 to 2001; a period of time 
which came to be known as the “global coffee crisis” (Gresser & Tickell, 2002; 
International Coffee Organization, 2014; Jha et al., 2011, p. 162). The effects were 
immediate and devastating for many countries including Guatemala. Central American 
coffee revenues decreased by 44 percent in one year (2000-2001) and Guatemalan coffee 
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exports fell from $600 million to $320 million (Eakin, Tucker, & Castellanos, 2006; 
Gresser & Tickell, 2002). 
The global coffee crisis affected low-income Guatemalan coffee farmers through 
reduced incomes, threatened livelihoods, and increased food insecurity. Employment in 
Guatemala’s coffee sector decreased by 41 percent, while across Central America, 
400,000 temporary and 200,000 full time coffee laborers lost their jobs (Gresser & 
Tickell, 2002). International aid agencies attributed the increase in malnutrition rates in 
coffee producing areas, increased migration to North America, and a decrease in primary 
school attendance to low coffee prices (Bacon, 2010; Eakin, Tucker, & Castellanos, 
2006). Scott’s (2012) study of Q’echi’ Mayan coffee laborers found many were 
displaced from their homes on coffee estates as owners sold their land or paid workers to 
leave. Gresser and Tickell (2002) found “widespread land invasions” by unemployed 
coffee laborers in some regions of Guatemala (p. 12). While the drop in coffee prices 
affected the food security and livelihoods of Guatemalan coffee farmers, it also led to a 
change in how coffee was produced. 
Worldwide coffee production used to be dominated by large landowners, 
however small-scale farmers now produce approximately 70 percent of the world’s 
coffee on farms of less than 10 hectares (Caswell, Mendez, & Bacon, 2012). In 
Mesoamerica there are an estimated 500,000 smallholder coffee farmers and a total of 
8.5 million people are involved in the production, purchasing, transport, and processing 
of coffee (Baca, Läderach, Haggar, Götz, & Ovalle, 2014; Läderach et al., 2010). In 
Guatemala, seven percent of the population depended upon coffee for their livelihood in 
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2001 (Morris, Mendez, & Olson, 2013). Tucker, Eakin, and Castellanos (2010) 
estimated 700,000 Guatemalans directly produced coffee or worked as hired labor in 
Guatemala in 2001. Since 1995, at least 50,000 new smallholder coffee growers have 
replaced large coffee estates in Guatemala; in the western highlands many of these 
growers are indigenous Maya (Fischer & Victor, 2014). After the ICA ended in 1989, 
coffee price volatility increased at the same that smallholder farmers (and not well 
capitalized estates) were shifting toward coffee production (Caswell, Mendez, & Bacon, 
2012). While coffee prices reached an all-time high in 2011, so did the cost of basic food 
commodities and cooking fuel (Caswell, Mendez, & Bacon, 2012; International Coffee 
Organization, 2014) 
 For many smallholder coffee producers in Guatemala, coffee is just one (albeit, 
an important) livelihood activity. In one study, only 24 percent of smallholder coffee 
producers identified themselves as cafetalero (coffee farmer) while 51 percent identified 
themselves as agricultor (farmer); over 50 percent of the families had other income 
generating activities beside coffee production (Fischer & Victor, 2014). Many coffee 
producing households engaged in off-farm employment, migration (regional and 
international), and subsistence farming as livelihood strategies (Bacon et al., 2014; 
Fischer & Victor, 2014; Jha et al., 2011; Tucker, Eakin, & Castellanos, 2010). Coffee 
production is thus seen as one important strategy contributing to smallholder farmers’ 
livelihoods in Guatemala.  
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Coffee production methods in Guatemala 
The genus Coffea, native to Ethiopia and the forests surrounding Lake Victoria in 
East Africa, has over 100 species, but only two, Coffea Arabica and Coffea Robusta are 
commercially grown. C. Robusta is typically grown in shade-free lowlands at sea level 
to 1000 meters, in temperatures ranging from 24-30 degrees Celsius, while C. Arabica is 
grown in various shade profiles between 500 and 1,500 meters, and thrives best at 
temperatures between 18 and 22 degrees Celsius (Jha et al., 2011; Toledo & Moguel, 
2012).  
It is believed that C. Arabica evolved as an understory crop and thus its 
photosynthetic rate is highest at relatively moderate temperatures and levels of sun (Lin, 
Perfecto, & Vandermeer, 2008; Nutman, 1937). Coffee trees are sensitive to drought, 
excessive moisture, and extreme temperatures; dry conditions must prevail for the plant 
to flower (Tucker, Eakin, & Castellanos, 2010). Central American countries and 
Colombia leads the production of C. Arabica, while C. Robusta is more common in East 
Africa, Southeast Asia, and Brazil. C. Arabica is grows best in tropical mountain forests. 
It yields less than C. Robusta and is not as hardy to pests, diseases, and weather 
fluctuations, but consumers prefer its superior taste profile, and thus commands a price 
premium over C. Robusta (Jha et al., 2011; Läderach et al., 2010; Luttinger & Dicum, 
1999; Toledo & Moguel, 2012). In general (specific varieties and climatic conditions can 
affect maturation rates) C. Arabica takes three to five years to bear fruit and will keep 
producing at maximum yield for 15 years (Fischer & Victor, 2014).  
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After many of Guatemala’s large coffee estates went bankrupt in the 1990s-
2000s or converted their land to rubber, cattle, or palm oil production, an increasing 
number of smallholder farmers have taken up producing coffee (Fischer & Victor, 
2014). As coffee prices recovered in the 2000s, consumers in North America and Europe 
increasingly demanded specialized “premium” Arabica coffee varieties, as well as “fair-
trade” and organically grown coffee. The coffee industry in Guatemala grows C. 
Robusta and C. Arabica, however smallholder farmers are more likely to cultivate 
Arabica varieties on small plots of land in mountainous regions while Robusta is still 
grown on large costal estates. 
Guatemala’s Arabica coffee is traditionally wet-processed (as oppose to dry or 
natural processed where cherries are simply dried with the beans inside). Wet-processing 
coffee requires 24-36 hours of fermentation (leaving the cherries to sit at room 
temperature) after being picked, followed by separating the skin and flesh of the cherry 
from the bean, and “washing” the bean before it is left to dry for three to five days of full 
sun. Wet processing requires more labor and water, but commands a price premium for 
the beans’ perceived superior taste (Pendergrast, 2010). 
Traditionally, Guatemala has produced Arabica “Prime” or “Extra Prime” (lower 
quality) coffee at 2,500-3,500 feet above sea level and “hard bean” (HB) or “semi-hard 
bean” (higher quality) at 3,500 to 4,500 feet above sea level (Fischer & Victor, 2014). 
More recently, ANACAFE has supported increasing production of the “top-quality” 
strictly hard beans (SHB), which are grown at 4,500-6,500 feet above sea level (Fischer 
& Victor, 2014; Pendergrast, 2010). If given one coffee variety grown at two different 
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elevations in the same region, the crop grown at the higher elevation will command a 
price premium over the lower elevation crop. Higher elevation coffee commands a 
higher price because the cherries will usually take a longer to mature (because of cooler 
temperatures). This will cause the higher altitude beans to grow slightly larger and 
denser than lower altitude beans, and most importantly, the extra time spent ripening will 
allow for more sugars to concentrate in the high altitude beans. The more development 
of sugars in the bean usually lead to a perceived richer complex taste in the cup 
(Bertrand et al., 2006; Sridevi & Giridhar, 2013). While higher elevation beans generally 
enjoy a price premium over similar low elevation beans, coffee trees grown at higher 
elevations are less hardy.  
Coffee leaf rust (CLR) in Guatemala 
 One of the oldest recorded diseases affecting C. Arabica is Hemileia vastatrix or 
coffee leaf rust (CLR). CLR is thought to have originated in Ethiopia and the Lake 
Victoria area of East Africa (Schieber & Zentmyer, 1984). In 1870, Ceylon (present day 
Sri Lanka) was the world’s largest exporter of coffee. However, after CLR was 
introduced to Ceylon in 1875 the island went from producing 42 million kilograms of 
coffee each year to 3 million in four years (Schieber, 1972). In 1970, CLR was 
discovered in Brazil, which created a “virtual panic among producers and national level 
institutes responsible for production” (Jha et al., 2011, p. 146). By 1980, its presence 
was detected in Guatemala and by 1984 it was firmly established in all of Central 
America and Mexico (Schieber & Zentmyer, 1984).  
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 CLR, also referred to as orange leaf rust, or as it is known in Guatemala, “la 
roya”, damages coffee trees by inhibiting the plant’s photosynthetic ability through 
premature defoliation of its leaves (Ferreira & Boley, 1991). Infection sites first appear 
as yellow or orange spots on the underside of a plant’s leaves. These spots increase in 
diameter and turn a darker yellow or orange-red as the spots begin to produce spores 
(Arneson, 2000). Spores are usually located on the edges of leaves; rain and wind can 
transfer the spores to neighboring trees. CLR causes defoliation but does not usually kill 
the infected coffee tree. Instead CLR weakens coffee and causes reduced yields during 
the infection and in subsequent years (Arneson, 2000; Ferreira & Boley, 1991). CLR 
typically decreases yields on average 30 percent when left unmanaged (Cristancho, 
Rozo, Escobar, Rivillas, & Gaitán, 2012; Monaco, 1977).  
CLR can be controlled chemically with copper-based fungicides. CLR resistant 
cultivars and agricultural management practices such as proper pruning, shade 
management, and proper fertilization can also decrease disease rates (Arneson, 2000). 
For smallholder Guatemalan coffee farmers, CLR management is limited by knowledge 
and financial capabilities. In 1987, the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID) established the Regional Cooperative Program for the Technological 
Development and Modernization of Coffee Cultivation (better known by its Spanish 
acronym, Promecafe). Based at the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on 
Agriculture in Costa Rica (IICA), Promacafe helped introduce new high yielding coffee 
varieties, promoted the removal of shade, and increased the planting density of trees 
which helped control CLR (Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture, 
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1996; Jha et al., 2011). CLR breeds in low light and high moisture environments, the 
same environment in which Guatemalan smallholder farmers produce premium HB and 
SHB coffee varieties (Läderach et al., 2010). It is thought to take approximately 10 years 
to breed and replace new a CLR resistant coffee variety (Schieber, 1972). CLR resistant 
coffee varieties have been developed, however some resistant varieties have already lost 
their resistance as new races of CLR (over 40 have been identified) evolve (Arneson, 
2000; Do Céu Silva et al., 2006; Ferreira & Boley, 1991; Muller, Berry, Avelino, & 
Bieysse, 2009).  
CLR “burst dramatically on the scene in late 2012” infecting coffee trees from 
Mexico to Peru (Vandermeer, Jackson, & Perfecto, 2014, p. 210). CLR has been a 
constant presence in Latin America since the 1970s, however an especially damaging 
outbreak occurred in 2012. No rigorous studies have established the cause of this 
epidemic. One preliminary study suspected that the outbreak was caused in part from 
temporary weather conditions; La Niña brought heavy rain and sunlight reductions in 
2011-2012, which are two main predictors of CLR growth (Cristancho, Rozo, Escobar, 
Rivillas, & Gaitán, 2012). Other preliminary studies point to more complex ecological 
interactions and long-term climate change is causing an increasing the risk of CLR 
(Ghini, Bettoil, & Hamada, 2011; Schieber, 1972; Vandermeer, Jackson, & Perfecto, 
2014).    
Anecdotal reports on the 2012 CLR outbreak in Guatemala have indicated that 
producers lost hundreds of millions of dollars, food insecurity and migration increased, 
and farmers shifted to other crops and off-farm employment (Agren, 8 July, 2014; 
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Castillo & Aleman, 31 May, 2014; Dardon, 2013; FEWS NET, 2014; Kahn, 28 July, 
2014; Palencia, 4 July, 2014; Sanchez, Rizzo, & Ortiz, 20 February, 2013; Tran, 16 
October, 2013; World Coffee Research, 2013). However, these reports are anecdotal in 
nature. One peer-reviewed study of coffee production in southern Mexico estimated 
yield losses from CLR would be 40-50 percent. In the study’s test plot, 60 percent of the 
coffee trees experienced more than 80 percent defoliation and nine percent died 
completely (Vandemeer, Jackson, & Perfecto, 2014). As of 2014, no peer-reviewed 
studies have been published examining the effects of the 2012 CLR outbreak on food 
security and livelihoods of Central American coffee producers. 
Food Security, Vulnerabilities, and Guatemalan Smallholder Coffee Producers 
Defining food security 
Food security first became a guiding concept for international development and 
aid agencies following the world food crisis of 1972-1974 and successive famines in 
Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1970s and 1980s (Maxwell & Smith, 1993). Food security 
remains a flexible concept that has “evolved, developed, multiplied, and diversified” 
(Maxwell, 1996, p. 155). Food security is most commonly defined by combining three 
“pillars” or constructs: availability, access, and utilization (Barrett, 2010, p. 825). Many 
accept the FAO’s 1996 World Food Summit definition stating that food security exists, 
“when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and 
nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy 
life” (Barrett, 2010; Caswell, Mendez, & Bacon, 2012; FAO, 1996, para. 12; Maxwell et 
al., 1999; Morris, Mendez, & Olson, 2013; Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009). 
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In the 1970s and throughout the 1980s, food security was simply defined as 
whether there was enough food available (Maxwell, 1996; Pinstrup-Andersen, 2009). 
This early definition focused solely on national food availability – that food production 
met caloric consumption needs for its citizens (FAO, 1983; Reutlinger & Knapp, 1980; 
Sahn, 1989). Sen (1981) shifted the conceptualization of food security away from 
availability and toward access (Barrett, 2010; Devereux, 2009; Dilley & Boudreau, 
2001; Maxwell, 1996; Maxwell and Smith, 1993). Sen (1981) found that acute food 
insecurity during famines was not caused by a sudden food availability decline (FAD), 
but by the failure to “command” food which he called food entitlement decline (FED). 
While FED can accompany a FAD, Sen (1981) argued that acute food insecurity was 
caused by people’s loss of food entitlements categorized as (1) trade based entitlements 
allowing people to obtain food through legitimate trade; (2) production-based 
entitlements allowing people to produce food (or non-agricultural goods) which could be 
traded or sold for food; (3) labor entitlements allowing people to use the value of their 
labor to acquire food; and (4) inheritance or transfer entitlements allowing people to 
acquire food from family members or a government entity. 
The third pillar of food security is utilization. Utilization focuses on whether food 
is biologically utilized as intended. While nutritious and abundant food may be 
available, people can remain food insecure if diseases and unsanitary conditions prevent 
their bodies from absorbing nutrients and caloric energy. Diarrheal diseases from 
unclean water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) cause malnutrition (Checkley et al., 
2008; Humphrey, 2009; Korpe & Petri, 2012). 
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 Two additional constructs included in the FAO’s 1996 definition of food security 
are distribution (i.e. “all people”) and stability (i.e. “at all times”). Stability implies that 
people can be food secure for part of the year while other parts of the year they may 
suffer from acute food insecurity. One example of this is what is known as the “hunger” 
or “lean” season when farmers have invested all or nearly all of their financial resources 
in their crops, however the crops are not yet mature enough to be eaten. The hunger 
season can be typified as a cyclical threat to food security; it usually occurs every year 
during the same period. For Guatemalan coffee farmers in the western highlands, the 
hunger season lasts from April to August, however the period varies according to 
elevation, the variety of coffee grown, and other considerations (FEWS NET, 2014). 
Other examples which test the stability of food security are one-time disruptions caused 
by a natural disaster, drought, or conflict. Distribution is the final construct that is most 
commonly included when defining food security. Food is not always distributed equally 
within a household or within a community. Research has shown that food is allocated 
according to gender, age, and relative social position (Haddad, Peña, Nishida, 
Quisumbing, & Slack, 1996).  
Household food security 
 Food security originally focused on the (a) objective measurements of (b) food 
availability at (c) the national level. Maxwell (1996) identified three “post-modern” food 
security paradigm shifts toward (a) subjective perceptions of food insecurity; (b) 
focusing on members of household and individuals; (c) taking a broader view of food 
security as one of many needs within a livelihood strategy. Barrett (2010) argued that 
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food security access was an “inherently multidimensional concept” which takes into 
account uneven inter and intra household food distribution, socioeconomic factors, and 
cultural practices (p. 825). Evaluating household food security can be problematic as 
individual members of households typically experience food insecurity differently and 
have different coping mechanisms (Maxwell & Smith, 1993). Pinstrup-Andersen (2009) 
noted that a household is food secure if “it has the ability to acquire the food needed by 
its members” (p. 6). Though measurement might be more difficult, examining household 
food security can be more reliable in understanding the household’s food security needs, 
changes in income, seasonal/cyclical changes, consumption patterns, the procurement, 
and the distribution of food across gender, age, and social position that individual food 
security assessments neglect (Corbett, 1988; Frankenberger, 1996; Frankenberger & 
Goldstein, 1990; Kennedy & Peters, 1992; Maxwell & Smith, 1993; Maxwell, 1996).  
 Measuring household food security usually takes into account the household size 
and composition, income sources, access to credit, land ownership, and understanding 
the flow of income and assets into not only food acquisition, but also school fees, 
housing, agricultural investment, and small business investment (Haddad, Kennedy, & 
Sullivan, 1994; Pinstrup-Anderson, 2009). Coates’ et al. (2006) meta-analysis of 22 
scales of household food security across 15 countries found four valid measurement 
domains: (a) uncertainty and worry; (b) inadequate quality; (c) insufficient quantity, and 
(d) social unacceptability. The authors suggested that while culture can affect the 
perceptions and experiences of food insecurity, these four domains (and in addition, 12 
subdomains) could be used as a valid measure across cultures for household food 
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security. One final issue to consider is how perceptions affect food security. Early 
measures of food security were objective – 24-hour food consumption recall surveys, 
anthropometric (e.g. height and weight z scores) measures of children, and cataloging 
household income. However, researchers have found that the subjective feelings of risk 
and the fear of becoming food insecure should be factored into food security 
measurements as these perceptions have been found to affect how a household reacts to 
challenges to their food security (Coates et al., 2006; Maxwell, 1996).   
Food security of smallholder coffee producers in Guatemala 
It is not well understood how smallholder coffee producers in Central America 
are affected by food insecurity, although there is evidence that changes in food security 
affect coffee production modalities (Bacon et al., 2008; Jaffee, 2007; Morris, Mendez, & 
Olson, 2013). Several studies show evidence that food insecurity in Central American 
coffee-growing communities is a concern (Caswell, Mendez, & Bacon, 2012; FEWS 
NET, 2014; Mendez, Bacon, Olson, Morris, & Shattuck, 2010). In one survey of almost 
500 smallholder coffee farmers in four Central American counties, 63 percent of 
respondents reported being food insecure during at least one part of the year (Mendez, 
Bacon, Olson, Morris, & Shattuck, 2010); another study found 67 percent of households 
in Mexico, Guatemala, and Nicaragua were food insecure for at least three months out of 
the year (Fujisaka, 2007), and in another survey, 97 percent of El Salvadorian coffee 
farmers reported there being at least one period of food insecurity during the year 
(Morris, Mendez, & Olson, 2013). Bacon et al. (2010) found smallholder Nicaraguan 
coffee producing households experienced on average 3.15 months of food insecurity. 
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Central American coffee producers suffer from cyclical food insecurity. One lean season 
lasts from December to February when coffee is being harvested, and another from April 
to September when coffee competes with subsistence crops for inputs, although these 
times vary by region (Bacon et al., 2014; Caswell, Mendez, & Bacon, 2012; Morris, 
Mendez, & Olson, 2013).       
Smallholder Guatemalan coffee growers face several livelihood obstacles. Coffee 
is usually grown with subsistence crops on steep slopes, in thin soils, which are 
dependent on rain (Bacon et al., 2014). Smallholder coffee farmers in Guatemala have to 
decide how to allocate scarce household resources between coffee and subsistence crop 
inputs, other household expenditures such as school fees and health care, while also 
forecasting weather and market prices (Caswell, Mendez, & Bacon, 2012; Morris, 
Mendez, & Olson, 2013; Steinberg & Taylor, 2009). Thus, coffee farmers face multiple 
risks. The livelihood strategies for smallholder coffee producing households are diverse. 
Off-farm employment, providing labor for other smallholder coffee producers, and 
working for wages on large coffee estates are commonly part of livelihood strategies. 
Coffee laborers are routinely paid $2-$6 per day. Pay can be based on pounds of cherries 
collected during harvest season. Despite regulations pertaining to child labor, 
Guatemalan children routinely work in the coffee fields with their parents (Gresser & 
Tickell, 2002; Jha et al., 2011; Pendergrast, 2010).  
Vulnerabilities 
Guatemalan coffee farmers’ vulnerability to food insecurity is one way the CLR 
epidemic could affect food security and coffee production. Food security-related 
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vulnerability consists of external risks, shocks, stresses, and the difficulty in coping the 
risks, shocks, and stresses (Chambers, 1989; Dilley & Boudreau, 2001; Frankenberger, 
1996; Watts & Bohle, 1993). For smallholder Guatemalan coffee farmers, vulnerability 
can be affected by long-term climate change, weather variability, natural hazards (e.g. 
hurricanes), plant diseases and pests (e.g. coffee rust), the prices of agricultural inputs, 
consumer goods prices, and the price of coffee (Adger, 2006; Bacon et al., 2014; Eakin 
& Luers, 2006; Scoones, 1998). Lovendal and Knowles (2006) stressed that “Because 
vulnerability is linked to the uncertainty of events, everyone is vulnerable to food 
insecurity, but some more so than others. Vulnerability can be thought of as a 
continuum” (p. 4). Households with the most assets are the least likely to be vulnerable 
(Swift, 1989). Integrating vulnerability analyses into food security measurements helps 
identify causes and food security improvements (Lovendal & Knowles, 2006). Dilley 
and Boudreau (2001) developed a three point vulnerability analysis: (a) the possibility of 
events happening which cause food insecurity; (b) relative susceptibility to these events; 
and (c) the likelihood of harm resulting from the inability to cope. 
Livelihoods: Coffee Farmers’ Food Security Coping Mechanisms and Adaptation 
Strategies 
 The livelihoods model takes into account all assets, resources, and the 
capabilities people have to overcome food security-related vulnerabilities (Bebbington, 
1999; Scoones, 1998). Scoones (1998) expanded on this definition by outlining a 
livelihoods framework consisting of human capital (e.g. health, education), physical 
capital (e.g. farm inputs, equipment), social capital (e.g. cooperatives, social networks), 
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financial capital (e.g. credit, savings), and natural capital (e.g. forests, water). The 
livelihoods approach to food security-related vulnerabilities provides researchers with a 
comprehensive understanding of assets, capabilities, and how those two are employed to 
avert food insecurity. Using a livelihoods approach can provide strategies for long-term 
change (Scoones, 1998). 
Bacon, Läderach, Haggar, Götz, and Ovalle (2014) noted climate change, high 
migration rates, and declining soil fertility threaten Arabica coffee growing areas in 
Central America. To decrease food security-related vulnerabilities, Central American 
smallholder coffee farmers diversify their livelihoods (Bacon, Läderach, Haggar, Götz, 
& Ovalle, 2014; Caswell, Mendez, & Bacon, 2012; Fischer & Victor, 2014; Morris, 
Mendez, & Olson, 2013; Tucker, Eakin, & Castellanos, 2010). Livelihood 
diversification can be thought of as “the process by which households construct a diverse 
portfolio of activities and social support capabilities…to improve their standard of 
living” (Ellis, 1999, p. 2). Livelihood adaptation is the choices made to enhance security 
and wealth or reduce vulnerability and poverty (Davies & Hossain, 1997). “Coping 
mechanisms” are defined as short-term responses to acute vulnerabilities (e.g. rapid rise 
of food prices) while “adaptive strategies” are defined as long-term changes to 
livelihoods (Davies, 1993; Maxwell, 1996). Livelihoods diversification, adaptation, and 
coping mechanisms are the three methods smallholder coffee farmers mitigate the effects 
of rising food insecurity and coffee production losses. 
 One qualitative study of coping mechanisms in coffee producing households in 
El Salvador described borrowing money from family or friends, eating less, modifying 
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diets, seeking off-farm employment, selling livestock, using savings, and borrowing 
food (Morris, Mendez, & Olson, 2013). These findings are similar to Maxwell’s (1996) 
hierarchy of food security-related coping mechanisms, which from least to most severe 
include: eating less preferred foods, limiting portion size, borrowing money or food, 
maternal buffering (where the mother eats less so that her children have more), skipping 
some meals, and skipping eating for whole days. Some coping mechanisms may lessen 
temporary food insecurity but threaten long-term livelihoods. For example, taking 
children out of school to work or selling seeds that would be needed for the following 
year’s planting, may lessen short-term food insecurity, but threaten long-term 
livelihoods (Jha et al., 2011). Tucker, Eakin, and Castellanos (2010) found migration 
among coffee producers in Mexico and Central America were short-term coping 
mechanisms rather than long-term adaptive strategies to market and weather shocks. 
Another method Central American smallholder coffee farmers use to diversify 
livelihoods is to devote a portion of their land to grow subsistence food crops such as 
corn and beans (Eakin, Tucker, & Castellanos, 2006; Fischer & Victor, 2014). 
Summary 
Coffee has dominated Guatemala’s economy, politics, and social development 
for many years. The 1999-2001 coffee crisis served as the inflection point when coffee 
production changed from an activity controlled by a small number of large landowners 
and protected by the government to an essential crop for thousands of smallholder 
farmers. Many Guatemalan smallholder coffee farmers cultivate rain-fed, high altitude, 
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“premium” HB or SHB Arabica. These growing conditions lend to higher rates of 
disease.  
 In 2012, a CLR epidemic surprised most with is devastating effects on 
Guatemalan coffee production. Anecdotal reports of the 2012 CLR outbreak in 
Guatemala indicated that producers lost hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of 
production, food insecurity increased and livelihoods were threatened. Food security 
remains a flexible concept, but which considers the ability to purchase food (access), 
food availability, biological utilization (e.g. through proper sanitation), stability over 
time, and distribution within and among households. Guatemalan smallholder coffee 
farmers were at risk of several food-security related vulnerabilities, of which the 2012 
CLR epidemic appeared to have exacerbated. The livelihoods model takes into account 
all assets, resources, and the capabilities people have to overcome food security-related 
vulnerabilities. To preserve livelihoods, smallholder coffee farmers in Guatemala, and 
other regions of Central America, utilize short-term coping mechanisms (e.g. eating less; 
borrowing money; skipping meals) and long-term diversification strategies (e.g. 
migrating in search of work; switching production to other crops).  
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
Research Design 
This research used a qualitative instrumental case study methodology to develop 
a grounded theory based on a rich description and analysis of how one Guatemalan 
coffee cooperative in the western highlands was affected by the CLR epidemic. The case 
provided a supportive role of understanding the issue of the CLR effects on the coffee 
industry (Merriam, 2009). The researcher used the instrumental case study methodology 
as it was specifically suited to “provide insight into an issue” (Stake, 2005, p. 437). 
There is a lack of knowledge about how the CLR epidemic in Guatemala affects food 
insecurity and livelihoods of smallholder coffee farmers (Caswell, Mendez, & Bacon, 
2012; Mendez, Bacon, Olson, Morris, & Shattuck, 2010; Morris, Mendez, & Olson, 
2013). Merriam (2009) defined a case study as “an in-depth description and analysis of a 
bounded system” (p. 43). 
The bounded system consisted of 10 producers of a coffee cooperative in one 
smallholder coffee farming community, Finca Santa Anita La Union (referred from now 
on as “Santa Anita”). The cooperative members served as the basis of the case study as 
they were a (a) social group (b) of relatively new smallholder coffee producers (c) and 
who were affected by the CLR outbreak. The 10 members formed the Asociación de 
Productores de Santa Anita (APCASA), or in English, the Santa Anita Coffee Producers 
Association. Each member of APCASA was a smallholder coffee holder with 
approximately 30 cuerdas (~3 acres) of land. The members began farming coffee in 
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Santa Anita in 1998. The members (or an immediate family member) participated in the 
organized guerilla movement that fought government forces between 1960 and 1996.  
The government loaned the members funds to purchase the finca in 1998 through a 
guerilla reintegration program authorized by the 1996 Peace Accords. Santa Anita is one 
of several smallholding coffee communities in the area which was founded by former 
guerilla fighters. 
Sampling Design 
Purposive nonprobabilistic sampling was used to understand, describe and 
interpret data; statistical generalizability to a population was not an objective of this 
research. Creswell (2007) noted that case studies involve collecting multiple sources of 
information from observations, interviews, documents, and audiovisual material. 
Theoretical sampling was used to achieve maximum variation. Maximum variation is the 
process by which the researcher attempts to collect data on varying instances of the 
phenomenon, in some cases, purposely searching for instances of incongruence with 
existing data (Merriam, 2009). Glaser and Strauss (1967) described theoretical sampling 
as “the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly 
collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next and where” 
(p. 45). Theoretical sampling is an “evolving process,” however Merriam (2009) argued 
that determining sample selection criteria was essential in qualitative research (p. 80). 
The sample selection criteria used to begin this research were: 
1. Members of one coffee cooperative residing in one community who were
(a) socio-economically vulnerable; and (b) who considered coffee 
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production as an important livelihood activity, and (c) whose coffee 
production was affected by the CLR epidemic in 2012. 
2. Members of governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
providing technical and social assistance to Guatemalans in response to 
the CLR epidemic. 
3. Coffee researchers, scientists, and industry representatives who work or
have worked in Guatemala. 
The researcher attempted to collect all relevant information about the bounded 
case. Data were collected to reach a point of saturation. Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 
(2006) argued data saturation is reached quicker the more homogeneous the participants 
are, the more structured the data collection instrument is (e.g. an interview protocol), and 
the complexity of the content that is being pursued. The concept of saturation in 
nonprobabilistic qualitative research is when one reaches the point where no new 
information or themes are observed in the data. 
Researcher’s role 
The researcher sought and received permission from Texas A&M University’s 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) to conduct this research. The researcher had eight 
years of experience working, living, and conducting research in Guatemala. The 
principal investigator’s prior research was conducted on the adoption rates of improved 
cookstoves (Bielecki & Wingenbach, 2014a) and social perceptions of food security in 
Guatemala (Bielecki & Wingenbach, 2014b). A Guatemalan professional reference put 
the researcher into contact with one member of APCASA. The APCASA member 
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invited the researcher in September of 2014 to visit the cooperative. The researcher 
visited the cooperative in October of 2014 and expressed an interest to the members in 
returning at a later date to carry out research and volunteer with coffee production. After 
the researcher received approval from Texas A&M University’s IRB, he made three 
visits; each visit lasted approximately five full days in late November through December 
2014. The researcher conducted research in Santa Anita while also serving as a 
voluntario or international volunteer helping APCASA members with all facets of coffee 
production. 
Case description 
Santa Anita is approximately 5 kilometers west-southwest of Colomba Costa 
Cuca (most commonly referred to as Colomba; sometimes abbreviated to Colomba C.C.) 
in the Quetzaltenango department (Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Study site location. The blue star indicates the study site location. The largest 
towns nearest the study site are Coatepeque approximately 15 km west and 
Quetzaltenango 50 km northeast (Central Intelligence Agency, 2001). 
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The community is located on what was a privately owned coffee finca that been 
producing coffee for at least 100 years. Santa Anita produces coffee at an altitude of 
1075 meters or 3,500 feet above sea level. Santa Anita is within a region known as 
Guatemala’s “Boca Costa” (Figure 4), a 30 km strip of foothills that descend from the 
country’s western highlands (El Antiplano) to the coastal plain. The Boca Costa region 
generally enjoys rich volcanic soils, a subtropical climate, and an attitude ranging from 
2,500 and 4,000 feet above sea level.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Guatemala's "Boca Costa" region. 
   
 
The Boca Costa region is famous for “premium” coffee cultivation. Coffea 
Arabica is the most common coffee species planted in Santa Anita which yields “hard 
bean” (high quality) coffee. Santa Anita is located on a paved road which has direct 
access to the highway connecting Colomba and Coatepeque. Coatepeque is the nearest 
major city, located approximately 15 kilometers west of Santa Anita. Santa Anita has 
37 
municipal electricity, water, sewage, and is served by one local bus route and shared 
“pickup” transport. Santa Anita was founded on February 12, 1998 by 35 families. 
Beside buildings used to process coffee, Santa Anita had one primary school with three 
classrooms, one pre-kindergarten school, several communal buildings, and a small 
chapel. 
There were approximately 35 households and 150 people living in Santa Anita 
when the researcher visited. Most of the 25 households that were not part of APCASA 
were a part of another coffee cooperative, Asociación Civil Maya de Pequeños 
Productores (ACMPA; commonly referred to as “Association Maya”). The primary 
income generating activity in Santa Anita was coffee production, although the majority 
of households had at least one person who received income from off-farm employment. 
The 10 members of APCASA had no experience farming coffee prior to 1998. Several 
members (or their spouses) grew up on coffee fincas; some had provided unskilled labor 
on coffee fincas in their youth, however no one had received formal training on any facet 
of coffee farming until arriving in Santa Anita in 1998. Prior to collecting data, all 
APCASA members reported having their income and coffee production affected by CLR 
in 2012. Each household in Santa Anita had 30 cuerdas (~3 acres) of land broken up into 
three to four parcels, in addition to one residential lot of 150 m
2
.
Data Collection Procedures 
The researcher was the primary instrument of data collection and analysis 
(Merriam, 2009). Data were collected from three main sources. The majority of the data 
collected were during visits to Santa Anita. This data consisted of semi-structured 
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interviews of APCASA members, focus group interviews of one or more members of 
APCASA, passive and active (participatory) observation during site visits, and 
photographs. Second, data were collected from publically available documents which 
pertain to APCASA and/or coffee production in Santa Anita. The third source of data 
consisted of semi-structured interviews with key informants who had experience 
working with members of APCASA and/or extensive experience in smallholder 
Guatemalan coffee production. 
Research instruments were developed in English and Spanish. The researcher 
used four instruments to collect data. Semi-structured and focus group interviews of 
APCASA cooperative members were conducted according to an interview protocol 
(Appendix A). This protocol consisted of 57 questions placed in six categories: 
Introduction, coffee production, livelihoods, coffee rust and food security, outside 
assistance, and conclusions. During most interviews, approximately 20 to 25 questions 
were asked from the protocol, depending on information the interviewee provided. Semi-
structured interviews of key informants who were not members of APCASA were 
conducted using a protocol (Appendix B). The key informant protocol was divided into 
two sections, one section pertained to members of international organizations and the 
other section pertained to members of Guatemalan organizations. There were 20 possible 
questions for members of international organizations and 15 questions for members of 
Guatemalan organizations. During most interviews, approximately 10 to 15 questions 
were asked from the protocol, depending on information the interviewee provided. 
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All interviewees were fluent in Spanish and/or English; no Mayan language 
translators were needed. All interviewed research subjects were 18 years of age or older. 
The researcher transcribed what each interviewee said during the interview. Attempts 
were made to transcribe the interviewees word for word, however at times it was 
impossible for the researcher to write down the exact words of the interviewee during 
the interview. Interviews lasted from 20 minutes to 90 minutes for both groups. 
Additional questions, related to but not listed on the protocols, were asked if deemed 
relevant. Interviews were conducted indoors, outdoors, during periods of labor, and were 
sometimes interrupted by other activities. 
The researcher used two additional data collection instruments: A reflexive 
research memo protocol (Appendix C) and a livelihoods framework analysis checklist 
(Appendix D). These instruments were used to collect data from passive and active 
(participatory) observation during site visits, documents, and photographs. The 
livelihoods framework analysis checklist was adapted from Scoones’ (2009) sustainable 
livelihoods framework checklist. The checklist draws “on diverse disciplinary 
perspectives and [cuts] across sectoral boundaries” to analyze “complex, highly dynamic 
rural contexts” (Scoones, 2009, p. 183). The livelihoods framework analysis checklist 
(Appendix D) was used to guide data collection. Data were collected in reflexive 
research memos (Appendix C) and photographs taken on-site by the researcher. 
According to Birks, Chapman, and Francis (2008), memoing in qualitative research is 
useful in recording decisions such as sampling, data collection, and analysis, and making 
sense of data during the research process. The researcher wrote memos on-site to log 
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research activity reports and field notes. Field note memos were used to collect 
observations, thoughts, and questions for further inquiry pertaining to the data. 
Data Analysis 
The researcher transcribed all data, except photographs. The transcribed data 
were reduced and given individual codes. Data were reduced by examining each stand-
alone interview and memo individually. Segments of data were separated out to be 
coded if they were (a) meaningful (or potentially meaningful) to one or more of the 
research questions (Merriam, 2009); and (b) were “the smallest piece of information 
about something that can stand by itself” (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 345). Data segments 
were identified according to an auditing system (Table 1). With the audit tag, data 
segments cited in the analysis, results, and discussion phases could be referred back its 
location and context in the raw data. The audit tag combined the data type and source 
and separated the number identifier with a period. 
Table 1. Data Auditing System. 
Code Category Code Code Explanation 
Data Type SI, KI, RR, DA  SI: Site interview (includes focus group 
interviews) 
KI: Key informant interview 
RR: Researcher reflection 
DA: Document analysis 
Data Source 1-999 Data sources within each type were given a 
number value.  
Number Identifier 1-999 The segment of data within each data 
source was numbered.  
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For example, the twelfth data segment from a site interview (SI) of APCASA 
member two would be coded SI2.12. The fourth data segment from research reflection 
(RR) memo one would be coded RR1.4. 
Data were analyzed using the constant comparative method of data analysis 
(Glaser, 1965; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Specifically, data were analyzed in three stages 
using Strauss’ (1987) progressive coding scheme of open, axial, and selective coding. 
Tesch (1990) described open coding as analyzing data line-by-line for actions, 
behaviors, events, or other observations. This first stage of data analysis consisted of the 
researcher breaking down the data into segments and given codes. During the open 
coding stage, data segments were sorted into preliminary themes related to the four 
research questions. The preliminary themes helped answer the research questions by 
providing context, meaning, and information. During the second stage, axial coding was 
used to examine data pertaining to each theme. Axial coding was also used to make 
connections between the themes or to create entirely new themes. Finally, selective 
coding was used to form discrete themes which brought new meaning, context, and 
information to one or more research questions (Tesch, 1990). Open, axial, and selective 
coding follow a pattern of refinement and reduction, however the researcher followed 
Strauss’ (1987) guidance to continue open and axial coding even after moving on to 
selective coding. The researcher wrote “theoretical memos” using the reflexive research 
memo template (Appendix C) during the open coding stage to induce meaning (Strauss, 
1987, p. 32). 
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Establishing Credibility, Consistency, and Transferability 
Credibility (referred to as internal validity in quantitative research) was 
established by collecting data from multiple sources (i.e. triangulation). Data were 
triangulated through interviews of cooperative members, key informants, researcher 
observations, and document analyses (for the list of documents used to triangulate 
findings, see Appendix G). Respondent validation, which allows respondents to view, 
comment on, or revise what they said (e.g. during an interview) or did (e.g. based on 
observations by the researcher) was used to increase credibility (Merriam, 2009). The 
researcher interviewed each cooperative member at least twice. The researcher reviewed 
key points made during the previous interview and requested that the interviewee modify 
their answers if they desired. Extended engagement with the community was also be 
used to increase credibility (Merriam, 2009). The researcher visited the community on 
three separate occasions, each visit lasting five full days. The researcher was fluent in 
Spanish and freely interacted with the residents of Santa Anita. The researcher slept in 
cooperative members houses and took all meals with cooperative members. 
The researcher established consistency (referred to as reliability in quantitative 
research) through the use of an audit trail, data triangulation, and reflexivity (Merriam, 
2009). The audit trail consisted of the data auditing system (Table 1) of raw data, and 
also included dated personal notes, instrument development information, and proposal 
documents (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Reflexivity, which is the process by which the 
researcher reflects upon him/herself as the primary instrument of data collection and 
analysis, was addressed through the reflexive research memo instrument (Appendix C). 
43 
Peer checking, which is a process whereby the researcher shares preliminary findings, 
conclusions, and analyses with experts was used to increase credibility and consistency. 
Transferability (referred to as external validity in quantitative research), was 
established by providing rich descriptions of the findings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; 
Merriam, 2009). Rich “thick” descriptions of qualitative data are highly descriptive 
presentations of the setting and findings which help readers apply the findings in other 
contexts.   
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
All of the results are associated with the original four original research questions, 
however because this research used a qualitative case study methodology following the 
naturalistic inquiry paradigm, the results are holistically presented by describing how 
one smallholder Guatemalan coffee cooperative was affected by the coffee leaf rust 
(CLR). The following seven themes were found during data analysis. They are described 
in greater detail in this chapter. 
 The 2012 CLR epidemic represented one crisis of many for APCASA.
 The CLR brought significant changes to APCASA’s livelihoods strategy.
 Despite setbacks, coffee would remain APCASA’s focus.
 APCASA employed a wide range of coping mechanisms to fight CLR.
 Livelihood diversification was viewed as an undesirable necessity
 Assistance from external organizations represented friendship and frustration
for APCASA. 
 The lure of the international market excited APCASA’s producers.
Unless otherwise noted, the researcher took all photographs presented in this section 
from November to December 2014. 
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Theme One: CLR Was One Crisis of Many 
APCASA members perceived the CLR as one crisis of many they faced in their 
lives. One member recalled the early years in Santa Anita, “Our first priority was 
[housing]. Our other priority was coffee. And so within these priorities we had a series 
of crises. First, with cultivating coffee, we had crises of prices. And now we have a crisis 
with the roya” (SI.11.4).  Members described the crises they faced beginning first as 
children of poor peasants. Later the crises continued during their time as guerilla 
fighters. After becoming smallholder coffee producers, members described a series of 
crises continually affected their livelihoods. The CLR was perceived as a crisis that 
devastated members’ livelihoods, but nonetheless, was viewed as “just one more” crisis 
to affect the community. To understand how Santa Anita’s farmers were coping with the 
CLR epidemic, it was necessary to understand from where and how they arrived as 
coffee farmers whose livelihoods were affected by the roya in 2012. 
The crisis of history 
All members described their childhoods as poor peasants. Most APCASA 
members were from the department of San Marcos who grew up on coffee plantations. 
In school, as children of peasants, some recalled discrimination against Mayan descent; 
being called “Indio pendejo” (stupid Indian), getting struck by the teacher, and made to 
sit in the back of the classroom (SI.8.1; SI.8.2). Their families usually lived on coffee 
plantations and had little or no land of their own with which to grow food. APCASA’s 
members frequently described feeling as though they were born into a crisis. Many 
described having a growing sense of inequality as they witnessed how the foreign-born 
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or ladino (of Spanish descent) children of finca owners were treated better than the poor 
landless children of farm laborers.  
All of the members of APCASA decided to (or a direct family member) 
participate as armed members of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (known 
by its Spanish acronym, URNG) in varying years and duration (SI.1.4). The URNG was 
the leftist guerilla group that fought government forces during Guatemala’s 30-year civil 
war from 1960 to 1996. APCASA members described the difficulties of losing friends, 
family, and community members during the armed resistance (Figure 5). They spent 
their time sleeping in the mountains that overlooked Santa Anita, evading the military, 
concealing their participation in the movement from their family, and eventually seeking 
refuge in the Mexican state of Chiapas, which borders western Guatemala. For many of 
APCASA’s members, growing up poor and participating in the armed movement were 
crises that later shaped their perceptions of livelihoods when they arrived in Santa Anita. 
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Figure 5. The entrance to Santa Anita. In the forefront a sign reads "Welcome: Museum 
of the martyrs fallen in combat during the revolutionary struggle." A URNG political 
sign (an ear of corn) is to the right. The purple building is a government-funded school. 
 
 
 
When the 35 founding members of Santa Anita and their families arrived on or 
about the community’s official founding date of February 12, 1998, they were 
immediately presented with a new set of crises. The finca had been abandoned for many 
years, along with many other fincas in the area, because of low coffee prices (KI.4.9; 
SI.5.1). Santa Anita’s coffee trees were past their producing prime and had not been 
pruned or otherwise cared for in many years. One mentioned that the “coffee land was 
almost lost, almost like how it just grows wild sometimes” (SI.9.3). The mozos, or 
permanent coffee laborers who lived on the finca’s property were working on other 
fincas. The indebted absentee owner had not been paying the mozos for “some time” 
(SI.5.2). There was no improved water or sewage service, and electricity existed only in 
the administrator’s house. There was no housing for the 35 families; only a handful of 
one or two room “ranchitos” or cottages existed (SI.13.10). The biggest crisis was lack 
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of water. As one APCASA woman member recalled, “With water, we suffered a lot. The 
women especially [suffered]. There was no water. There is no river close to us” 
(SI.13.2). The women had to travel long distances to streams to which they would have 
to carry water in buckets back to their houses. At the time of the researcher’s visit, there 
were two streams near the residences. Each stream was approximately 500 meters from 
the closest residence. The paths to the streams from the residences were rocky, uneven, 
and steep. 
Beside the lack of infrastructure, deciding how to make a living as coffee farmers 
presented the second crisis for the new residents of Santa Anita. Some possessed cursory 
knowledge about coffee. Most APCASA members came from coffee producing areas in 
San Marcos, however as one said, “Some of us knew a little, because I worked a little bit 
when I was young in coffee. But as a process, I didn’t know anything about coffee 
production specifically” (SI.1.5). Some members grew up in the mountains or tierra fria 
(cold land) and had never seen coffee cultivated (SI.2.15). As one member mentioned, 
“Also a lot of people who worked in coffee, worked for the boss, so they didn’t know 
how to work for themselves. It’s very different going from being a worker to a producer” 
(SI.8.5). One member reported that, “Well all of us came at the same time here. We all 
learned how to grow coffee together. Nobody knew anything about [coffee production] 
before. All we knew about was how to wage war. So we came here full of ignorance” 
(SI.9.1).  
The Fondo de Tierras, or Government-run Land Fund organization, was created 
to address land distribution inequality after the civil war ended. The Fondo de Tierras 
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helped organize the sale of the finca to the new residents of Santa Anita. The Fondo de 
Tierras was the first external organization tasked to help the new coffee cooperative. 
The Fondo de Tierras provided agronomists to teach the new residents how to farm and 
produce coffee, however many interviewed by the researcher placed little value on this 
early technical assistance (SI.1.6). 
The first priority when members arrived in 1998 was to build the community. 
The members resisted calls by the government-provided civil engineers to construct 
homes on small lots. The engineers suggested that one area be devoted to residential lots, 
and each lot should be 10 meters in width and 15 meters in depth, however Santa Anita’s 
early leaders decided on constructing three residential areas with each lot measuring 20 
meters in width and 30 meters in depth (Figure 6). The deep lots allowed members to 
grow trees for fuel wood, fruit trees, vegetables, and to raise animals (SI.2.50). 
Figure 6. Residences in Santa Anita. 
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The second objective for the new members was to rehabilitate the coffee and 
banana producing capabilities of the finca (SI.2.5; SI.11.3; DA.22). The third and final 
objective was to “develop socially” (SI.2.5). As one early leader said, “This third 
objective was difficult as we were busy with the first two. So we were starting a new 
life” (SI.2.5). Members also realized in retrospect that education suffered in these early 
years as schooling was perceived as having little value in producing coffee (SI.11.3). 
The crisis of coffee prices 
Although APCASA members who were interviewed admitted their inability to 
precisely recall specific dates and figures, several told a similar story of their disastrous 
first “formal” coffee harvest. Initially, all adult male Santa Anita residents worked 
collectively to produce coffee. The community’s junta, or governing body, directed 
workers to specific coffee production tasks, and profits were shared by all equally. The 
first harvest netted 400 quintales (100 pounds is equal to 1 quintal) of coffee in 
pergamino (dried coffee beans ready for export, but still encased within the hard outer 
shell that must be mechanically removed before roasting). Although no APCASA 
member was able to remember the exact year of the first harvest, it was between 1999 
and 2001. The price of one quintal of coffee was selling for approximately 600 quetzales 
in the time leading up to the harvest. The leaders decided to hold the coffee before 
selling it. They hoped prices would increase from Q600 to perhaps Q800. Instead, 
members remembered feeling shocked and depressed that the price went from Q600 to 
Q200 (SI.12.3; KI.1.11; SI.12.1). The cooperative finally sold their 400 quintales of 
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coffee to coyotes (coffee purchasing middlemen) in Coatepeque. To make matters worse, 
one member remembered 
The coyote never even paid us half of what he owed us for the coffee we sold 
him! And many of us had debts with local people for the labor costs to produce 
the coffee. So, because of this, we had to pay these the debts and sell the coffee 
at this really low price. We sold the coffee to coyotes in Coatepeque. We lost a 
lot! And the coyote didn’t pay us completely for the coffee, even today. He has 
never paid us completely! (SI.14.2) 
Another APCASA member recalled, “To pay for the coffee workers and my food, I had 
to sell my crop for [Q200]” (SI.3.26). One document published in 2005, recorded Santa 
Anita’s first harvest (of which the members were most likely recalling in the previous 
paragraph) as occurring in 2001. According to the document, this harvest netted 700 
quintales and each quintal sold for 240 quetzales (DA.23.1). 
Unfortunately, the new residents of Santa Anita began producing coffee during 
the “global coffee crisis” which reduced coffee prices to one of their lowest levels ever 
recorded. Before the crisis, coffee in the Colomba area sold for approximately Q1,300 to 
Q1,500 for a quintal of pergamino. Echoing the experience of Santa Anita’s residents, 
one key informant who still grew coffee on his family’s 500 cuerda finca in the same 
area as Santa Anita recalled, “During the crisis, coffee [sold for] Q200 to Q300 for each 
quintal. This was a serious crisis for many years. Many coffee producers suffered. They 
lost their fincas” (KI.1.11). This producer’s yield went from 1,800 quintales to 250 
during the crisis years. His family had no money to invest in fertilizers, fumigation, and 
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labor (KI.1.13). Fortunately, prices for Guatemalan SHB and HB coffee improved after 
2002. The price for one quintal increased to a level between Q900 and Q1000 between 
2002 and 2005 (SI.12.3). Thus, Santa Anita began their coffee production at one of, if 
not the worst, time for new entrants to the market. 
The crisis of money: Santa Anita’s debt 
APCASA’s members were given credit to purchase the abandoned finca in 1998 
through the Fondo de Tierras. However this “credit” quickly turned into a debt. One 
member said, “The government lent us credit to purchase this finca. But they did not 
give us this land. Sometimes the government says they handed over land to us, but it’s 
important to know that they didn’t give us anything” (SI.2.2). The APCASA members 
that the researcher interviewed admitted they were not sure exactly how much they had 
originally borrowed collectively. They were also unsure of how much they owed 
individually. Two of those interviewed believed the debt to be between Q24,000 and 
Q25,000 and that the original loan was for between Q800,000 to Q900,000. Another 
member believed that the original loan burden for each member was Q65,000 and that 
the total amount owed was Q1,600,000, but that it had been reduced down to Q25,000 
(SI.2.3; SI 13.3; SI.6.8). One document noted that the loan from Fondo de Tierras was 
for Q2,062,500 (DA.23.2). There was still much uncertainty about how much each 
member owed, because the government had been reducing the land debts of Santa Anita 
and neighboring smallholder coffee communities. One key informant who was a 
member of another local coffee cooperative reported that the government reduced their 
debt substantially after they joined a national political party (KI.4.7; KI.4.11). One 
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APCASA member thought it was possible that eventually the government would reduce 
the debt that Santa Anita’s residents owed like the government had done with other 
smallholder coffee communities (SI.13.4; KI.4.8). At the time of the researcher’s visit, 
the members reported not making any payments on the debt they owed for the finca. 
While members perceived that the government would reduce the amount they 
owed, the debt represented a serious crisis for the new community, especially in the first 
years after they arrived. They were told that the annual interest on the loan was 12 
percent and that they had to begin repayments after two or three years (SI.3.38). One 
APCASA member remembered those first years in Santa Anita 
Before things were worse. The Fondo de Tierras would threaten us and tell us 
that you guys haven’t paid anything. They told us that they were going to take 
away our land and that the interest on the loan had gone up and up. So we got 
really worried, like what the heck are we going to do? I thought that since I am 
with my husband, we will each pack up a blanket, leave Santa Anita, and go to 
my sister’s house [in Guatemala City]. (SI.13.5) 
After hearing these threats, Santa Anita’s leaders appealed to the Fondo de Tierras by 
arguing that their improvements to the finca were equal to the original value of the land. 
There was no water, no roads, almost no electrical service, no formal housing, the coffee 
fields were abandoned, and all of the coffee production assets were in disrepair. They 
argued that a formal valuation of the land must be made before the Fondo de Tierras 
could carry out on their threats to remove them from Santa Anita. While nearly all of the 
APCASA members interviewed believed that the government would absolve most of the 
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debt they owed for the land, they were nonetheless worried in the early years that the 
debt burden was too much to bear. No individual member, or either of the two 
cooperatives in Santa Anita possessed the deeds to the land. Members could arrange the 
sale of their residential lots and houses through a lawyer, but not the coffee fields. One 
community member, who was a part of Association Maya, put his residence up for sale 
for Q50,000. One interviewee mentioned that the process of registering deeds had been 
slow not only because of bureaucratic inertia, but because in 1998 some of Santa Anita’s 
residents originally gave false names or names closely resembling their legal names out 
of fear (SI.8.4). 
The crisis of the environment 
While the roya had affected Guatemala’s coffee since 1984, prior to 2012, it had 
never been the main concern for coffee farmers in Santa Anita. Traditionally, the three 
most common threats to coffee production as described by members of APCASA were 
heavy rain, the broca (coffee borer beetle, Hypothenemus hampei), and the ojo de gallo 
(American leaf spot of coffee, Mycena citricolor) (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. Infected coffee plant. The tree was defoliated from the roya and subsequently 
infected with ojo de gallo (indicated by the brown-yellow round spots). 
CLR was not a serious concern for Santa Anita’s farmers until 2012 when it 
surprised everyone. As one key informant who produced coffee near Santa Anita 
explained, “If we’re speaking of general plagues, the broca is the most serious of all 
coffee diseases in the Colomba region…For us the broca was the most important plague 
against coffee production. It wasn’t the roya, it was the broca. So, if you did not control 
the broca, your coffee production would decrease” (KI.1.4). Heavy rain also proved to 
be serious concern for Santa Anita’s coffee producers. 
One APCASA member recalled that finally in 2005, as a group, they felt like 
confident coffee farmers. It had taken nearly 7 years, but they were finally starting to 
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increase production. They went from producing 400 quintales of coffee in 1999-2000 to 
nearly 1000 quintales in 2005 (SI.9.22). A Catholic Relief Services (CRS) document 
listed Santa Anita’s production at 1,100 quintales in 2011 (DA.2). Santa Anita’s coffee 
farmers typically invested in their coffee trees for eight months from February to 
September and then harvested and sold coffee from October to January (coffee varieties 
ripen at slightly different periods and weather can affect harvest times). Hurricane Stan 
brought heavy rain and wind to Guatemala from October 1 to October 5, 2005. 
Hurricane Stan arrived just as harvest season was getting underway and Santa Anita’s 
farmers were hoping to recoup eight months of investment. As one member recalled, 
“we didn’t have a harvest because of the hurricane” (SI.14.3). Heavy rains and wind 
caused many of the cherries to drop prematurely. Roads and bridges were washed out 
which prevented seasonal migrants from arriving to help with the harvest. Even after 
Hurricane Stan dissipated, it rained heavily for the remainder of the month, and Santa 
Anita’s harvest “was lost” (SI.3.34). For APCASA, the environment (i.e. weather, 
climate, and pests other than the roya) created crises for Santa Anita before the roya 
epidemic in 2012.  
The crisis of community: A fragmented Santa Anita  
 From 1999 to approximately 2006-2007, all of Santa Anita’s coffee producers 
were part of one coffee producing cooperative Asociación Civil Maya de Pequeños 
Productores (ACMPA; Mayan Civil Association of Small Producers). On August 9, 
1999, 35 producers registered with this original cooperative with 980 cuerdas under 
collective production (DA.23.3). Coffee cultivation and processing was directed by an 
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elected group of farmers. They oversaw coffee farming activities, assigned workers to 
tasks, and administered funds. All producers shared profits equally. 
As Santa Anita began producing more coffee and prices rose, internal rifts began 
forming among the 35 producers. There seemed to be no single cause for the separation 
of APCASA’s 10 members from the Asociación Civil Maya de Pequeños Productores 
(commonly referred to as Association Maya). Of those interviewed, not one was able to 
articulate a single reason for the split or recall a specific event which caused the split. 
Most mentioned a growing sense of distrust, jealousy, and differences in opinion over 
leadership and strategic vision. One APCASA member recalled: 
About seven years ago we [APCASA] didn’t want to remain part of [Association 
Maya], so we became individuals. There wasn’t any development. We received 
such a small salary from what we produced, so we demanded that each one have 
their own land. If someone wanted to be lazy then they could, if one wanted to 
work, then they could work...We were making good money [when we were 
united]. But when everything was going well, the Association Maya got more 
political influence. It became like an attraction. So, several members of the 
Association Maya took power from us and they threw us out. They kicked us 10 
out and all that we constructed is now theirs (SI.1.11; SI.1.13). 
Another member noted, “Because of problems we separated from the other group. We 
could never find a solution with them. Each person now works for themselves to get 
ahead” (SI.9.15). When one member was asked if there was a possibly of reconciliation 
between the two groups, the interviewee responded, “No…no…no, that will never 
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happen. We are happy to be free of them so we can do what we want to do and they can 
do what they want to do” (RR.5.1).  
The split between the 10 producers of APCASA and the 25 producers of 
Association Maya was perhaps the most frequently spontaneously mentioned “incident” 
beside the CLR epidemic. Mention of the split came up in nearly every interview with 
the researcher, regardless of the topic or questions asked. Members of APCASA 
frequently mentioned that the members of Association Maya did not have the desire to 
work in coffee. One mentioned, “The majority of [the Association Maya producers] 
don’t want to work. Their land is abandoned. APCASA is the group that works more” 
(SI.9.15). The interviewee went on to explain that it was not fair that APCASA members 
were working harder than the other 25 producers when everyone was part of the same 
collective, “especially when [the Association Maya members] were making money 
outside while we’re working hard” (SI.9.16). Another explained that the Association 
Maya members did not have the discipline it took to produce high quality coffee for 
export; they felt it was too much work (SI.14.5). When the researcher asked one 
APCASA member if they could imagine what the Association Maya members would say 
about APCASA if the researcher interviewed someone from Association Maya, the 
APCASA member responded they would most likely claim that APCASA had been 
stealing from the cooperative.  
The split between APCASA and Association Maya was a recurrent theme with 
APCASA members. They expressed happiness for being free to work together in a 
small, but dedicated group of capable coffee farmers. Yet, they also lamented how much 
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they had lost in exchange for this independence. The Association Maya retained control 
over nearly all means of communal coffee production, which included the large drying 
patio, coffee storage buildings, a professional industrial-grade coffee roaster, the 
“ecological” (uses less water) coffee beneficio or processing mill, an industrial coffee 
bean roaster, and several smaller internationally-donated community supplies such as 
ovens to bake bread, computers, and desks.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Beneficio humedo (wet coffee processing mill). Santa Anita coffee producers 
used this beneficio until 2009 or 2010 after which the ecological beneificio was 
constructed. APCASA members were considering (as of November-December 2014) 
using the beneficio humedo again, once production increased, because the Association 
Maya would not provide them access to the ecological beneifico. The channels in the 
lower right of the picture were used to bring water from a nearby stream so that the 
coffee could be “washed”. However, a recent (in 2014) storm caused a landslide, which 
diverted the stream away from the beneficio.  
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APCASA “surrendered” possession of these things, as they wanted to completely 
sever all ties with Association Maya (RR.5.2). APCASA decided to “take” control over 
an empty field approximately 750 meters from the residential areas. APCASA members 
planned that this area would be where they could re-constitute themselves as an 
independent coffee-producing cooperative. They were also considering re-opening the 
beneficio humedo that was used by the whole community before the ecological beneficio 
was constructed (Figure 8). An international fair-trade coffee importing group and 
international student groups donated funds to build a warehouse, a coffee drying patio, 
and a motorized coffee processor (DA.1; RR.5.3). The breakup of Santa Anita into 
opposing cooperatives represented an existential crisis for APCASA. One German fair-
trade coffee exporter, Quijote Coffee, terminated their coffee purchasing agreement with 
Santa Anita because of the split. APCASA members also described the various 
international student groups and tourists who stopped arriving with the same frequency 
after the community split (Figure 9). For APCASA, they were left with no means to 
produce and market coffee. 
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Figure 9. Entrance sign to Santa Anita. As of January 2015, the website cited on the sign 
was functioning. APCASA members noted they did not have access to the website. The 
contact information listed on the website to arrange a visit do not list APCASA 
members’ names. 
 
 
The crisis of (consumer) prices 
When Santa Anita’s farmers began cultivating coffee in 1999-2000, prices 
dropped from Q600 to an all-time low of Q200 to Q240 per quintal. In 2002, prices 
began steadily rising. In November to December of 2014, APCASA members were 
content with the price of coffee. Coffee prices were generally Q1,000 for one quintal of 
pergamino although spot prices reached upward to Q1,075 if selling to the coyotes in 
Coatepeque (Figure 10) (SI.3.32; SI.5.8). 
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Figure 10. Weighing coffee. An APCASA member weighing pergamino coffee to be 
sold in Coatepeque. 
While APCASA’s farmers were happy about the price, they felt that the high 
price of consumer goods negated the high coffee prices. One interviewee said, “We 
began to suffer in the past few years because we didn’t have sufficient income to match 
the inflation of the common food expenses” (KI.2.26). Another APCASA member 
recalled the era of low coffee prices in 1999-2002: 
Although [coffee] prices were lower then, so were basic goods. So if the price of 
coffee goes up Q10, the price of meat also goes up Q3 per pound. So, I recall 
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when price of coffee was Q800, the price of cement was Q17 per quintal. But 
when the price of coffee went all the way up to Q1,200 and then back down to 
Q1,000, the price of cement is still Q73 or more. (SI.12.7) 
Another APCASA member described how difficult it was to send children to the 
university or diversificado (the approximate Guatemalan equivalent to the United States’ 
high school). He explained that diversificado costs were between Q380 to Q400 per 
month, and private universities cost Q700 to Q800 per month (SI.11.15). He said, “The 
farmer suffers a lot when his child leaves basico [middle school] for diversificado. 
Because in diversificado you have to pay, so for this reason we call it “el cuello de la 
botella” [the bottleneck]” (SI.11.13). The interviewee described that it was relatively 
easy to enroll your child in a local basico whose costs are covered by the state. However, 
diversificados were most often in larger towns and the costs were not covered by the 
state. Farmers must not only pay for enrollment, fees, books, and uniforms, but also 
transportation, which could be the costliest component of receiving an education.  
 Thus, while the price of coffee steadily increased since Santa Anita was formed, 
so had the prices of consumer goods in Guatemala. As one APCASA member said of 
higher coffee prices 
But you know what happens? The prices of basic goods are the not the same. 
They go up. So, although the price of coffee has increased; the price of coffee 
might be good, but it’s negated by the high price of food. We are blind if we just 
pay attention to the price of coffee and not the price of basic goods. So I feel we 
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are actually going back to the 1990s and 2000s [when coffee prices were low] 
(SI.12.6). 
The crisis of the roya 
 The latest and most pressing crisis perceived by APCASA was the roya (Figure 
11). The roya had always been a problem for Guatemalan coffee producers in Santa 
Anita. It regularly weakened trees and decreased yields, but was seen as “a cough” 
instead of a “major sickness” (SI.8.21). The members would usually apply relatively 
cheap, but weak copper-based fungicides. If the farmers had the resources and the 
outbreak that year was more prevalent, they would apply stronger chemical mixtures 
such as Alto 10 (with the active ingredient, cyproconazole). When the roya first appeared 
in 2012, nobody thought anything of it (KI.1.8). However, within a matter of weeks, the 
roya “surprised” APCASA and went from a “cough” that “always existed,” to a “major 
sickness” (SI.8.21). As one member described it, “All of the leaves turned orange.  
 
 
Figure 11. Roya on a Bourbon coffee tree. 
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And if you entered the coffee fields with a white shirt you would end up covered 
in orange. So the aggressiveness of the roya was incredible” (SI.8.22). Members 
reported excessive defoliation was still prevalent in most fields (Figure 12). One key 
informant, and accredited agricultural engineer with a coffee finca near Santa Anita said, 
“It started burning the leaves. Our coffee was organic. This is why the rust took 
everything. By the time I was ready to do something it was too late” (KI.1.15). Another 
APCASA member said, “The roya made all the leaves turn yellow. I had no idea that it 
was going to turn into a huge problem” (SI.3.30). APCASA members described the CLR 
outbreak as “a knockout” (SI.2.44), “aggressive and invasive” which affected the best 
types of coffee (SI.2.28), “dangerous” and “criminal” (SI.1.3), and “a suicide” (SI.1.16). 
One member described the outbreak as “a tragedy right in front of people’s eyes” 
(SI.2.29). 
Figure 12. Coffee plant weakened by the roya. 
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After APCASA got over the initial shock of the death of their coffee trees, they 
began to realize the lasting implications of the CLR outbreak. Less than two years later, 
as the researcher walked through the coffee fields, the coffee appeared green and 
healthy, however very little coffee cherries were present (Figure 13). As one member 
described it, “So you have seen the coffee trees around here. They have green leaves, but 
no harvest. These trees are only for decoration” (KI.3.29). 
Figure 13. A deceivingly healthy looking Arabica coffee tree. While the tree looked 
relatively healthy (e.g. green) and foliated, notice the small amount of cherries during 
harvest time. 
The year of the outbreak affected the farmers’ livelihoods less than subsequent 
years as APCASA was still able to harvest the cherries after the leaves had fallen off. As 
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one member described, “That first year we were still able to harvest something, but then 
[in 2013] we were stuck thinking, ‘What am I going to do now?” (SI.2.40). APCASA 
members were not sure what actions to take. They felt desperate, because they had no 
money to purchase fungicides (SI.5.16). There was panic, fear, and desperation not just 
in Santa Anita, but all across the Boca Costa, Guatemala’s southern coffee producing 
region (KI.1.41; SI.8.23; SI.5.21). 
By the time APCASA realized the CLR was turning into an epidemic, they 
perceived it to be too late to do anything. One member described feeling “like I was 
dying myself and the future of my children was now not guaranteed” (SI.10.11). While 
the roya was affecting the coffee, world coffee prices in 2012 and 2013 dropped 
approximately 50 percent. According to one member, everything “nos juntó” (came 
together at us): A low harvest, low prices, and high input costs (KI.2.20; SI.4.8). When 
asked about what was done to fight the roya, one member replied, “Well, what can you 
do about something that has already happened?” (SI.9.9). One key informant had a 
similar response, “It would take too much money and effort to try and kill all of the roya 
that year, so what we did was let all of the coffee production suffer” (KI.1.9). Coffee 
production in Santa Anita went from a livelihood activity that brought in money, to one 
that lost money (SI.11.21; SI.16.8). 
Theme Two: CLR Changed APCASA’s Livelihoods Strategy 
Coffee production losses 
APCASA’s main source of income was through the sale of their coffee. 
APCASA’s members planted five varieties of Arabica: Bourbon, Catimor, Catuai, 
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Caturra, and Sarchimor (SI.12.13). The roya had very little effect on Robusta compared 
to Arabica. Of the Arabica varieties, Bourbon was the most susceptible to the roya 
(K.1.3). APCASA members reported an average production decline of 73 percent 
attributable to the roya (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Self-reported Production Losses of Interviewees Attributable to the CLR 
 
Source Traditional/Expected 
production (quintales) 
Actual production 
post-CLR outbreak 
(quintales) 
Approximate 
production loss 
(%) 
KI.16.7 36-40 uva
a 
8-10 uva 75 
KI.16.10 N/A “Half” of expected 50 
SI.5.7 N/A 9 uva N/A 
SI.4.1 N/A “50% ” of expected 50 
SI.9.4 30-40 uva 3-4 uva 90 
SI.3.31 10-20 pergamino 2 pergamino 86 
SI.2.38 60 uva 6 uva 90 
SI.1.1 120 uva 36 uva 70 
SI.10.16 12-14 pergamino 3-4 pergamino 75 
KI.2.15 12-13 pergamino  4-5 pergamino 67 
Average Production Loss (%) 73 
a
Note. Uva (grape in Spanish) is the term used to describe a coffee cherry that has been 
picked, but not yet processed. Five to six quintales of uva will yield one quintal of 
pergamino.  
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Bourbon variety was perceived by APCASA members as the most worthwhile 
Arabica variety to cultivate, because it was thought to have the best flavor and the 
highest international demand. Despite the Bourbon variety being the most affected by 
the roya, APCASA’s members planned to continue its cultivation into the future 
(SI.2.32; SI.12.13). 
Interviewees noted that 100 percent of Santa Anita’s coffee fields were infected 
with CLR in 2012. Approximately 30 percent of the trees recuperated, while 70 percent 
died off completely (KI.2.8). The APCASA members perceived that, while the roya did 
not necessarily kill the coffee plant directly, it allowed other diseases like the ojo de 
gallo and mancha de hierro (leaf spot, Cercospora coffeicola) to infect the coffee 
(KI.2.3). Many interviewees perceived that the roya affected their production yields in 
subsequent years (i.e. 2013 and 2014) more than in 2012 (SI.2.39; SI.4.6). 
Coffee plant losses from the CLR 
One of the biggest obstacles to overcoming the effects of the 2012 CLR epidemic 
was not the reduction in yields, but the permanent weakening of coffee trees. Arabica 
trees in the Colomba region typically required three to five years to reach the ensayo or 
the age of “first production”. Many of APCASA’s Arabica trees in Santa Anita were 60 
years old or more when the CLR arrived in 2012 (SI.2.61). Agronomists who advised 
APCASA on how to combat the roya in 2012 and 2013 urged the cooperative to 
continually plant new coffee trees into their fields and to take out the old diseased 
varieties (KI.3.2; SI.3.37). APCASA was told that if the members did not renew their 
fields, then the roya would keep returning and could be just as destructive as the 
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epidemic was in 2012. Members were told that older Arabica varieties produced less and 
were more susceptible to the roya than the new cultivars. Generally, the older the coffee 
tree, the more susceptible it will be to disease. Although no formal quantitative survey 
was conducted on the amount of plants that were diseased and those that subsequently 
died, APCASA’s members reported that the majority of their coffee trees had been so 
weakened by the CLR that they effectively stopped producing. One member reported, 
“everything died” in his 10 cuerdas of coffee (SI.1.12). Another member reported 70 
percent of his coffee dying (KI.2.8) and also estimated that less than 10 percent of the 
relatively young 70,000 saplings APCASA had planted collectively between 2008 and 
2011 survived the roya (KI.2.61). APCASA decided to cut back or pull out the infected 
trees and reestablish their land with new coffee trees (Figure 14) (SI.9.6; SI.8.32).  
 
 
 
Figure 14. A row of new coffee trees. Planted within the last three months. 
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The damaging effects that the roya had on APCASA’s coffee can be traced back 
to what APCASA accomplished in the years prior. In July of 2009, a member of 
APCASA was interviewed on a Guatemalan television news channel about Santa Anita’s 
coffee production and the recent international donations the community had received. 
During the interview the member noted that Santa Anita had worked for three years with 
Tufts University’s Building Understanding through International Learning and 
Development (BUILD). As part of BUILD’s assistance to APCASA, BUILD was 
donating 20,000 young coffee trees. According to the interview, the APCASA member 
noted that they were not only working with Tufts, but also CRS, the fair-trade importer 
Cooperative Coffees, and the social investment fund, Root Capital. Root Capital would 
donate an additional 30,000 young coffee trees. The interviewee described how it was “a 
very serious challenge and goal” Santa Anita had in planting 50,000 coffee trees in 2009. 
In 2010, he anticipated planting 30,000 young bourbon coffee trees. He described how 
these young trees would help Santa Anita’s coffee farmers. 
This is a three-year project, which is to say, 2009, 2010, and 2011. But the fruits 
of this project will be realized in 2012 and 2013. This is our vision for the future; 
to elevate production, multiply production. Here is greatest concentration of 
efforts in this community. Therefore, the message I would give to someone is 
that you have to make a community not just through organization, but also by 
having the initiative, vision, and strategies to see into the future. And like we 
were talking about before, I was commenting on how it’s not enough just to have 
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land. You also need to know how to produce coffee, to know coffee, to plant 
coffee, and also how to sell the coffee (DA.12).  
Five years later (in 2014), the researcher spoke with this man who had given the 
interview in 2009. The man reported (without any mention of the 2009 interview he 
gave) that of the 70,000 young bourbon coffee trees they established from 2008 to 2011, 
only 5,000 survived the roya. He stated this was, “incredibly disappointing for us” 
(SI.2.61). 
The process of growing new coffee trees was one of APCASA’s most labor-
intensive and expensive processes in coffee production. One APCASA member showed 
the researcher the process of starting new coffee trees (SI.12.13-SI.12.20). First, a farmer 
had to specially prepare three to five pounds of coffee beans (i.e. seeds). After gently air-
drying them for one month, seeds were planted in a specially designed seedbed. The soil 
in the seedbed had to be decontaminated from weeds, fungus, and pests. 
Decontamination was accomplished using several methods. The most popular method 
was to lay the soil out on a black tarp in full sun. Lime, ashes, and hot water mixed with 
the broth of cooked corn. These additives were used to further rid the soil of pests and 
balance soil acidity. Manure and mulch from processing coffee cherries were mixed into 
the soil as well. The seeds were planted, covered in a banana leaf or costal (burlap sack) 
material, and watered every two days for 30-40 days. After 40 days, the seedlings were 
transplanted. One plant was placed into an 8- to 10-inch tall cylindrical black bag 
weighing two to three pounds (Figure 15). The seedlings were left to grow in the bags 
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for one to two months while the fields in which to plant the new seedlings were 
prepared. 
Figure 15. Newly transplanted seedlings. The seedling on the left is Arabica and the 
seedling on the right is Robusta. 
The fields were primed by preparing holes 40 cm by 40 cm with a machete. The 
machete was used to break up and loosen the soil. Organic matter were sometimes mixed 
into the soil before planting. The new seedlings in the bags were then transported from a 
central location to the field to be planted. Santa Anita’s coffee fields began as close to as 
500 meters from residences and up to what the researcher estimated as one and one-half 
kilometers away. It would take 30 to 40 minutes for a farmer to reach a field. Typically 
one worker could prepare 35 holes and plant 35 new coffee trees in one day (SI.7.9). In 
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Santa Anita, only one road was maintained that was wide enough for a pickup truck. 
This road looped from residences out 500 meters and back toward the residences.  
The vast majority of Santa Anita’s coffee fields had to be reached on foot using 
paths that were rocky, uneven, muddy, and steep. To carry the new coffee trees, a 
cacaxte was used (Figure 16).  
 
 
Figure 16. Cacaxte.  
 
 
The long back of the cacaxte was attached to the waist and forehead of the user 
with straps. The seat of the chair was used carry the coffee trees. A farmer could 
typically carry 30 trees, with each plant weighing two to three pounds. Thus each trip 
consisted of carrying an average of 70 pounds for 40 minutes through uneven, rocky, 
muddy, and steep terrain. In January to March 2015, each APCASA member planned to 
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establish 900 to 1000 trees. In 2013, each member planted 800 new coffee trees 
(SI.4.17).  
 
 
Figure 17. APCASA member with his new coffee trees. This field was established in the 
early months of 2013 and was one of the first rehabilitation efforts after the CLR 
epidemic arrived. 
 
 
 
The costs of cultivating new coffee trees from seeds and establishing the 
seedlings in the fields was perceived as a serious time and financial investment. The 
need to re-plant coffee fields that had been planted with new saplings only a few years 
before was just as much, if not more of a shock for APCASA, than the production 
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declines from the CLR (Figures 17 and 18). Beside the financial and time investment 
required to grow and establish new trees, one member reported that it took three days to 
remove one cuerda of diseased or old coffee (SI.3.37).  
 
 
 
Figure 18. A mature diseased coffee tree. In the background are small, recently planted, 
12-16 inch tall, coffee plants. 
 
 
 
 Thus, following the advice of agronomists on how to combat the roya required a 
large amount of labor and financial investment for APCASA’s members. As one 
member explained the process of renewing their diseased coffee, “Right now we’re in 
the first phase [of responding to the roya]. When the trees grow then all you have to do 
is prune and take care of the shading” (SI.10.19). 
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Social and economic costs of the CLR 
APCASA members perceived themselves to be trapped in a paradoxical situation 
with regard to coffee production, livelihoods, and the CLR. Coffee prices increased from 
2013 and 2014, yet there was little production in Santa Anita (SI.4.10). Members 
commented that they needed a harvest so they had money to invest in the next year’s 
crop, but if they were not able to harvest anything because of the CLR’s effects, then 
they would be unable to invest in inputs to improve next year’s harvest. APCASA 
members lamented that they did not have the coffee to sell while market prices were 
perceived to be favorable. To produce coffee, APCASA’s farmers invested in inputs and 
labor for eight to nine months out of the year. They had to buy “medicine” (i.e. fungicide 
to combat the roya), fertilizer, and to pay laborers to clean, weed, and properly shade 
their coffee fields (KI.16.9). As one farmer noted, “What you make in four months [of 
harvests] will affect your livelihood the other eight months” (SI.4.5). Farmers also had to 
balance the needs of their coffee trees with the basic needs of their family (SI.5.20). 
How did families cope with less income? One interviewee replied, “Well, what 
we have to do is eat less. Eat less food, because there is nothing left to do. Just imagine 
if you eat three times a day and then multiply all of your family members by three meals. 
Do the math. Imagine how much money that it would cost to feed all of them. So you 
have to eat less” (SI.4.14). The “lean period” (i.e. when there was less money for food) 
for APCASA’s families was from January to August. This was when investment was 
needed in their coffee fields (SI.4.12). With international help and the little coffee they 
could harvest and sell, APCASA’s members had the ability to buy only what was 
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necessary such as corn, sugar, and “maybe” some tomatoes, but not milk, cereals, or 
meat (SI.4.15). One interviewee shared 
Around here there is poverty. There are families that only make 30 or 40 
quetzales per day. It’s an enormous amount of poverty. We have lived on only 
five quetzales per day before. Right now, no. Right now, I live better. I work 
outside, so I make money, but I had to learn how to do the job first… But the 
majority don’t have the same thing. (KI.3.34)   
A health professional in a local government-run clinic reported that the causes of 
malnutrition were from a lack of income and the weak coffee economy. The health 
professional was unable to provide statistics showing the rate of malnutrition in the area, 
but did note that malnutrition was a serious concern in coffee-producing communities. In 
Santa Anita, there was a government-funded daycare center that served approximately 
30 children between ages three and five, and an elementary school for children more 
than age five. One APCASA member expressed gratitude for the day-care center as it 
allowed mothers to search for work, and most important, provided breakfast and lunch to 
children. When asked about the state of Santa Anita’s food security she replied, “In this 
community, the children don’t suffer from hunger like in other communities” (SI.5.14).  
 Changing labor patterns was the most common response when asked how the 
CLR affected Santa Anita. Nearly everyone the researcher interviewed noted that the 
CLR forced smallholder coffee producers in Santa Anita to search for work outside the 
community. APCASA’s members perceived employment outside Santa Anita as a 
necessity, but also as a threat to their long-term coffee production capability. When the 
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researcher asked one APCASA member if people were working outside of Santa Anita’s 
coffee fields, he replied, “Oh yeah there are a lot of people working outside. The 
problem is when you work outside, the income you make does not go toward your coffee 
trees. No, it goes toward schooling, health, clothes, and food for your family” (KI.3.5). 
The member later continued, “When the roya came we had to think of alternatives like 
searching for work outside of the community. If a father and his sons are working in 
coffee, now at least a few of them have to leave to search for work” (SI.3.29).  
The most frequent destinations for those working outside of Santa Anita included 
other coffee plantations, Guatemala City, the state of Chiapas in Mexico, the United 
States, and the agriculturally-productive area around Guatemala’s second largest city, 
Quetzaltenango (SI.2.35; SI.3.18; SI.4.18; KI.1.31). Nearly all APCASA’s members 
and/or their family members had lived or had been born in Chiapas during the civil war. 
Many of the children of APCASA members had dual citizenship, making it easy for 
them to travel in search of work in Mexico or transit through Mexico on their way to the 
United States (SI.2.37; SI.3.23).   
APCASA members also described that the CLR caused the hastening of one 
particular regional labor movement. Traditionally, the Mayan indigenous from the 
departments of Quetzaltenango, San Marcos, and Totonicapán would descend 
(sometimes by force) from their mountainous subsistence farming plots to work 
seasonally on coffee plantations in the Boca Costa region. They would reinforce the 
mozos, or permanent workers, during coffee harvest times, which usually came after the 
mountain corn harvests ended in November. However, since the global coffee crisis 
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depressed prices in the late 1990s, the large coffee fincas in Guatemala began to go 
bankrupt or were converting production to macadamia, rubber, palm oil, and cattle 
(SI.2.27). Several of APCASA’s members mentioned that the large fincas had been 
downsizing and requesting less seasonal labor (SI.3.11; SI.5.22). Since the global coffee 
crisis, the demand for labor from the Mayan indigenous mountain towns decreased. 
Instead, it was the laborers who had worked on the now defunct coffee fincas who were 
migrating to the mountains to look for work. Members reported that this pattern reversal 
appeared to hasten since the roya epidemic in 2012 (KI.1.34; SI.3.6). One key informant 
whose finca employed up to 50 people was asked if laborers still came from the 
mountains to work in coffee. He responded 
This used to be a normal occurrence. Because there was a lot of coffee 
production, a lot of labor was needed. A lot of people from the mountains, after 
they finished their harvest of subsistence crops, would come and work on coffee 
plantations. Since the coffee price crisis [of 1999-2002] this ended, and the same 
thing [is] now [happening] again with the roya. So, the phenomenon is now the 
opposite. People from the coast now migrate to the mountains searching for 
work, instead of the other way around. (KI.1.34) 
Some APCASA members mentioned working their friends’ coffee lands while the 
friends were in Guatemala City or Quetzaltenango working as security guards, bus 
attendants, and gardeners (SI.9.13). 
APCASA members were also concerned about the effects that the perceived 
labor shortage would have on their coffee trees. This presented another paradox for 
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APCASA. On one hand there was not enough work for all since the roya affected 
production so drastically. One key informant who farmed coffee with his four brothers 
reported that they would usually employ 50 people daily for four months, but in 2014, 
they was employing no one (KI.1.27). Most in APCASA reported paying other Santa 
Anita community members, or laborers from neighboring communities, to help tend to 
their coffee fields. Temporary labor, especially from young men, was sought after to 
help shade, fertilize, “clean” (cutting the undergrowth that would compete with the 
coffee), and to prepare soil and plant new coffee seedlings. So, while there was generally 
less labor demand because of the roya, there were still labor needs at certain times. 
However, many young men had moved to Mexico, the U.S., and areas in Guatemala. 
APCASA’s members expressed concern about acquiring labor because if cherries were 
not picked within a certain amount of time after they ripen, then they will ferment on the 
tree (KI.2.22). Picking cherries also facilitated the growth of blossoms in which would 
then produce next year’s harvest. 
There appeared to be a leveraging aspect with respect to labor in Santa Anita. To 
buy food and re-invest in the coffee fields affected by the CLR, members needed to 
search for work outside of Colomba. But, once they were away from their coffee fields, 
it was difficult to find labor back in Santa Anita to ensure that the money they were 
sending was being used to improve their coffee. One member described it as, “A lot of 
people have to go look for work and what happens is they then abandon their land. When 
and if they can make money, they pay people to work their land” (SI.3.20). 
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APCASA members were also concerned about how the roya would affect the 
youth of Santa Anita, which they perceived as the future generation of coffee farmers. 
Because of a lot of Santa Anita’s youth were born in Mexico, they had dual citizenship, 
permits, or school papers allowing them to easily search for work in Chiapas’ coffee, 
banana, mango, and cacao plantations (KI.3.8; SI.13.7; SI.5.12). Other youth had moved 
to Guatemalan cities to work, and many had enrolled in high schools and universities in 
those urban areas. There was a perceived fear among APCASA that youth would forget 
about coffee farming. Members expressed the perception that once they had received a 
professional degree they would not want to return when coffee production improved. 
One interviewee pointed to the fact that youth were only paid Q20-25 per day to work on 
a plantation, whereas they could earn at least the official Guatemalan minimum wage of 
Q78, if not more, in an urban area (KI.2.25). 
An additional social and economic cost of the roya frequently mentioned by 
members of APCASA was the personal loans they took out to cope with the production 
losses of 2012-2013. They mentioned that local branches of the Banco de Desarollo 
Rural (Rural Development Bank, commonly known as Banrural in Guatemala) provided 
loans to APCASA members. These loans were to be invested in their coffee, however 
they spent it to purchase food for their families (KI.16.11). One member described how 
families were able to cope with a sharp drop in income because of the roya during a 
focus group meeting with the APCASA’s comité de mujeres (women’s committee). 
Well the truth is we have taken out loans. The months that are hard we take out a 
loan from the bank. So our hope is that the coffee will allow us to pay it back 
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over the years. So the months of January and February…well really, all of the 
months are hard. Also others have sold firewood. Because you have to think 
where is the money going to come from to invest in the coffee? The bank is 
giving us money to invest in our coffee, while we spend what we have to support 
our family. The bank might give us Q3,000, Q4,000, or Q5,000. If the bank 
knows you, then it will give you Q6,000. To invest in what you need in terms of 
fertilizer and chemicals you need at least Q3,000 for your coffee trees. Selling 
firewood is one way to make money [Figure 19]. The banks might give us two 
years to pay back the loan. So the monthly payments are Q300 and Q400. 
(KI.16.12). 
Figure 19. Firewood. The wood came from a member’s coffee field. It could be used to 
fuel the owner's cooking fire or sold in the local market. 
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Members were apprehensive about taking out loans that were to be invested in 
their coffee trees, but which at least a portion being used to buy food for their families. 
They were fearful that they would not be able to repay the loans. They also worried 
about the strength of the banks as “a lot of people are in debt” which could destabilize 
banking in the future (SI.11.38).  
APCASA’s members frequently mentioned the “coffee production chain” and 
how the roya had weakened or broken the chain. One member asserted that one coffee 
field could support 50 or 60 people when considering those (and the families who relied 
upon them) who were paid to clean, shade, establish new trees, pick (i.e. harvest), and 
process (SI.15.3). APCASA’s members would frequently pay other Santa Anita 
community members to provide labor in their coffee fields. When coffee needed to be 
“cleaned” or shaded (cutting the limbs of trees above the coffee), they would pay 
between Q30 and Q40 per day of work. Because all of APCASA’s members were selling 
their coffee individually in Coatepeque (some members sold their coffee to fellow 
members who then took the coffee to market in Coatepeque), they paid Q200 for a 
pickup truck to take them and their coffee to the market (Figure 20). 
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Figure 20. Taking coffee to the Coatepeque market. The owner of the coffee paid Q200 
to the driver to take him to the town to sell his coffee. Notice the coffee in pergamino 
drying in the background on black tarps. Because APCASA had no access to the central 
patio controlled by the Association Maya, and the newly constructed patio was located 
far away from the residences, most members dried their coffee outside their homes.  
APCASA members commented that the roya had not only affected them, but was 
also affecting the “people who don’t have coffee too” (SI.5.9). As one APCASA 
member described 
Here you feel the circulation of trade. The small producer has money to spend, 
especially during the months of December to February. During this time of year, 
there is a lot of buying and trade, but this year there was not. This year the stores 
don’t have a lot of business, all because of coffee. Because, who buys at the 
stores are the small coffee farmers and laborers. The large producers export their 
products, and they live and purchase goods in large supermarkets in Guatemala 
City, while the small producer is the engine of the economy [in Colomba]. 
(SI.11.31; SI.11.32) 
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CLR and organic to conventional coffee production in Santa Anita 
During the researcher’s visit, APCASA members voiced their strategy of 
forgoing organic coffee production in favor of conventional. For at least seven years 
APCASA, and APCASA’s predecessor, the community’s unified cooperative Mayan 
Civil Association of Small Producers, grew organic coffee for export (Figure 21). 
Figure 21. Santa Anita’s organic brand. The coffee roasting building on the left (of 
which APCASA had no access) still advertised organic coffee as of December 2014. An 
old photograph on the right is showing Santa Anita’s organic coffee for sale in 
Quetzaltenango.  
As one member explained, “Before when we were a united community, we 
exported coffee to the U.S. So we all grew our coffee organically. We didn’t use 
chemicals at all, because we worked collectively” (SI.9.19). One reason why APCASA’s 
producers slowly decided to produce coffee conventionally (e.g. the use of synthetic 
fertilizer, chemical fungicides, and pesticides) was because of the loss of export 
agreements (SI.12.19). Local coffee buyer middlemen, often referred to as coyotes, did 
not pay producers more for organically grown coffee (SI.1.19; SI.3.32). The coyotes 
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were concerned about three aspects; from what region was (i.e. what altitude) the coffee 
was grown, how “clean” it was (i.e. whether it was primarily first class beans) and most 
importantly, whether it had the right moisture content (KI.3.21). Coffee that was 
warehoused with too much moisture would spoil. As one APCASA member explained, 
“Those coyotes don’t ask whether it is organic or not. They want to know its quality; that 
it is dried right and is clean” (SI.15.6).  
 APCASA’s members recalled growing organic coffee as difficult. They grew 
organically because international, fair-trade, importers desired organically certified 
coffee (SI.10.15). One APCASA member explained the difficulties of using organic 
fertilizer 
The problem with organic fertilizer is that it takes a lot of labor to carry and 
apply. It’s not easy. For example, for every pound of chemical fertilizer, you 
would need to carry three or four pounds of organic fertilizer to be equivalent. So 
for two cuerdas of land I would need to carry six quintales of organic fertilizer 
from my house to my fields, but if it is conventional then I only need to bring one 
quintal. Also you have to think about the time involved. To spread organic 
fertilizer it would take me at least two days, but the conventional would take me 
three hours. (SI.10.14) 
Another APCASA member mentioned that the cooperative members used to clean their 
coffee fields every two or three months, but by applying herbicides, they cleaned their 
fields only twice a year (SI.9.21). Even when Santa Anita produced organic coffee, there 
was disagreement in the community about whether it was worth the extra labor, costs, 
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and discipline (SI.2.12; SI.14.6). Association Maya’s members dislike for the extra labor 
and discipline required to produce organic coffee was cited by APCASA as one reason 
for the split between the two groups. So, “one by one, little by little” Santa Anita’s 
producers began applying chemicals to their coffee after the export agreements ended 
(SI.9.20). 
The roya appeared to strengthen the perceptions of APCASA’s members that, 
barring an agreement with an organic coffee importer, conventional production would 
continue. All of APCASA’s members reported converting their land to conventional 
production. They noted that the roya had weakened their coffee so much that the only 
way to save it was by applying chemical fungicides and synthetic fertilizers (SI.1.17; 
SI.1.18; KI.3.3). One recalled his friend who had a coffee harvest in 2014 because he 
sprayed chemicals in 2011 and 2012, which prevented the roya from spreading; the 
interviewee was left with no harvest. In his words, “I believed in organics. Not now. I 
will die of hunger believing in organics. If it wasn’t for chemicals we wouldn’t have 
trees” (SI.7.20). APCASA members spoke frequently of the discipline it took to produce 
organic coffee for export. They also spoke about the pride they felt knowing 
international consumers valued their organic coffee (SI.10.20). Yet, the termination of 
their export agreement coupled with the roya had led Santa Anita’s production to shift to 
conventional.  
Theme Three: APCASA Utilized Varied Coping Mechanisms 
Coffee farming attitudes and how attitudes shaped the CLR response
            To better understand the coping mechanisms and livelihood strategies APCASA 
89 
 used to respond to the effects of the CLR outbreak, it was necessary to understand the 
members’ attitudes about their vocation. APCASA’s farmers perceived themselves to be 
both fortunate to have prime coffee cultivating land, but also apprehensive about the risk 
they were assuming as small producers. This perception seemed especially strong after 
the recent roya outbreak. Additionally, APCASA’s members expressed pride of their 
occupation and of their coffee, but were also aware of the structural difficulties they 
faced as smallholder farmers. 
Many in APCASA expressed a feeling of hope. All were emphatic that they 
would continue growing coffee, despite the roya, price fluctuations, and internal turmoil 
in Santa Anita. Several members told stories of their childhood and the time spent 
fighting during the civil war in San Marcos as reasons for being hopeful. All of the 
members came from peasant backgrounds where the most productive land was owned by 
large fincas. Their families owned very little (if any) land. Now they were proud to be 
smallholder coffee producers. Most rural Guatemalans dedicate themselves to some form 
of subsistence farming. The crops they produce are meant for local consumption. 
However with coffee, as one member explained, “With coffee no. Coffee is different. 
You can make a living with coffee. We have a market in Germany and the United 
States!” (SI.7.18). Coffee farming was seen as something completely different than 
being a typical Guatemalan farmer growing corn, beans, squash, and potatoes. Coffee 
was perceived to be a “global product” (SI.4.4). One of APCASA’s leaders said, “We 
see coffee as the ambassador of our friendship with people from other parts of the world. 
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It’s great that they say they’re going to drink coffee from Santa Anita. It’s coffee with a 
history!” (SI.2.53).  
APCASA was adamant about remaining progressive coffee farmers. They felt 
pride and hope, because at one time their coffee had been exported. But, in another way, 
APCASA members perceived themselves to be like passive bystanders to economics. As 
one member commented, “We have always worked here in coffee. We suffer what we 
have to suffer, but this is where we make our living” (SI.11.20). Another noted that they 
had been coffee farming for 16 years, which he described as being “practically new 
here!” (SI.2.1). 
Members also described the perceived risk of being a smallholder farmer. They 
pointed out that in Guatemala there were no subsidies to farmers. Credit was very hard 
to attain through government programs. One said, “Here, the farmer has to be an 
adventurer” (KI.2.18). Farming was seen as “not easy” and “complicated”; something 
that took quite a lot of financial and labor investment (SI.12.18). They felt the 
responsibility of producing coffee and providing income for their family, because as one 
member shared, “our country and the instability here will not generate employment 
opportunities” (SI.11.18). 
They felt they had been given a great opportunity, an opportunity that was rare 
among rural low income Guatemalans with little to no formal education. One member 
described the opportunity this way, “God gave us the opportunity to plant coffee, but we 
can’t wait for him to grow the crops himself. So we are lucky to have survived the war. 
We are also fortunate to have a bit of land” (SI.2.49). Another member felt “good”, 
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“lucky, and “blessed” to be a small coffee producer, but that it was up to them to 
“dominate the knowledge of our plants. We have to be good workers, producers, and 
sellers of our coffee” (SI.8.6).  
 Therefore, one of the coping strategies that APCASA employed was a change (or 
reiteration) of attitudes. When asked about the roya and APCASA’s view of coffee 
farming in the future, one member replied, “Well we have hope for the future of coffee. 
When we plant coffee we hope for a good harvest. But someone who does not plant new 
coffee, well they have no hope for the future” (SI.5.5). Another referenced the large 
private finca, which abutted Santa Anita 
 Sometimes I think I am crazy. Why? Because I want to grow my coffee like 
them. I want to produce more, learn more, and improve my coffee crop. Maybe 
I’ll never reach their level of production, but I want to. I want to make more 
money…with the roya, all of my hopes were lost. But the coffee I have right now 
is growing well. So, I am doing better now than before. Getting better is my 
intention. (KI.3.32) 
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Figure 22. A comparison of finca growing operations. Notice the different appearance in 
growing environments of a private finca (left) and an APCASA member's coffee field 
(right) with private finca appearing to control more for extraneous vegetation.   
Private fincas in the Colomba region were typically large (1000 cuerdas or more) 
and owned by one person or a family (Figure 22). The owner(s) usually did not oversee 
production, but delegated authority to the administrator, assistants to the administrator, 
and the field laborers. Private finca owners had the ability to invest in their coffee for 
three or four years, despite having little to harvest (KI.1.17). The private fincas in the 
area were perceived by APCASA members to be owned by foreigners or politically 
active Guatemalans (KI.3.30; KI.2.21). Nearly all APCASA members were asked about 
whether they planned to continue cultivating coffee, or whether the roya had been such a 
shock, and such a devastation to production, that the investment was not worth the risk. 
All responded that APCASA had decided to fully continue, if not expand, coffee 
production. 
APCASA, nor any other farmers the researcher interviewed, recalled believing 
that the 2012 CLR epidemic would be such a destructive force to their coffee. It was a 
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crisis for APCASA, yet they viewed the crisis as an opportunity to improve. As one 
member explained, “The roya gave us an opportunity to enrich our ideas about how to 
grow coffee, not to cry or flee, but to stand up, think, and make decisions” (SI.8.27). The 
roya forced APCASA to generate new ideas, seek out help, and rejuvenate their coffee 
fields. They realized they had to design “tactics” and “instead of going backwards, we’re 
going forwards” to combat the roya (SI.4.17; SI.8.25). Many in APCASA referenced the 
other Santa Anita cooperative, Association Maya, and expressed doubt that the 
Association Maya had the right attitude about coping with the CLR. APCASA members 
perceived themselves as the harder workers; APCASA was the better-organized and 
capable cooperative. They told the researcher that many of the Association Maya 
members were not investing in their coffee trees after the CLR forced them to search for 
work outside of Santa Anita.   
APCASA’s agricultural response to the CLR 
 APCASA’s strategy to recover from the effects of the 2012 CLR epidemic and 
insulate itself from future outbreaks utilized several approaches. The members realized 
that it would take more than one approach to control the roya (SI.8.31). The first 
approach, which was described earlier in this section, was to renew APCASA’s fields 
with young coffee trees. These trees were a mixture of Bourbon, Sarchimor, Catimor, 
Caturra, and Catuai. Bourbon, despite it being the most susceptible to the roya, was 
being planted more than the other varieties. Growing and establishing new coffee trees 
appeared to be the first priority for APCASA, yet this step also required the most labor 
and financial investment.  
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APCASA’s renewal strategy was to focus on five cuerdas of land each year. 
They felt that if they focused their time and energy on renewing those five cuerdas, they 
would be more successful than attempting to reestablish the entire 30 cuerdas each 
cooperative member owned. As has been previously described, APCASA completely 
gave up growing coffee organically. In 2014, they reported fertilizing and applying 
chemicals to these five cuerdas. Their objective with these five cuerdas, and the five 
cuerdas they would plant each subsequent year, was “thinking long-term” (SI.2.45; 
SI.8.34). The first five cuerdas were expected to begin bearing fruit in 2018 or 2019. In 
2014, APCASA established 8,000 new trees and planned to establish a further 45,000 
new coffee trees over the next five years (SI.2.58). Unlike the large private fincas, 
APCASA members perceived that they did not have the resources to control the roya 
with fungicides and fertilizer (SI.3.5). APCASA members mentioned receiving a small 
amount of fertilizer and fungicide from the government and the U.S.-based coffee 
importer/NGO, De La Gente (SI.9.10). 
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 Beside establishing new trees and applying chemicals, the other approach 
APCASA believed would help control future CLR outbreaks was proper shading. 
APCASA members described coffee shade as an important variable to roya control. This 
approach was valued because it required little financial investment. By climbing a tree 
with a machete, a coffee farmer would cut the tree branches growing the most vertical 
while leaving the more horizontal branches (Figure 23).  
 
 
 
Figure 23. Coffee shading. A recently cut tree to provide shade for the coffee below. 
Shading was regarded as one of the most labor intensive and dangerous jobs in the 
coffee production process.  
 
 
 
The objective was to manage the shade, thus leave the coffee trees with three or 
four hours of direct sun, and four or more hours of indirect sun. More shade was viewed 
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as retarding CLR growth, but it would also reduce production. Less shade would 
increase production, but increase CLR growth. A farmer could control the CLR on a full 
sun coffee plant, however it would require purchasing fungicide and fertilizer so the 
plant would be strong enough to resist the roya infection. With little money to spend on 
inputs, APCASA felt managing the proper shade was an effective method to balancing 
production and stopping the CLR (KI.2.1; KI.1.36; KI.2.32; SI.8.31).   
Theme Four: Coffee Would Remain the Focus 
 Throughout visits to Santa Anita, the researcher asked members about the future. 
Would they continue growing coffee despite the threats of another CLR epidemic? 
Would they switch to other crops or search for off-farm employment? One member 
described their rationale. 
The other reason why we are sticking with coffee is that we know how to grow it. 
We know coffee well – how to grow it, process it, and sell it. For example, take a 
lawyer who studies and becomes licensed. He loses five cases in one month. 
What is he going to do? Become an engineer? No, he’s going to continue being a 
lawyer. It’s the same thing for us as coffee farmers. (SI.8.29) 
Despite continual crises and the threat of another CLR outbreak, APCASA’s members 
remained wholly committed to producing coffee as their primary livelihood activity.  
 APCASA recently built a coffee storage building, a concrete patio for drying 
coffee, and had a coffee demucilager (cherry fruit de-pulper) donated to them. They had 
also built a shaded nursery for coffee trees, which during the researcher’s visits, was full 
of young coffee trees. Zion Coffee Company of Massachusetts donated the fruit de-
97 
pulper, whose donation was facilitated by De La Gente (DA.1). The young coffee trees 
were donated by De La Gente (Figure 24). 
Figure 24. Recent international donations. Clockwise from top left: A hand crank de-
pulper (not donated, but presented for comparison purposes), the demucilager meant to 
replace the hand cranked de-pulper, the warehouse, and new coffee plants. 
The coffee storage warehouse and patio had been constructed in 2013, prior to 
the nursery and fruit de-pulper donation. De La Gente and an unidentified Rotary club 
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donated the warehouse, while the patio was part of a university student service-learning 
course. These donations would give APCASA the ability to grow, process, and store 
coffee in an area separate from Association Maya. When the 10 members of APCASA 
decided to split from Association Maya, they lost their rights to use the community’s 
patio, storage, and ecological beneficio.  
 These relatively recent donations, meant to help APCASA’s farmers through the 
CLR crisis, were aimed at helping APCASA’s future ability to continue with coffee as 
their primary livelihood activity. As one of APCASA’s leaders stated, “Coffee will 
remain the main source of income here” (SI.2.51). Despite the disunity with Association 
Maya and the subsequent loss of export agreements, APCASA members were optimistic 
about the future. During a focus group meeting with APCASA’s women’s committee, 
one explained their organization. 
I believe that a good group will get ahead more than just a big group. A small 
group can work with harmony and love, even though it’s a small group. With a 
big group, a lot do not attend [meetings] or participate, so for me this small group 
is getting along good. (KI.16.3) 
Another APCASA reiterated this sentiment by stating, “To be 10 and strong is more 
important than to be many, but not work well” (SI.2.54).  
 For APCASA members, the cooperative had both advantages and disadvantages. 
Creating a cooperative provided the members with a method to legitimize themselves to 
the outside world. They pointed to the researcher’s presence and noted that anyone could 
publish a solicitation on the Internet and accept visitors, but by forming an association, it 
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enabled the members to project their work out and give legitimacy to external audiences 
(SI.16.4). The members also perceived that to be able to export coffee to the United 
States, Canada, or Europe, they needed to form a cooperative (KI.16.1; SI.8.18; SI.10.7). 
Beside coffee, forming APCASA also provided a feeling of security for the members. A 
cooperative could help manage social and community projects or provide scholarships to 
students (SI.8.17). The disadvantage of APCASA as described by the members was that 
it was a small association (SI.10.8; KI.16.2) APCASA officially had 10 producers, but 
one producer was “not active” and one producer was recuperating from a serious car 
accident, leaving only eight active producers. 
Theme Five: Forced to Diversify Livelihoods 
APCASA members reported that the CLR forced those living in Santa Anita to 
utilize multiple short-term coping mechanisms. Taking out loans, eating less, and 
searching for off-farm employment opportunities were the most frequently mentioned 
coping mechanisms. While APCASA members agreed that they would remain coffee 
farmers, they noted that the CLR caused them to consider long-term livelihood 
diversification strategies. Members perceived these diversification strategies as 
necessary, but destructive to the overall focus on coffee production. 
Many of the short-term coping strategies previously described as reactions to the 
roya were also perceived to possible long-term coping mechanisms. Santa Anita’s coffee 
farmers had used these coping mechanisms before the 2012 CLR outbreak, and reported 
that they would most likely continue to in the future, even if the CLR’s threat 
diminished. Therefore, there was an overlap between what members considered short-
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term coping mechanism and what was perceived as a long-term livelihood 
diversification strategy. Off-farm migration in search of employment was the most 
frequently mentioned livelihood diversification strategy that also served as a short-term 
coping mechanism. The months of January to August were the most common time 
coffee farmers or their family members migrated in search of off-farm employment 
(SI.4.19). Migrants traveled to Mexico, Guatemala City, Quetzaltenango, and the United 
States. Quetzaltenango was a favored destination as it was less than two hours away by 
bus and offered urban and agricultural employment. Guatemala City was six hours by 
bus and offered migrants jobs such as a construction laborer. Several APCASA members 
reported having family members living in Guatemala City, facilitating a move there. 
Mexico appeared to be the third most frequent destination (the bordering state of 
Chiapas especially). Members traveled to Chiapas to work in mango, plantain, banana, 
coffee, and cacao plantations. This destination appeared to be favored by youth of Santa 
Anita. Many youth had been born in Chiapas and had the necessary permits (including 
citizenship) to work and travel freely in Mexico (KI.3.8; KI.3.10; SI.3.23; SI.5.12; 
SI.5.13; SI.5.11; SI.5.12).  
Employment in coffee fincas was not perceived to be a long-term livelihood 
diversification strategy. Coffee laborers were paid a minimal salary of between Q25 and 
Q40 a day, although Q30 was the average rate (KI.3.11; KI.3.12). APCASA members 
and their families decided they would rather devote the time and labor investment to 
their own coffee fields and forgo payment for the eight months until harvest time instead 
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of working for another coffee finca. Maintaining coffee and harvesting was 
accomplished almost entirely by hand in the Colomba region (Figure 25).  
 
 
 
Figure 25. The researcher harvesting coffee.  
 
 
 
Machines were sometimes used during processing, however the bulk of jobs 
required the use of two hands and one machete.  
The most common jobs available to coffee laborers were cleaning, shading, 
pruning, fertilizing, establishing new coffee trees, and harvesting. An adult male coffee 
laborer was expected to be able to harvest at least one quintal of uva in one day of work 
typically lasting from 6:00AM to 2:00PM. The researcher assisted APCASA members in 
harvesting and cleaning coffee and recorded reflections of the work (RR.3.1-RR.3.5). 
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Cleaning coffee was difficult, “back breaking”, sweaty, and exhausting work. To clean 
coffee, a worker would have to crouch and cut horizontally with a machete. After the 
brush was cut from a height of two or three feet, the worker had to then swing the 
machete at or below ground level into the soil (Figure 26). It was exhausting work. 
Figure 26. “Cleaning” coffee. An APCASA member showing the researcher the proper 
way to cut away vegetation growing around a coffee sapling. 
A machete weighed five to six pounds, but felt much heavier when used to cut 
horizontally (e.g. like a lawnmower blade) instead of vertically (i.e. chopping). The most 
exhausting part of cleaning coffee in Santa Anita was that it was shade grown on steep 
mountain inclines. Moving around on steep, sandy, and uneven land was very difficult 
and dangerous with a machete in one hand. There was little preventing one’s accidental 
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descent, so keeping a careful foothold on the slope was essential. The coffee farmer with 
whom the researcher helped clean coffee noted that the most dangerous work was 
shading. To shade coffee one must climb a tree and hack away branches with a machete. 
Another member recalled a time he almost died after cutting himself while shading. He 
was shading and his machete got caught in a branch above his head, which changed the 
trajectory of his downswing. The machete hit his hand and wrist creating a deep cut. He 
reported that it took more than an hour to reach a hospital at which time he was nearly 
dead of blood loss. It took him nearly nine months to recuperate to begin working in his 
coffee fields again. Another member noted that it was not unusual to hear about a coffee 
farmer falling from a tree while shading and being impaled by a coffee tree stump upon 
landing. Cultivating coffee was difficult work and this was one reason why APCASA’s 
members desired to work in their own land instead of laboring on another’s.   
APCASA members used a wide variety of livelihood diversification strategies 
inside the Santa Anita community. The most common strategy was to grow other crops 
in their coffee fields or in their residential lot. Members had banana, orange, lime, 
pacaya (flower of the date palm), avocado, guisquil (squash-like; also known as 
chayote), camote (sweet potato), malanga (a cousin of the taro root), beans, corn, 
rambutan, plantain, and other fruits and vegetables growing in the back of their 
residences. In their coffee fields, the researcher saw banana, corn, beans, guisquil, and 
sugar cane being cultivated (Figure 27).  
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Figure 27. An APCASA member's banana tree. 
Banana was the most frequently cultivated crop in the coffee fields, even though 
members reported production was limited by disease and the tuza (a species of gopher). 
APCASA utilized the common land around the warehouse and patio to grow beans, 
corn, and sugarcane (Figure 28). One APCASA member also had an apiculture (bee 
keeping) project on his land (Figure 29). 
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Figure 28. Food crop cultivation. An APCASA member’s beans growing in the 
commonly-held campo (open field). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 29. A member’s apiculture project. 
 
 
 
Members reported that diversifying into food crops like corn, beans, and 
guisquiles helped them provide food for their family to eat since the 2012 CLR 
epidemic. However, as one member noted, corn and beans did not grow well in the 
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heavily forested and poor soil of Santa Anita (SI.9.11). One member explained, “I can 
plant corn and beans, but that will not guarantee me anything. I think of my kids. What 
can I do to guarantee their future? I am getting older now” (SI.10.12). One farmer had 
planted macadamia within 10 cuerdas of his coffee fields, but only one cuerda each of 
banana and beans (Figure 30) (SI.2.48). 
Figure 30. Macadamia sapling. The plant is approximately 24 inches tall; planted one 
year prior within coffee fields. 
APCASA members were not convinced that corn and beans would contribute to 
their livelihoods. As one member explained, “If we all plant corn and beans, the problem 
is that if you planted five cuerdas of each you will make very little money while with 
coffee you can make money in the international market” (SI.7.16). 
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 The destination for non-coffee agricultural produce was the local market in 
Colomba. Members reported selling two items in Colomba, banana and guisquiles. 
Guisquiles could be sold in town for Q0.75 each while banana could sell for between Q2 
and Q4 for a dozen of the “manzana” variety. However, members reported that selling 
produce in the local market was generally not profitable. Many times when they arrived 
with guisquiles or bananas there were other small producers who were also trying to sell 
these products. Sales were difficult to obtain (SI.4.2; SI.6.1). Chickens were also being 
raised in many of APCASA members’ residences. These chickens were consumed by the 
family, sold to other Santa Anita families, or sometimes sold at the Colomba market 
(Figure 31).  
 
 
 
Figure 31. Chicken coop in the back of a member’s residence. 
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Some families operated tiendas (stores) out of their houses which would sell 
candy, margarine, bread, or soft drinks. One APCASA member operated two molinos 
(corn milling machines). Residents would begin arriving before 5:00AM to mill their 
corn to make tortillas. The member who had the molinos reported that he had recouped 
his investment of the purchase of the machine in one year, six years ago. He charged 
between Q0.75 and Q1.25, depending on the amount of corn to be milled. The molinos 
provided him with “six years of making money” (SI.10.1).   
Prior to 2012, international donors helped Santa Anita create non-agricultural 
income diversification projects. Santa Anita’s women’s committee were given sewing 
machines and training on how to us the machines to make textiles for sale in 
Quetzaltenango. They were also provided ovens and training on how to make banana 
bread to also sell in Quetzaltenango. A chicken farm and egg production was a third 
project that Santa Anita was involved in prior to the 2012 CLR outbreak. During the 
researcher’s visits, these projects all appeared to be non-existent. The APCASA 
women’s committee reported that they thought the banana bread and sewing operation 
had ceased after group split. They also reported that egg production was no longer 
ongoing, although Santa Anita’s entrance sign still advertised fresh eggs (Figure 32). 
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Figure 32. On-farm income generation. The sign to the right of Santa Anita's entrance 
advertised, "For sale: Fresh eggs, small and large purchases." 
Association Maya controlled these three aforementioned projects after the groups 
split, thus APCASA had no access to those resources. 
Diversification was seen by some in APCASA as difficult and a distraction to 
coffee production. Both banana and coffee used to be cultivated in Santa Anita. When 
the 35 original families arrived in 1998, banana trees were growing and there were plans 
to make the production of banana a commercially viable option (DA.23.2). One 
document from 2005, noted that Santa Anita had approximately nine banana trees in 
each of the 650 cuerdas of coffee (DA.23.2). However during the researcher’s visits 
members noted that banana was no longer cultivated in Santa Anita. “A disease” came 
and killed much of the banana (SI.3.36; SI.1.10). While some banana trees did exist in 
Santa Anita, the researcher noted that they were being attacked by tuzas (gophers) or 
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affected by diseases. It was labor intensive to search for the tuzas and one APCASA 
member reported that the poison used to control tuzas was expensive (Figure 33).  
 
 
 
Figure 33. A field of bananas. The holes were created by the tuza and the farmer 
attempting to locate the animal. 
 
 
 
One member described the problem Santa Anita had attempting to diversify 
production into more than one cash crop.  
One decision was to take 10 cuerdas of each member and plow it all under and 
grow banana instead. But I will tell you I have bananas and they are full of all 
kinds of plagues and bugs. So this is the problem with diversifying. If we grow 
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avocado, the trees will start rotting with sicknesses. Or mangos, oranges, and 
others. The [coffee] roya needs a spray control, just the same as bananas, 
oranges, and mangos. So to diversify just creates more problems. But one thing 
we did was diversify into consumer crops. This means we should have one 
principal crop for the market and then other diverse products to consume like 
corn, beans, or bananas. Or for example cilantro, peppers, guisquiles, or green 
beans. So diversity is a good idea for things that we will consume ourselves as 
these trees don’t require chemicals. If we lose the crop it’s not a big deal. 
(SI.8.28) 
Another member noted that several coffee fincas in the Colomba area had 
converted their land to macadamia over the past few years. However, they noted that 
macadamia would create a problem for Santa Anita. Macadamia trees required full sun 
and they did not grow as broad trees that could shade coffee. Instead, the members 
explained that the macadamia competes with coffee for the sun, so that diversifying 
one’s coffee fields with macadamia would only create more problems (KI.3.13). 
One member described the problem with diversifying in their fields, “Right now 
for us to diversify; it’s difficult because in the middle of coffee you can’t grow 
vegetables. The vegetables compete with the coffee” (SI.7.14). The only evidence the 
researcher saw of APCASA’s members cultivating another crop for sale outside (i.e. a 
crop with international demand) of Colomba was cacao. One member noted he had 12 
cacao trees, which yielded two quintales, of which he received Q1,100 for each quintal 
(Figure 34). 
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Figure 34. A member's cacao tree. 
 
 
 
Diversification into other export crops would be difficult for APCASA. They 
attempted to balance coffee and bananas, however the bananas had their host of diseases 
and pests. One member disparaged diversification stating, “You need to buy a 
completely new infrastructure of work and you need a new culture of work. So, imagine 
starting a brand new method of agriculture” (SI.2.18).  
Theme Six: External Assistance 
  External organizations had been involved with APCASA throughout its 16 year 
history. These organizations included the Guatemalan government, local political 
organizations, Guatemalan NGOs, North American NGOs, North American fair-trade 
coffee importers, and North American civil society organizations (e.g. rotary club). 
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APCASA was generally frustrated by the (or lack of) help provided to them by 
Guatemalan organizations. APCASA perceived the greatest value was in North 
American-based NGOs and fair-trade coffee importers. They perceived North American 
organizations as the most likely to help APCASA ameliorate the lingering effects of the 
2012 CLR epidemic and help them develop as high quality coffee producers. When the 
researcher asked direct questions of APCASA interviewees if they had received help in 
the aftermath of the CLR epidemic, all interviewees stated that they had not. However, 
ample evidence of help emerged during interviews pertaining to other subjects. The 
researcher also observed evidence of outside support and found documents referring to 
financial and technical support from external organizations. 
Two themes emerged regarding APCASA’s frustration with external 
organizations. These frustrations were directed at Guatemalan organizations. The first 
theme was that APCASA was not interested in capacity building with no financial 
support. They noted that they had attended trainings provided by ANACAFE, Fondo de 
Tierras, and the Ministerio de Agricultura Ganadería y Alimentación (MAGA; in 
English, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Food) about how to combat the roya 
(K.2.23). The trainings suggested farmers use inputs, however without the economic 
ability to purchase these inputs, APCASA members perceived they received little benefit 
from these trainings. One member stated, “What we need is not words but money for 
inputs” (SI.8.13). Another member remembered a course he received on how to combat 
the broca. He said, “They tell me how to do it, but if I don’t have the ability to purchase 
the inputs, then what good is the training?” (Figure 35) (SI.10.22) 
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Figure 35. A broca trap. The pest would be attracted to the dropper bottle filled with a 
particular type of alcohol. They would hit the dropper and fall into a soap and water 
mixture below, trapping them. APCASA members reported difficulty purchasing the 
alcohol attractant. 
They perceived these trainings as superficial ways for the government and 
ANACAFE to utilize farmers (SI.3.22). They perceived that the money was “spent on 
economists who go and visit fincas” but never do anything. One member alluded to the 
training logs which attendees were required to sign, and noted that the farmer’s 
“signature [on a training log] is worth millions” (SI.11.29; SI.8.15; KI.2.6). 
The second frustration that APCASA had with Guatemalan external 
organizations was their perception that as a small cooperative they would not receive 
assistance. Several members perceived ANACAFE as only being interested in helping 
large producers (KI.2.9; KI.1.44). When one member was asked by the researcher if 
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Guatemalan organizations had assisted APCASA, they replied, “From MAGA and 
ANACAFE, no. We appear disappeared to them. We want ANACAFE to visit 
APCASA, but they have not responded to our request. MAGA is the same problem” 
(SI.14.8). ANACAFE’s training calendar for 2012 showed that four courses would be 
offered at “Finca Santa Anita La Union” on January 24, September 4, July 17, and June 
28 (DA.19.1).  
During two of the three researcher’s visits, the Fondo de Tierras was observed 
meeting with members of the Association Maya. Members told the researcher that since 
the community split, government agronomists and representatives met with Association 
Maya members, but not APCASA. Members of the APCASA women’s committee made 
similar comments, with one saying, “The problem with us here in APCASA is that we 
are few so they don’t pay attention to us” (SI.16.14). The members were frustrated that 
MAGA was neglecting part of their duties. MAGA was responsible in Guatemala for 
improving food security and agricultural extension. However, one APCASA member 
noted of MAGA, “They give out food and the people are happy, but they know here that 
the coffee is still sick” (KI.2.11).  
Most APCASA members mentioned receiving assistance from foreign 
organizations. None mentioned received assistance from foreign governmental 
organizations such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Since 
splitting from the other Santa Anita producers, APCASA created an initiative called, 
“Caminos de Amistad” (Paths to Friendship). This initiative had three objectives to 
create an interchange with farmers, create links with international institutions that could 
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help APCASA, and commercialization to be able to export their coffee abroad (SI.2.16). 
During interviews of other subjects, APCASA members mentioned receiving help from 
their “friends in Canada”, CRS, As Green as it Gets, Quixote Coffee, Cooperative 
Coffees, Tufts University, and Root Capital. CRECER was the only Guatemalan NGO 
that APCASA mentioned receiving assistance from. 
Approximately four years ago, Santa Anita received assistance from CRS’ CAFE 
Livelihoods (Coffee Assistance and Enhanced Livelihoods) project, which appeared to 
be partially funded by the Howard G. Buffett Foundation. In CRS’ final report to the 
Howard G. Buffett Foundation, Santa Anita was mentioned one time. The report stated 
that Santa Anita’s business audit rating increased from 34 to 42 percent and its credit 
rating remained a C during the initial and final rating periods (Catholic Relief Services, 
2011). CRS’ involvement with APCASA was perceived to be beneficial for the 
members. Several favorably recalled the assistance they received from CRS, especially 
from the Guatemalan agronomist CRS hired to work with APCASA (SI.1.12; SI.1.18 
SI.11.25; KI.2.28; KI.3.33). After the CRS project ended, the Guatemalan agronomist 
who managed the project continued to provide technical assistance to APCASA pro 
bono. 
APCASA members received advanced coffee production training by 
international organizations. CRS assisted Santa Anita’s producers with how to manage 
the cooperative’s administration, “financial culture”, and commercialization (SI.11.25). 
Cooperative Coffees assisted APCASA with coffee cupping (i.e. coffee tasting) and the 
organization also paid for one member to travel to the United States to learn coffee 
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roasting (SI.11.27). Quixote Coffee trained APCASA members in financing and 
managing coffee projects. APCASA members brought the researcher to the coffee 
nursery, which they noted was donated by De La Gente, a fair-trade coffee importer 
based in La Antigua, Guatemala. Members reported that De La Gente donated the 
nursery, fungicide, and portable sprayers because of the CLR epidemic (SI.5.17; 
SI.14.9). 
Theme Seven: The International Market’s Lure  
 APCASA’s members had exported coffee to the United States and Germany in 
the past. For approximately eight years, beginning in 2002 and ending in 2010 or 2011, 
Santa Anita exported coffee (KI.3.35). When the researcher visited, APCASA members 
were selling their processed coffee to coyotes in Coatepeque (SI.15.2). APCASA’s 
members did not believe that the Guatemalan market was the best destination for their 
coffee. As one member explained, “Our future vision is to export coffee, organic or 
conventional, but we have to export internationally” (SI.9.23). They perceived there to 
be no future in the Guatemalan market. Exporting to the international market would be 
the best way to make profits from their relatively high quality HB Arabica coffee. One 
member said that for him, “coffee is an ambition” (SI.15.4). In their view, only second-
class coffee was bought and sold in Guatemala. They perceived the international market 
as offering them something different than they could receive in Guatemala. As one 
member explained, “You can make a living with coffee. We have a market in Germany 
and the United States” (SI.7.18) while Guatemala’s economy was perceived as 
“spontaneous and disorganized” (SI.8.9). 
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Building international partnerships, contacts, and increasing international 
visibility was perceived by APCASA to be the primary vehicle for eventually entering 
into an agreement to export coffee to North America or Europe. APCASA members 
reported entering into several types of export agreements. The most beneficial export 
agreements were formal contracts APCASA signed with relatively small scale North 
American and German coffee wholesale purchasers who then sold APCASA’s coffee to 
ten or fifteen local coffee houses or food markets. These agreements were in effect from 
approximately 2009 to 2011. These agreements outlined the quality, quantity, and selling 
price of coffee and provided APCASA with anticipatory funds once a sample was 
received and deemed acceptable by the wholesale purchasers. APCASA members also 
described entering into informal agreements with small scale “fair- or direct-trade” 
coffee exporters based in Antigua, Guatemala. Since 2011, with no formal contracts in 
effect, informal agreements were the only way APCASA was able to reach North 
American or European markets. Informal agreements were one-time agreements 
between certain APCASA members and the small scale “fair- or direct-trade” coffee 
exporters.  
 APCASA was not capable of exporting coffee during the researcher’s visits. One 
member, who others cited as having the most production of any of the cooperative 
members in 2014, reported that De La Gente wanted to purchase his coffee. He was 
unable to sell his processed coffee, because they told him he would be responsible for 
the transportation costs to San Miguel Escobar, near La Antigua, a five-hour ride by 
automobile from Colomba. The member said he would also be responsible for the 
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processing and selection costs (KI.3.27). The members hoped that in subsequent years, 
when they were able to collectively harvest and process more coffee, APCASA would 
sell their coffee to De La Gente (SI.9.24; SI.2.4; SI.5.17). One member described the 
positive experience of exporting coffee in the past. 
Coffee in the United States is sold in 14 ounce bag for $16 or so. I know, because 
I went to the United States, so I know at what price they sell it. One time a 
foreigner I knew, came to me and said, that it’s horrible… He said, “Look they’re 
selling your coffee for $16, but look how little you sell it to them for.” So, he 
wanted to fight for us. But, I told him, “Wait, they send us plants, inputs, and 
other help. They give us also $5 per quintal [above the market rate]. The bags 
were also specially made by them. The bags said “Coffee from Santa Anita, from 
the Mountains of Quetzaltenango, Colomba, Costa Cuca.” They also paid the 
fees for exportation, taxes and everything else. They helped us quite a lot, but the 
foreigner didn’t understand. He thought we were getting ripped off. (SI.7.19) 
The “ultimate objective” for APCASA, as expressed to the researcher, was to 
export coffee (SI.3.35). The two largest obstacles to exporting coffee as perceived by 
APCASA members were production discipline and licensing. To export coffee, 
APCASA had to ensure their processed (i.e. pergamino) coffee was free of nata or 
flawed coffee beans. Only ripe cherries had to be harvested and the cherries had to be 
fermented and cleanly washed (Figure 36) (SI.14.4). 
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Figure 36. Recently harvested coffee. Notice the green unripe cherries were picked along 
with the ripe dark red to purple cherries. 
One member explained APCASA’s first experience exporting coffee, “The 
international market is very particular. Every day it demands a specific and demanding 
product. We were accustomed to selling whatever” (SI.2.11). Another explained, “The 
custom is to cut coffee and take it straight to the market, but with exporting it you have 
to store it, and then sell it all at once. Cooperative Coffees wanted a lot of coffee from 
us, but we couldn’t deliver [after the roya affected our production] and communication 
with them was lost” (SI.14.7). Licensing was the other obstacle to exportation. 
APCASA’s members were unable to furnish documents to the researcher pertaining to 
past export agreements. To export coffee from Guatemala, the members perceived 
themselves as having two options. One option was to sell it to a fair-trade coffee 
cooperative/NGO in Guatemala who would then arrange for the processing and 
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transportation to North America or Europe. This would have been difficult, because their 
production was so low after the roya that they were unable to produce enough for the 
fair-trade coffee exporters. The other option would be apply for an export license 
themselves, however this would have to be done through ANACAFE. Members had 
little confidence this option would work. 
Although there were several obstacles to exporting coffee, APCASA was 
uniformly in agreement that it had to remain the ultimate objective. This was a point of 
contention with members of the Association Maya, and cited as one reason why 
APCASA split and formed their own cooperative. Association Maya members were 
perceived as not interested in the export market and they did not want to invest time and 
labor into their coffee fields. 
122 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
            The discussion is presented in the context of the study’s five research objectives: 
1. Describe the effects of the CLR epidemic on the cooperative members’ food
security. 
2. Describe the effects of the CLR epidemic on the cooperative’s livelihoods (e.g.
employment, social networks, health, and education). 
3. Describe and analyze coping mechanisms that the cooperative members employ
to preserve their livelihoods from the CLR’s effects on coffee production. 
4. Develop a grounded theory to explain how the food security and livelihoods of
the cooperative are affected by the CLR epidemic. 
5. Develop a smallholder coffee producer vulnerability framework that could be
used to forecast how the food security and livelihoods of smallholder coffee 
producers may be affected by future production disruptions. 
CLR’s Effects on APCASA Members’ Food Security 
Results indicated that the CLR epidemic increased APCASA members’ food 
insecurity. For the purpose of this study, food security was defined as the economic 
access (ability to acquire through trade, production, purchase, and transfer) to food. 
APCASA’s members’ food insecurity was caused by the loss of production and labor-
based entitlements. APCASA members experienced coffee production losses ranging 
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from 50 to 90 percent, which made them at-risk of food entitlement decline (Sen, 1981). 
APCASA members reported ameliorating the effects of food insecurity by eating less 
food, skipping meals, eating less desirable foods, searching for off-farm employment to 
make money to purchase food, and borrowing money to purchase food. Members 
reported difficulty in allocating financial resources between food and other household 
expenses such as education, transportation, and healthcare. Interviewees described 
feelings of uncertainty, risk, and fear about meeting food needs while still being able to 
invest in coffee production. 
Data collected on APCASA’s struggle for food security agree with research 
revealing chronic food insecurity in Central American smallholder coffee producing 
communities (Caswell, Mendez, & Bacon, 2012; Fujisaka, 2007; Mendez, Bacon, Olson, 
Morris, & Shattuck, 2010; Morris, Mendez, & Olson, 2013). APCASA members 
reported a history of difficulty in meeting food needs. Prior to the 2012 CLR epidemic, 
APCASA members described a history of crises affecting their livelihoods and food 
security. The CLR epidemic affected APCASA members’ food security, yet it was not 
perceived as more threatening than the crises they previously experienced ranging from 
severe harvest losses after Hurricane Stan to low coffee prices of the early 2000s. The 
CLR epidemic caused APCASA members to balance scarce financial resources between 
food, other household expenditures, and coffee production inputs. The difficulty of 
balancing resources supports previous research of smallholder coffee farmers in Central 
America (Caswell, Mendez, & Bacon, 2012; Morris, Mendez, & Olson, 2013; Steinberg 
& Taylor, 2009). 
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 Members reported the most difficulty in meeting food and household expenditure 
needs for eight months, lasting from January to August. The data suggested a longer 
“lean period” when food and household expenditures competed with farm investments 
than Bacon et al. (2010) that found smallholder Nicaraguan coffee producers 
experienced an average of 3.15 months of food insecurity. Some members mentioned 
January as an especially stressful month to meet expenses and acquire food. January is 
when the Guatemalan school year starts, thus a time when enrollment fees, uniforms, 
and books are bought for children. January usually coincided with the end of harvests 
(i.e. profits for coffee farmers), but members reported this month was spent repaying 
debts to laborers and banks which left less money for household expenses. Others 
mentioned January through March as being the most difficult, because these months 
were when APCASA members had to invest the most in their fields by purchasing new 
coffee plants, soil amendments, fertilizer, and fungicide. The CLR epidemic killed (or 
weakened) the majority of APCASA members’ coffee trees, forcing them to invest even 
more than what was normally required during the January to March coffee planting 
season. These findings are different than the Famine Early Warning Systems Network’s 
(FEWS NET) report (2014), noting that Central American coffee producers’ “lean 
season” was from April to August.  
 There was no evidence of acute food insecurity in Santa Anita. Acute food 
insecurity can be demonstrated by destructive coping mechanisms (e.g. selling 
productive farm assets or jewelry), the presence of severely underweight children, a high 
infant mortality rate, and/or nutritional oedema (World Health Organization, 2006). The 
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researcher did not observe outward signs of these conditions and interviewees could not 
recall these acute food insecurity conditions existing in Santa Anita. Members reported 
having sufficient support through APCASA’s social safety net for themselves and their 
families. The government-run pre-kindergarten and elementary school was viewed as a 
buffer against hunger, because it provided APCASA’s children with food during the 
school day. The regional coordinator of the Guatemalan Ministry of Health’s food 
security program (“Pacto Hambre Cero” or Zero Hunger Challenge) noted that while 
chronic food insecurity was present in many smallholder coffee communities like Santa 
Anita, acute food insecurity cases were nearly all located in more geographically remote 
communities than Santa Anita. The coordinator did not have, and could not recall in the 
past, any cases of acute food insecurity in Santa Anita. Though APCASA members 
reported there had never been a state of “hambruna” (severe hunger) in Santa Anita, they 
did describe experiencing chronic food security.  
CLR’s Effects on APCASA Members’ Livelihoods 
Livelihoods are defined as a “portfolio of activities and social support 
capabilities” to improve standards of living (Ellis, 1999, p.2). Beside coffee production, 
members reported off-farm employment as the most important livelihood activity. 
Members increased their off-farm employment activities after the CLR epidemic arrived.  
Dramatic drops in coffee production in 2013 and 2014 led APCASA members to search 
for work outside of the Boca Costa region. Santa Anita farmers, and neighboring coffee 
producing communities in the region, offered less short-term labor opportunities (e.g. 
harvesting) for APCASA members because of the coffee rust. As the rust decreased 
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production, so did the demand for laborers in the region. APCASA members’ perceived 
their best option was to search for employment in commercial zones of Guatemala City, 
Quetzaltenango, or on banana, cacao, and coffee plantations in Chiapas, Mexico.  
APCASA did not report on-farm small business ventures, such as raising 
chickens, selling eggs, or roasting coffee, as contributing to members’ livelihoods. 
Receiving visitors was reported as the most beneficial on-farm business opportunity for 
APCASA. Visiting international tourists and Guatemalan students provided APCASA 
members with additional income through room, board, and paying for charlas (talks) on 
coffee production or the members’ experiences during the civil war. International 
tourists were especially valued for their potential to provide donations or being able to 
possibly organize direct/fair trade coffee sale agreements. The CLR epidemic did not 
have an effect on these livelihood activities. However, APCASA members reported a 
decline in these on-farm business ventures after they split with Association Maya.  
APCASA members used their social and financial capital to stabilize livelihoods 
after the 2012 CLR epidemic. Members reported taking out short-term loans from local 
banks set up by the government to serve agricultural communities. While the money was 
loaned to members on the pretense that it would be invested in the coffee fields, the 
money was sometimes spent to purchase food. APCASA represented a powerful social 
force. Social capital is a multi-dimensional concept that is frequently defined as a 
people’s trust that the social networks available to them can be used for productive 
purposes (Grootaert, Narayan, Nyhan Jones, & Woolcock, 2004). Being a part of 
APCASA provided members with coffee production and social benefits. Members 
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perceived an increasing usefulness in the cooperatives’ functions after the CLR epidemic 
first appeared. Members reported feeling bewildered about how to combat the CLR; the 
cooperative helped them form a unified strategy. The cooperative allowed members to 
make long-term plans and to provide legitimacy when searching for fair-trade coffee 
exporting partners or international donors for small-scale development projects (e.g. 
constructing the warehouse). APCASA represented a valuable livelihood strategy for 
members despite them having to transfer some individual autonomy to the group 
dynamic.  
Santa Anita’s cooperatives 
APCASA members might have been especially responsive to forming a 
cooperative, because of their prior history of taking part in political and paramilitary 
organizations. APCASA’s coffee producers chose to join the leftist URNG guerilla 
group in their youth or young adulthood. While most members reported not being active 
politically, they still self-described themselves as belonging to the “izquierda” (the left). 
Thus Santa Anita’s community members might have been inclined to form a coffee 
cooperative when they arrived together in Santa Anita in 1998. However, APCASA 
members described feeling disillusioned with how the first unified Santa Anita 
cooperative was organized to share land, labor, and profits equally. 
APCASA members recalled that producers who were now a part of Association 
Maya avoided working in Santa Anita’s coffee fields and would search for work outside 
of Santa Anita or attach themselves to the cooperative’s administrative office. APCASA 
members perceived themselves as more industrious workers, while reporting those in the 
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Association Maya were more concerned with off-farm employment than coffee 
production. While the information on production efficacy between groups was 
influenced by interviewing only APCASA members, it appeared that some members 
were unfairly reaping the rewards at the expense of others. In or around 2007, the 
community decided to remain a producers’ cooperative, but to end collective farming 
and hold a lottery and parcel out an equal amount of land to each producer. Producers 
would be responsible for working their own land, but harvests would be processed and 
sold together. Profits would be distributed according to how much each producer had 
harvested.  
The 2012 CLR epidemic presented a defining moment for APCASA. Members 
could decide to leave the cooperative, remain within a relatively small 10 member (eight 
active producers) cooperative, or choose individually or together to reunify with the 
other 25 Santa Anita producers of Association Maya. APCASA members chose to 
remain a small cooperative. It was surprising that even in the wake of the CLR epidemic 
and its effects on food security and production, APCASA made no apparent move to 
reunify with Association Maya. No members of APCASA expressed a desire to reunify 
with the Association Maya, despite reporting the benefits of (a) being part of a larger 
cooperative, (b) being able to use the community’s means of coffee processing (e.g. the 
ecological beneficio; professional coffee roaster), and (c) making themselves a larger 
unified group, and thus a more desirable fair-trade export partner.  
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APCASA Members’ Coping Mechanisms 
 The 2012 CLR epidemic, and lingering effects on coffee production to December 
2014, caused APCASA members to employ coping mechanisms consisting of changes to 
(a) coffee production methods, and (b) livelihood strategies. These findings are similar 
to studies documenting livelihood and production changes in food insecure Nicaraguan 
and Salvadorian coffee producing communities (Bacon et al., 2008; Jaffee, 2007; Morris, 
Mendez, & Olson, 2013). APCASA members narrowed their coffee cultivation focus 
from the 30 cuerdas of land each member owned to five. The purpose of this change was 
for members to be able to use limited financial means to rehabilitate their coffee fields 
and protect against future rust outbreaks.  
Members reported converting coffee production from organic to conventional as 
another coping mechanism. Santa Anita’s move away from organic production and 
toward conventional occurred when their most recent export agreement ended in 2010-
2012. The CLR epidemic hastened the community’s move toward fully conventional 
production. The rust was perceived to be a greater threat to organically grown coffee 
than conventionally grown coffee. Crop management techniques that prevent coffee rust 
are “not well documented and remain controversial” (Avelino, Willocquet, & Savary, 
2004, p. 541). Environmental variables, including the effects of microclimates, shade, 
weather, soil acidity, and precipitation have made it difficult to generalize about the best 
methods for preventing and managing coffee rust (Arneson, 2000; Avelino, Willocquet, 
& Savary, 2004). Members perceived copper-based fungicides and conventional 
fertilizer as the two best coffee rust management methods available, given the members’ 
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knowledge and financial resources. Chemically-based fertilizers were applied to 
strengthen the plants’ resistance to future rust outbreaks. Copper-based fungicides have a 
“tonic effect” that increases yields while also controlling the coffee rust (Arneson, 2000, 
para 20). Organic coffee demanded more labor than conventional coffee in the form of 
additional cleanings (i.e. weeding), fertilizing, and the labor required to transport bulkier 
organic materials to the coffee fields. Members received no price benefit from the local 
Guatemalan market to produce organic coffee, thus APCASA perceived conventional 
production as a better way to recover from the CLR epidemic than organic production.   
 APCASA members perceived off-farm employment as the most effective coping 
mechanism to the CLR epidemic. At least one family member of the eight producers (or 
the producers themselves) interviewed had worked outside of Santa Anita. The money 
made from off-farm employment was used for three purposes: coffee investment, 
household food purchases, and school fees. Members perceived off-farm employment as 
an ambiguous livelihood strategy. Off-farm employment provided much needed income 
for household expenses when the CLR took away the primary means of income. 
However, off-farm employment also took members away from caring for their coffee 
fields. In Santa Anita, members reported jornaleros (day laborers) were paid Q35-Q40 
per day. APCASA members’ own labor in their coffee could be similarly valued at this 
rate. A laborer in Quetzaltenango or Guatemala City could make Q75-Q100 per day, 
however they would have to pay transportation, room, and board. While members could 
make considerably more money in off-farm labor (especially the longer they were 
employed) than as coffee laborers, there remained the problem of how to care for their 
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coffee fields. Most frequently, members paid jornaleros, from Santa Anita or a 
neighboring community, to perform the necessary cleaning, shading, and fertilizing tasks 
while the owners were away working off-farm jobs. But these workers had to be paid 
Q35-Q40, thus reducing the profit APCASA members made from off-farm employment 
to Q60-Q65, before room and board expenses were factored. Thus, while off-farm 
employment remained an essential short-term coping mechanism, APCASA members 
perceived coffee cultivation as promising greater rewards. 
 APACASA members used agricultural diversification as a coping mechanism, 
however with one caveat. Despite the threat of another rust outbreak, APCASA 
members were convinced in the future of their coffee production. Diversifying their 
coffee fields into producing another cash crop was perceived as an unnecessary 
distraction. This finding might contradict research of Central American smallholder 
coffee farmers that argued that farmers shift to lower risk subsistence food crops when 
faced with coffee production challenges (Baca, Läderach, Haggar, Götz, & Ovalle, 2014; 
Bacon et al., 2014; Eakin, Tucker, & Castellanos, 2006; Fischer & Victor, 2014; Tucker, 
Eakin, & Castellanos, 2010). While all APCASA members did report cultivating food 
crops, members did not report increasing cash or food crop production by reducing 
investments in coffee production.   
APCASA members believed in the profitability of exporting their coffee and had 
enjoyed profits in the past through profitable export agreements. While the rust 
devastated their coffee production capabilities, they perceived no benefit from other cash 
crops, such as banana or macadamia. These other cash crops were perceived to be 
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equally susceptible to diseases, plagues, and pests. Thus switching from coffee to 
another cash crop would only expose members’ livelihoods to production problems 
requiring a different set of mitigation strategies and/or chemical remedies. Agricultural 
diversification was used as a coping mechanism, however only if it did not interfere with 
members’ coffee production capabilities.  
APCASA members perceived growing subsistence food crops as an essential 
coping mechanism as long as it did not take away from coffee production. They could 
consume what they produced or take produce to the local market. Growing food crops 
was done in their residential lots or communally held land. Rarely did members plant 
food crops within their coffee fields. Members reported that their staple food crops (e.g. 
corn, guisquil, and beans) did not grow well in Santa Anita’s soil and profits were rarely 
made in Colomba’s central market. Thus, while growing food crops was a coping 
mechanism to fight food insecurity and a decrease in income, it was not perceived to be 
long-term livelihood diversification strategy. 
External assistance  
 There appeared to be a divergence of perceptions and realities pertaining to the 
external assistance provided to APCASA. The researcher observed a gap between how 
much assistance members reported that they received and the amount of assistance from 
external organizations that they did receive. APCASA members appeared to underreport 
the amount and type of assistance they received to the researcher. The assistance referred 
both to recent help provided to combat the rust and general assistance before and after 
the rust epidemic. When members were asked the three questions (Appendix A) during 
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interviews pertaining to receiving (a) non-governmental assistance, (b) Guatemalan 
governmental assistance, or (c) technical assistance from any entity, members nearly 
always answered that they had not received assistance.  
However during interviews of other topics, members repeatedly referred to 
receiving assistance from a host of entities including non-governmental organizations, 
fair-trade coffee exporters, the Guatemalan government, ANACAFE, Fondo de Tierras, 
small North American civic organizations (e.g. rotary clubs), North American 
universities, and international tourists. The researcher observed evidence of this 
assistance in the form of donations that included the warehouse, the concrete patio for 
drying coffee, a mechanized coffee demucilager, 900-1000 young coffee plants, and 
portable pesticide sprayers. APACASA members openly described these items as being 
donated by various international “partners”. Despite what appeared to be ample external 
assistance by the research, the donations may have been perceived by members as not 
being sufficient to sustain production, food security, or livelihoods.  
 When the researcher interviewed a key informant who was also a small producer 
in the Colomba area, he perceived that only “special” groups of coffee producers 
received help from international organizations. According to him, organizations that 
received help were managed or founded by women, indigenous Maya, or were ex-
guerilla fighters like Santa Anita. “Normal” small producers, especially those who were 
not part of a cooperative, had no chance of acquiring international assistance. The 
researcher submitted multiple Internet searches using the terms “Santa Anita 
Guatemala,” “APCASA,” “APCASA coffee,” “Santa Anita La Union,” “APCASA 
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cafe,” and several other variants of these terms. The searches returned dozens of articles 
specifically mentioning (or alluding to) technical and financial assistance Santa Anita’s 
farmers received from others (Appendix G). It remains unknown why members appeared 
to give minimal weight to the external assistance received. One possibility was that 
interviewees wanted to appear deprived when faced by a foreign visitor (i.e. the 
researcher) who could provide them with assistance. However, it is more likely that the 
assistance was perceived as not effective and/or insufficient to sustain livelihoods. One 
member mentioned that, while assistance from foreigners was valued, it merely provided 
the cooperative the ability to “breathe a little” (KI.2.28). 
One final point to consider with respect to external assistance was that despite the 
support Santa Anita received, they appeared just as vulnerable to the CLR as other 
smallholder-producing communities. The researcher observed members over the course 
of three weeks. Most member households had no televisions, no members had a vehicle, 
and no member households had washing machines. Most homes lacked basic furniture 
other than one dining table, chairs, and beds. Members did not appear to have personally 
benefited from external assistance. It appeared that prior support to the unified Santa 
Anita community cooperative was negated, first by the split in the community, and then 
by the CLR epidemic. Santa Anita could provide a cautionary tale to external 
organizations intent on helping coffee-producing communities in developing countries. 
Despite assistance from dozens of Guatemalan organizations, international NGOs, fair-
trade exporters, and individuals, Santa Anita appeared to be as vulnerable as other 
communities that had received minimal or no external assistance. 
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A Grounded Theory 
Introduction 
 The CLR epidemic increased APCASA’s food insecurity and threatened 
members’ livelihoods. The CLR epidemic forced members to use coping strategies that 
changed coffee production and livelihood strategies. APCASA’s members’ food 
insecurity was caused by the loss of production and labor-based entitlements. Members 
reported that the CLR intensified symptoms of chronic food insecurity including not 
having enough food to eat, eating less desirable food, borrowing money to purchase 
food, skipping meals, and having feelings of worry about acquiring food in the future. 
There were no outward signs of acute food insecurity in Santa Anita. APCASA members 
experienced coffee production losses ranging from 50 to 90 percent which made them at 
risk of food entitlement decline. Decreases in coffee production from the CLR epidemic 
in Santa Anita, and other coffee-producing communities in the region, increased the 
need for APCASA members to search for off-farm employment in urban areas in 
Guatemala and on Mexican plantations in the state of Chiapas.  
 APCASA remained committed to Arabica coffee production (specifically the 
Bourbon variety) even though Arabica (and specifically Bourbon) was at most risk to 
future rust outbreaks. Members did not intend to diversify their coffee fields to produce 
food crops or cash crops. Diversification was perceived as diverting attention away from 
the main goal of producing high quality HB Arabica beans for export. Members reported 
planting more food crops behind their residences and in communally-held land as a 
response to income losses from coffee infected with CLR.  
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Grounded theory 
The purpose of this study was to develop a theory about how the CLR affected 
the food security and livelihoods of members from one Guatemalan coffee cooperative. 
The data and analysis revealed that the CLR increased chronic food security by 
decreasing coffee production which resulted in less income for the cooperative’s 
households. The CLR had an even more dramatic effect on the farmers’ livelihoods as 
they were forced to search for off-farm employment, borrow money, and intensify their 
investment in their coffee fields affected by the CLR. However, despite the threat posed 
by the CLR to members’ food security, livelihoods, and coffee production, APCASA 
members were committed to producing high quality Arabica coffee for export. In 
summary, the grounded theory of how the CLR affected the food security and 
livelihoods of APCASA members is that “Despite the CLR’s devastating effects on food 
security, and even more so, livelihoods, cooperative members perceived coffee to be 
their only hope out of poverty.” 
Smallholder Coffee Producer Vulnerability Framework 
It is suggested that the smallholder coffee producer vulnerability framework be 
used to understand and analyze future livelihoods disruptions of smallholder coffee 
producers. The smallholder coffee producer vulnerability framework was developed 
during the course of this research and is partially based on a modified version of 
Scoones’ (2009) sustainable livelihoods framework checklist (Appendix D). The 
smallholder coffee producer vulnerability framework consists of three stages. The first 
stage involves analyzing the producers’ context, resources, and the institutions and 
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organizations that influence the producers. The second stage analyzes the vulnerabilities 
that threaten food security, production, income, and/or livelihoods. The third stage 
analyzes the response to vulnerabilities by examining coping mechanisms, 
diversification, and external assistance. The smallholder coffee producer vulnerability 
framework could be used to evaluate smallholder coffee producers’ livelihoods and 
predict production and livelihoods outcomes. A visual conceptualization of the 
framework is presented (Figure 37). 
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Figure 37. Smallholder coffee producer vulnerability framework.
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CHAPTER VI 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Introduction 
The results and recommendations of this case study are primarily intended for 
two audiences: International development organizations (IDOs) and international 
agricultural extension organizations. Caution is advised in generalizing this case study to 
other populations, unless they share Santa Anita farmers’ characteristics, challenges, and 
hopes as food insecure smallholder farmers in developing countries. 
The recommendations are organized into three categories: (a) Practical 
recommendations for organizations working specifically with Central American 
smallholder coffee farmers affected by the CLR; (b) Policy recommendations for IDOs 
and international agricultural extension organizations working with vulnerable 
smallholder coffee producing communities; and (c) Recommendations for future 
research. 
Practical Recommendations to Mitigate CLR’s Effects on Food Security and 
Livelihoods 
IDOs and international agricultural extension organizations should treat the CLR 
as one, but not the only, challenge confronted by smallholder coffee farmers. While the 
CLR received considerable attention in the media, plagues and crises were not new to 
Santa Anita’s farmers. IDOs and international agricultural extension organizations 
should understand that traditional coffee pests can be just as damaging to coffee 
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production as the CLR. Additionally, coffee production losses resulting from climate 
change, low prices, and labor scarcity can compound losses from the CLR. Thus, CLR 
mitigation projects/programs should be built into a larger livelihoods approach that 
mitigates the CLR, but also reduces traditional threats to coffee production. In summary, 
CLR mitigation projects/programs should be designed holistically not diagnostically.  
Coffee production assistance should be prioritized over food aid to coffee-
producing communities affected by the CLR. APCASA members requested technical 
and financial assistance to recover from the CLR. While Santa Anita suffered from 
chronic food insecurity, acute food insecurity was not present. Members specifically 
stated they did not desire food assistance. Food assistance was perceived by members as 
an inexpensive tactic used by Guatemalan political parties and the government to gain 
support from the populace. APCASA’s coffee farmers believed in the future profitability 
of their coffee. They specifically stated they did not desire “handouts”; what they needed 
was CLR recovery assistance. Thus, coffee cooperatives should be provided temporary 
technical and financial assistance to renew their coffee fields with rust-resistant 
cultivars. Food aid should only be provided to communities facing acute food insecurity.  
IDOs and international agricultural extension organizations should establish 
CLR-related farmer-to-farmer exchanges. APCASA members reported feeling 
devastated in 2012-2013, perceiving that the CLR had only affected their community. 
Their outlook improved after they realized it had affected nearly all smallholder 
producers in Guatemala and Southern Mexico. Farmer-to-farmer exchanges, could bring 
together coffee farmers from different countries and regions to share knowledge about 
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possible coffee rust control techniques. Farmer-to-farmer exchanges, geared specifically 
toward strategies to mitigate the CLR, could (a) help farmers experiment with new 
mitigation strategies; (b) provide farmers with socio-economic support from other 
farmer groups; and (c) provide an established network to which research centers (e.g. 
PROMECAFE; CGIAR) can disseminate extension advice. 
IDOs should facilitate market familiarization programs between producers and 
buyers. The program(s) should constitute two interconnecting functions, (a) information 
sharing, and (b) producer-buyer exchanges. There is a significant amount of doubt and 
uncertainty among coffee wholesale buyers about Arabica coffee availability in Central 
America. Smallholder farmers many times also lack the knowledge and abilities to 
connect with foreign buyers. Market familiarization programs should share production 
information with buyers, so they are aware that despite production losses from the CLR, 
high quality Arabica coffee is still being produced in Central America. Producer-buyer 
exchanges could bring producers to destination markets in the United States, Canada, 
and Europe to facilitate export agreements and/or increase understanding of how coffee 
is marketed and sold to consumers. The exchanges could also bring buyers to coffee-
producing regions in Central America that are producing coffee despite being affected 
by the CLR epidemic.  
Policy Recommendations for Improving the Livelihoods of Vulnerable Smallholder 
Coffee Farmers 
IDOs and international agricultural extension organizations should continue 
promoting cooperatives as a powerful tool to empower farmers, but they should also 
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protect against the possibility of the cooperatives fragmenting communities. 
Cooperatives are frequently promoted as a logical “easy win” strategy to improve 
farmers’ livelihoods. Cooperatives can empower farmers, allow them to negotiate for 
higher prices, and facilitate knowledge exchange and social support between members. 
They can also serve as de facto political organizations that divide communities. The 
cooperative (or its leaders) can choose to exclude the use of resources to certain people, 
as was the case in Santa Anita. IDOs and international agricultural extension agents 
should design cooperative training programs that include topics such as (a) increasing 
community inclusiveness; and (b) transparent administration. The purpose of these 
cooperative training programs is that they would focus on strengthening the cooperative 
from a socio-political institution standpoint instead of as a technical, market-oriented 
entity.  
IDOs and international agricultural extension organizations should promote crop 
diversification only after receiving input and buy-in from farmers. Agricultural 
diversification is frequently endorsed as a way to protect livelihoods against a plague 
like the coffee rust. However, from the APCASA members’ point-of-view, 
diversification had significant disadvantages. Organizations promoting crop 
diversification among smallholder coffee farmers should seek input, and if 
diversification is deemed feasible, buy-in from farmers and/or cooperatives.  
Finally, the CLR epidemic showed that there was no single institution 
responsible for providing research-based policy advice to stakeholders and/or an 
institution responsible for disseminating this advice to producers. Research-based policy 
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advice is disseminated by country-specific agricultural ministries, NGOs, large 
international development organizations (e.g. USAID), international research centers 
(e.g. CGIAR; PROMECAFE) coffee industry-supported research (e.g. Keurig Green 
Mountain), and research centers supported by a combination of public, private, and 
industry funds (e.g. World Coffee Research).  
These organizations/centers/foundations should collaborate to promote one 
international coffee research and development center to promote worldwide coffee 
production. While research and development should be supported and conducted by a 
combination of stakeholders, the lack of coordination between stakeholders created a 
muffled and fragmentary response to the CLR epidemic. An organization, modeled after 
CGIAR’s research centers or USAID’s Feed the Future Innovation Labs, could serve to 
coordinate responses to the CLR and future challenges to coffee production. While 
coffee is not a food crop, it is a globally-traded product desired by millions of consumers 
that contributes to the food security and livelihoods of millions of people in developing 
countries, and thus worthy of better coordination between stakeholders. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Future research related to this study’s objectives 
 APCASA members were interested in diversification only if it did not divert 
resources away from coffee production. Future research should further explore the 
perceptions of crop diversification, coffee production, and the CLR. Members also 
appeared committed to planting the Bourbon variety because of its superior flavor, 
despite being the Arabica variety most susceptible to the CLR. Future research should 
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explore reasons why members preferred planting a) Arabica more than Robusta; and b) 
Bourbon more than other Arabica varieties, despite their relative fragilities to the CLR.   
 Research should also follow-up on the study’s objectives in future years. How 
will the 2012 CLR epidemic be perceived in two, five, or 10 years? How did the coping 
mechanisms that the researcher described ultimately contribute or detract from 
APCASA’s food security and livelihoods? A comparative case study could compare 
Santa Anita with similar Guatemalan smallholder coffee-producing communities to 
understand how each community perceived and reacted to the CLR. It is suggested that a 
comparative case study be completed in Finca Blanca Flor in the Chuva region of the 
Colomba municipality. Finca Blanca Flor is considered by Santa Anita to be a “sister 
community” because it is also a smallholder coffee farming community founded by ex-
guerilla fighters in the late 1990s. Several communities in the El Palmar and La Florida 
municipalities of Quetzaltenango consist of smallholder coffee farmers. A case study 
similar to this one could explore questions of food security, livelihoods, and the CLR in 
these communities.  
Future research tangential to this study’s objectives 
The case study illuminated several interesting questions that were not connected 
to the CLR epidemic’s effects on food security and livelihoods. Additional research 
could examine the community-power dynamic between APCASA and Association 
Maya. Community disunity came up repeatedly throughout the research, although it did 
not appear to be related to, or affected by, the CLR epidemic. What were the reasons 
why Santa Anita community members decided to split into two cooperatives? Did the 
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disunity between cooperatives affect coffee production, market linkages, or livelihoods? 
If so, how?  
APCASA members described changes to Guatemalan coffee labor practices 
during their lifetime. Coffee plantations have largely stopped employing mozos, or full-
time workers who live permanently on the property, in favor of temporary wage labor. 
What are the implications of this change for rural communities who derive the majority 
of their income from producing or laboring in coffee production? Did the change in 
labor modify coffee production in Guatemala? If so, how?  
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APPENDIX A 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR COOPERATIVE MEMBERS 
General Introduction 
Thank you for receiving me today. I appreciate you being able to spend some time 
speaking with me. I would like to hear about how you got started growing coffee.  
1. Could you tell me about your life on this finca (coffee plantation)? 
a. How did you come to be here? How did you get started growing coffee? 
b. What kinds of work do you and your family engage in on this finca? 
What kinds of crops (or agricultural products) do you produce? 
2. What is life like as a ______________ (smallholder coffee producer, coffee 
laborer, member of a coffee cooperative etc.) on this finca? 
Coffee Production 
Thank you for telling me a little bit about your life on the finca. I would be interested in 
hearing more about how you produce coffee (or work in coffee production).  
1. Can you discuss with me about how you grow (or how this finca grows) coffee? 
Could you describe: 
a. The techniques you/this finca uses to grow coffee? 
b. The types of varieties planted? Why are these varieties planted? 
c. How is the coffee processed? 
d. How is the coffee sold?  
e. Any recent challenges to how coffee is grown on this finca? 
f. Any recent changes to how coffee is grown on this finca? 
 
Livelihoods: Social and Economic Aspects of Coffee Production 
Thank you for helping me understand how coffee is grown on this finca. Now that I 
understand a little bit more about how you are involved in the production of coffee, I 
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would like to understand the social and economic aspects of coffee producers/laborers 
like you.  
1. Can you tell me about how you make a living producing (or laboring in) coffee? 
a. What are the costs you incur? How do you make money? What are the 
risks you face? 
b. Are there ways that a coffee farmer (or laborer) is able to make money 
outside of coffee? For example, cultivating other crops or working other 
jobs. 
2. How has the way people make a living (producing or laboring) in coffee changed 
during your lifetime? 
a. Can you tell me about experiences you have had in other regions? 
b. Can you tell me about your experiences on different types of fincas, such 
as large privately-owned fincas? 
c. Can you tell me about the coffee crisis in Guatemala in the 1990s and 
early 2000s? Did it affect you or your family? If so, how? 
3. How are smallholder coffee farmers treated in Guatemalan society? How are 
coffee laborers treated in Guatemalan society? 
4. Are there ways that people like you who are engaged in coffee production 
organize for economic purposes? Could you describe these organizations and 
how they operate? 
5.  Are there ways that people like you who are engaged in coffee production 
organize for political or social purposes? Could you describe these organizations 
and how they operate? 
a. Are you (or others in this finca) part of a coffee cooperative? If so, can 
you describe how it operates? What benefits does it provide? What are (if 
any) drawbacks to being part of the cooperative? 
6. Do you have any thoughts about your work as a coffee farmer/laborer and how it 
interacts with the natural environment? 
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a. Can you describe how the environment affects your work? Can you 
describe how your work in coffee production affects the environment? 
 
Coffee Rust: Food Security and Livelihoods 
Nearly every person I have spoken with in Guatemala about coffee mentions that the 
roya (coffee leaf rust) has deeply affected people like you who depend upon coffee for 
their livelihood. I would like to ask you a few questions about how the roya has affected 
your income and your ability to provide for your family.  
1. How has the roya affected your economic income? 
a. Have you had difficulty meeting the needs of daily spending on such 
things as food, education for children, transport, and health care over the 
past few years because of the roya?  
2. If you have had difficulty purchasing food for you and/or family, can you 
describe this more? 
a. If you have had difficulty providing food in the past few years because of 
the roya, how have you tried to improve the situation? 
3. Have you or anyone else in your household made decisions to try and improve 
the economic situation since the roya started affecting coffee in this region? For 
example, migration, looking for other types of work, reducing certain expenses, 
or changing the way you produce (or work in) coffee. 
 
International, National, and NGO Assistance 
1. Have you (or others in this finca) received help from any international 
organization? This can include NGOs, or foreign governments like the European 
Union, United Nations, and the US Government)  
a. If so, can you describe the help received? 
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2. Have you (or others in this finca) received help from the Guatemalan 
government?  
a. If so, can you describe the help received? 
3. Have you (or others in this finca) received technical assistance in coffee 
production from agricultural engineers, extension agents from MAGA, or 
international volunteers? 
a. If so, can you describe the help you received? 
 
Conclusion 
Thank you for taking the time to speak with me about your life as a smallholder coffee 
producer. I had many questions, and I appreciate you being patient in answering them. If 
there is anything else you would like to speak about please let me know.  
1. Is there anything else we did speak about that you would like to add more to? 
a) Would you like to clarify any answers or information you provided me 
such as: 
a) How you grow coffee? The effects of the roya? 
b) Your community? The cooperative you are part of? 
c) How you provide for yourself and your family? 
d) Assistance you have received from others? 
b) Is there anything that I did not mention, but which you think is important? 
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APPENDIX B 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW PROTOCOL FOR KEY INFORMANTS 
International Organizations (e.g. USAID, CRS and other INGOs) 
Thank you for being able to spend some time with me today to discuss coffee production 
in Guatemala. I would like to discuss your organization’s work in Guatemala’s coffee 
production chain, current challenges, and the effects (if any) that these challenges have 
had on smallholder coffee producers.  
1. Can you describe your organization’s work with Guatemalan coffee 
producers? 
a) What are the current priorities of this work? Why are these priorities? 
 
I am currently researching the effects that the roya (coffee leaf rust disease) has had on a 
cooperative of smallholder coffee producers in the Guatemalan western highlands. It 
appears that the roya has affected nearly every coffee producer in Guatemala to at least 
some degree.  
2. Can you tell me about what experiences you have had with the roya in the 
context of your organization’s work? 
a) How has the roya affected the coffee producers with whom you work? 
b) In your experience, has the roya affected the food security of coffee 
producers (with whom you’ve worked directly, or in general)? If so, can 
you describe how their food security has been affected? 
c) In your experience, has the roya affected the livelihoods of coffee 
producers (with whom you’ve worked directly, or in general)? If so, can 
you describe how their livelihoods have been affected? By livelihoods, I 
am referring to how coffee producers make and sustain a living which 
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includes outside employment, education, health, and belonging to social 
networks such as cooperatives.  
3. I know the roya is just one potential challenge to coffee production. In your 
experience are there other challenges facing smallholder Guatemalan coffee 
producers? Possible challenges could include coffee market prices, pests, 
political conditions, etc. If so, can you describe these challenges? 
4. Is your organization specifically working to ameliorate [the challenges 
mentioned]? How so? 
5. Beside your interventions/assistance, have you noticed smallholder coffee 
farmers using their own coping mechanisms to preserve their livelihoods 
from the CLR epidemic’s effects? 
a) If so, can you describe them? 
b) In your own experience and opinion, do these coping mechanisms 
positively contribute to livelihoods, negatively contribute, or do they have 
no net effect?  
 
Thank you for your information. At this time, I believe we have covered everything that 
I had planned to ask you. However, if you feel that we missed an important point of 
discussion, or if you would like to clarify a point, please feel free to do so.   
1. Is there anything else we did speak about that you would like to add more to? 
a) Would you like to clarify any answers or information you provided me? 
b) Is there anything that I did not mention, but which you think is important? 
 
Guatemalan Organizations (e.g. health ministry, agriculture ministry etc.) 
Thank you for being able to spend some time with me today to discuss [coffee 
production, food security, malnutrition, agricultural extension]. I would like to discuss 
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how your organization’s work affects smallholder coffee producing communities in the 
Colomba region.   
1. Can you describe your organization’s work in the Colomba region? 
a) Are there current priorities? Why are these priorities? 
2. For agriculture organizations: What can you tell me about the current state of 
coffee production in the Colomba region? 
3. For health organizations: What can you tell me about the current state of 
health for children age five and under in the Colomba region?  
a) Have you noticed any changes in their health status over the past 2-3 
years? 
I am currently researching the effects that the roya has had on a cooperative of 
smallholder coffee producers near Colomba.  
1. How has the roya affected [agricultural production, food security, 
malnutrition] of coffee producers or communities with whom you work? 
a) Are you aware of ways communities are changing the way they live or 
produce coffee in response to the roya? If so, can you describe them? 
b) In your own experience and opinion, are the ways in which communities 
are changing helping, hurting, or having no effect?  
2. For health organizations: Did you notice any increase in stunting or 
malnutrition among children age five and under in the Colomba region over 
the past 2-3 years?  
I would be interested in seeing any documents you have pertaining to your work with 
coffee producing communities and/or any specific interventions or assistance you 
provided to communities in response to the roya. I am most interested in any information 
you may have pertaining to the Colomba region. 
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1. Do you have, or can you lead me to, any publically available documents 
which could improve my understanding of [food security, malnutrition, 
coffee production] in the Colomba region? 
 
Thank you for speaking with me. At this time, I believe we have covered everything that 
I had planned to ask you. However, if you feel that we missed an important point of 
discussion, or if you would like to clarify a point, please feel free to do so.   
1. Is there anything else we did speak about that you would like to add more to? 
a) Would you like to clarify any answers or information you provided me? 
b) Is there anything that I did not mention, but which you think is important? 
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APPENDIX C 
REFLEXIVE RESEARCH MEMO TEMPLATE 
Type (check all 
that apply) 
Research Activity Report 
Data Analysis 
Peer/Member Check 
Field Note 
Date and Time  
Location  
Possible Topics (Birks, Chapman, & Francis, 2008):  
 Decisions relating to any phase of the study, such as sampling, data collection, 
and analytical procedures.  
 Articulate, explore, contemplate, and challenge interpretations of data. 
 “What is actually happening with the data?”  
 Understand perspectives and decisions. 
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APPENDIX D 
LIVELIHOODS FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS CHECKLIST FOR SITE VISITS, DOCUMENT ANALYSIS, 
OBSERVATIONS, AND REFLEXIVE RESEARCH MEMO 
Describe the context, 
conditions, and trends 
which affect the 
coffee cooperative. 
Identify the livelihood 
resources to which the 
coffee cooperative has 
access. 
Analyze the influences 
that institutions and 
organizations have on 
livelihood resource 
access. 
Construct livelihood 
strategies which members of 
the coffee cooperative use 
to access resources 
Evaluate 
livelihoods 
 
History 
Social Capital 
Describe the institutional 
processes which influence 
the community. How do 
these processes influence 
livelihood resource 
access? 
Pathways: Simple coping 
strategies to access 
resources. 
Analyze 
livelihood 
outcomes. Politics 
Macro-economic 
conditions Economic/financial 
Capital Terms of trade Portfolios: A collection of 
coping strategies to access 
resources. Climate Natural Capital 
Describe the 
organizational 
structures present in the 
community. How do these 
structures influence 
livelihood resource 
access? 
 
Agro-ecology Analyze 
trade-offs to 
different 
resources. 
Demography 
Human Capital 
Holistic interactions: 
Connections between 
coping strategies and 
resource access.  
Social 
differentiation 
Food Security 
Other Resources 
Note: Adapted from Scoones’ (2009) sustainable livelihoods framework checklist 
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APPENDIX E 
TIMELINE OF MAJOR EVENTS IN SANTA ANITA, GUATEMALAN POLITICS, AND THE COFFEE MARKET 
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APPENDIX F 
NOMENCLATURE/SPANISH LANGUAGE TRANSLATION 
 
ANACAFE Asociación Nacional del Café (Guatemalan National Coffee 
Association)  
APCASA Asociación de Productores de Santa Anita (Producers Association 
of Santa Anita) 
Beneficio Literally “benefit”. In Guatemala’s coffee-producing areas it 
referred to coffee processing and storage centers.  
Bodega Literally “warehouse”. A place to store processed coffee.  
Broca Literally “drill”. The colloquial name used for the coffee borer 
beetle (Hypothenemus hampei).  
Cacaxte Mayan language term for a wooden-frame that is strapped to one’s 
back and used to carry goods on foot. 
CAFE Livelihoods Coffee Assistance and Enhanced Livelihoods 
CLR   Coffee leaf rust (Hemileia vastatrix) 
CGIAR  Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
Costal   A burlap or nylon sack used to carry and store coffee.  
Coyote Literally “coyote”. A term used to describe Guatemalan coffee 
purchasing middlemen. 
CRECER A Guatemalan fair-trade association that provides technical and 
advisory services to small agricultural producers/cooperatives.  
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CRS   Catholic Relief Services 
Cuerda An inexact land measurement used in Guatemala. In the Boca 
Costa region (i.e. Santa Anita) 1 cuerda = 25 x 25 varas = 1/16 of 
a manzana. 1 cuerda = 1/10 acre (approx.).   
De La Gente Literally “from the people”. A Guatemalan-based, North 
American-owned fair-trade coffee purchaser/NGO. 
Diversificado  Literally “diversified”. Equivalent to the U.S.’ high school.  
Extra Prime  Lower quality coffee grown at 2,500-3,500 feet above sea level. 
Fondo de Tierras Literally “Land Fund”. Also referred to as FONTIERRAS in 
Guatemala. A government organization created after the civil war 
to address land inequality.  
Finca Literally “estate”. Used to describe medium to large coffee 
holdings in Guatemala.  
HB Hard Bean. High quality coffee grown at 3,500 to 4,500 feet 
above sea level. 
IDO   International Development Organization 
Indigenous In Guatemala, indigenous “indigena” refers to people from the 23 
(21 Mayan) recognized ethic groups that identify with their pre-
Colombian cultures.  
Jornal Literally “wage”. Coffee producers typically refer to one full day 
(8 hours) of labor as a “jornal” (i.e. “It will take three jornales to 
harvest the coffee.”). 
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Jornalero A “wage laborer”.  
Junta   Literally “board”; “assembly”. A decision making group.  
Ladino In Guatemala, being of mixed indigenous and European (Spanish) 
ancestry. Ladinos typically speak Spanish and dress in “western” 
clothing. 
MAGA Ministerio de Agricultura Ganadería y Alimentación (Ministry of 
Agriculture, Livestock, and Food) 
Mozo Literally “porter”. In Guatemala, the term refers to coffee laborers 
who were provided permanent housing on the finca, certain 
social/health benefits, and sometimes, retirement benefits.  
Nata Literally “cream”; “scum”. The second-class beans and other 
materials that float up to the surface when wet-processing coffee.  
NGO   Non-governmental Organization 
Ojo de Gallo  American leaf spot of coffee (Mycena citricolor) 
Oro Literally “gold”. Coffee “in oro” refers to green coffee that has no 
outer parchment shell and that is ready to be roasted.  
Pergamino Green, dried coffee beans still enclosed in the outer parchment 
shell.   
Prime See Extra Prime. Lower quality coffee grown at 2,500-3,500 feet 
above sea level 
PROMECAFE El Programa Cooperativo Regional para el Desarrollo 
Tecnológico y Modernización de la Caficultura (the Regional 
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Cooperative Program for the Technological Development and 
Modernization of Coffee.  
Quintal (QQ) A weight measurement used in Guatemalan agriculture. In coffee 
production, a quintal can have several meanings depending on the 
context and region. In Santa Anita, and in this study, 1 quintal = 
100 pounds.  
Quetzales (Q)  Guatemalan currency.  
Semi-washed A method for processing coffee beans. In Santa Anita, refers to 
beans that were washed immediately and not left to ferment for 
24-36 hours.  
SHB Strictly Hard Bean. The highest quality coffee, grown at 4,500-
6,500 feet above sea level.   
Tierra Caliente Literally “hot land”. In Guatemala, the term refers to costal/low 
elevation land that can support cultivation of tropical crops such 
as sugar cane, coffee, and bananas.  
Tierra Fria Literally “cold land”. In Guatemala, the term refers to high 
elevation/mountain land that can support cultivation of temperate 
food crops such as corn, beans, and squash.  
URNG Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (Guatemalan 
National Revolutionary Unity) 
USAID  U.S. Agency for International Development 
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Uva Literally “grape”. Used to describe a coffee cherry that has 
recently been picked.  
Wet Process A method for processing coffee beans. The sugar coating on the 
beans (mucilage) is left to ferment for 24-36 hours. The mucilage 
is then removed by washing it repeatedly with water or allowing 
the beans to soak in specially designed tanks. Produces “fully-
washed” beans.  
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APPENDIX G 
LIST OF DOCUMENTS USED IN THE CASE STUDY PERTAINING TO SANTA 
ANITA’S HISTORY, APCASA, AND EXTERNAL ASSISTENCE 
The following list of documents was built and used by the researcher throughout the data 
analysis stage. The documents were not used during the pre-data collection or data 
collection stages. The documents helped guide data analysis and were used to triangulate 
the primary data collected from interviews and observations during site visits. All 
Internet links listed functioned as of February 16, 2015.   
  
Code DA.1 
Description De La Gente: APCASA receives coffee fruit de-pulper 
Source http://www.dlgcoffee.org/news/2014/3/31/apcasa-receives-coffee-fruit-
de-pulper 
Code DA.2 
Description CRS: Description of Santa Anita, APCASA, production, founding date. 
Dated April 7, 2011.  
Source http://coffeelands.crs.org/2011/04/apcasa-a-revolutionary-approach-to-
coffee/ 
Code DA.3 
Description http://members.coopcoffees.com/producer-photos/santa-anita-
guatamala 
Source Cooperative Coffees: Images of Santa Anita coffee production, people, 
land.  
Code DA.4 
Description Personal Blog: Visitor stayed with Santa Anita 
Source http://bensampsonite.blogspot.com/2012/01/courage-coffee.html 
Code DA.5 
Description LUSH Handmade Cosmetics: Donate to De La Gente to help APCASA 
Community Development Program in Santa Anita.  
Source http://www.lushusa.com/on/demandware.store/Sites-Lush-
Site/en_US/Charities-Charity?cid=de-la-gente 
Code DA.6 
Description DESGUA: NGO collaborates with Santa Anita. Has held funding 
drives and organized farmers’ trip to NY and NJ.  
Source http://desgua.org/santa-anita-la-union/ 
Code DA.7 
Description De La Gente Blog Post: Joined student group from Southern Oregon 
University.  
Source http://www.dlgcoffee.org/news/2014/8/6/guest-post-santa-anita-la-
union 
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Code DA.8 
Description Santa Anita La Union Blog: Last updated January 10, 2010. 
Information about community, members, and production. Appears like 
it was/is a semi-official blog.  
Source https://santaanitalaunion.wordpress.com/ 
Code DA.9 
Description EntreMundos: Information about becoming a volunteer in Santa Anita. 
Updated June 6, 2014.  
Source http://www.entremundos.org/Projects/db/DisplayListing.php?p_listing
_id=180 
Code DA.10 
Description Viajero Sustentable: Information about community, production, and 
how to visit.  
Source http://viajerosustentable.com/2011/09/11/finca-santa-anita-la-union/ 
Code DA.11 
Description YouTube Video: “Proyecto Cafe de BUILD, CRS, y Santa Anita la 
Union” BUILD’s project, Canal 3 interview with Santa Anita’s 
members.  
Source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ihi_T_0h9Uk 
Code DA.12 
Description YouTube Video: “SANTA ANITA LA UNION: Transitions to 
Agricultural Development.wmv”. BUILD Project. Uploaded by Molly 
Ferrill.  
Source https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WM6A__5iGZM 
Code DA.13 
Description Possible official and current website of Santa Anita. Contact, 
community, and production information.  
Source http://www.fincasantaanita.org/ 
Code DA.14 
Description Red de Turismo Comunitario de America Latina: Information about 
visiting community. Updated 10/23/2009 
Source http://www.redturs.org/nuevaes/articulo.php?ar_codigo=503&ca_codig
o=32&ca_padre= 
Code DA.15 
Description Voice of a Mountain Movie: Explains Santa Anita’s history, 
production, and future aspirations of members. Interviews of members.  
Source http://www.voiceofamountain.com/ 
Code DA.16 
Description CRS Voices Blog Post: Ex-guerillas Build Coffee Cooperative. Posted 
3/25/2009. 
Source http://crs-blog.org/ex-guerillas-build-coffee-cooperative/ 
Code DA.17 
Description Tufts’ BUILD Program for Sustainable Development. Community 
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Development Plan. July 2010 
Source http://www.tuftsgloballeadership.org/sites/default/files/images/resource
s/BUILD%20Guate%20Community%20Development%20Plan.pdf 
Code DA.18 
Description Maddabout Coffee Blog post: Information about Santa Anita 
Source http://www.maddaboutcoffee.com/maddwebsite/wordpress/santa-anita-
la-union-coffee-cooperative/ 
Code DA.19 
Description ANACAFE’s 2012 training calendar 
Source http://www.anacafe.org/glifos/images/c/c7/APCM_calendario_RI.pdf 
Code DA.20 
Description ANACAFE blog post: German cooperative came to Santa Anita 
interested in buying coffee. 2/7/2014. 
Source http://www.anacafe.org/glifos/index.php?title=13NOT:Alemania-
compra-cafe-organico 
Code DA.21 
Description Research Project, San Carlos University, Guatemala: “Experiencias 
Alternativas y Tendencias Socio-Productivas Actuales en el Área Rural 
del Occidente de Guatemala Un estudio comparado en cuatro 
comunidades.” December 2005 
Source http://digi.usac.edu.gt/bvirtual/informes/puiep/INF-2005-012.pdf 
Code DA.22 
Description MA Thesis, Omid Madjidi, University of Calgary “SUSTAINABLE 
COFFEE CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS AND COFFEE 
COOPERATIVES IN GUATEMALA: A SMALL-SCALE 
PRODUCER PERSPECTIVE” 2011. One brief mention of Santa Anita 
by an interviewee.  
Source N/A 
Code DA.23 
Description Research Project, San Carlos University, Guatemala: “Experiencias 
Alternativas y Tendencias Socio-Productivas Actuales en el Área Rural 
del Occidente de Guatemala Un estudio comparado en cuatro 
comunidades.” December 2005 
Source http://digi.usac.edu.gt/bvirtual/informes/puiep/INF-2005-012.pdf 
Code DA.24 
Description Thesis, San Carlos University, Guatemala: “El impacto de la 
cooperación de la Unión Europea y el Gobierno de Guatemala, en el 
desarrollo socioeconómico de los desmovilizados del país, después de 
la firma de los Acuerdos de Paz, Estudio de caso, proyecto PAREC II 
en la finca Santa Anita, Colomba Costa Cuca, 1998 a 2002” by Gloria 
Ester Avila Avelar. June 2007.  
Source N/A 
Code DA.25 
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Description Operation Groundswell blog post: OG Guatemala goes off the grid for 
work and a fiesta.  
Source http://operationgroundswell.com/guatemala/guetemala-volunteer-
fiesta/ 
Code DA.26 
Description Operation Groundswell: Fair Trade Adventure to Guatemala 
information guide. Briefly described APCASA split with Association 
Maya. Summer 2013. 
Source http://operationgroundswell.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/Guatemala-Fair-Trade-.pdf 
Code DA.27 
Description Revue (Guatemala’s English Language Magazine): “Ex-guerilla 
entrepreneurship”. Description of Santa Anita and information about 
how to visit. July 2011 
Source http://www.revuemag.com/2011/07/ex-guerilla-entrepreneurship/ 
Code DA.28 
Description Foros Guate: Public forum posting “Santa Anita La Union: 
Agroecoturismo Diferente”. August 10, 2013. Information about Santa 
Anita and how to visit.  
Source http://www.forosguate.com/showthread.php?t=18195 
Code DA.29 
Description Prensa Libre “Ex combatientes se vuelven productivos”. Article 
mentioned planting plans, plant nursery, organic compost project, and 
CRS involvement. 12/23/2009.  
Source http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/Ex-combatientes-vuelven-
productivos_0_176382458.html 
Code DA.30 
Description Prensa Libre: “De las armas al agroecoturismo”. Description of 
community, exporting coffee to the US, ecotourism, selling banana 
bread in Quetzaltenango, and using the ex-administrator’s house as a 
hotel. 08/28/2010 
Source http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/armas-
agroecoturismo_0_325167526.html 
Code DA.31 
Description Tufts’ BUILD external links: Mentions Santa Anita being the programs 
2008-2009 partner community.  
Source http://tiglarchives.org/programs/build/external-links 
Code DA.32 
Description University of Wisconsin, Whitewater: Guatemala Service Learning 
information sheet. For travel Summer 2015.  
Source http://www.uww.edu/Documents/colleges/coeps/counseled/Guatemala
%20Info%20Sheet.pdf 
Code DA.33 
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Description University of Toronto: Operation Groundswell partnership for Summer 
2013 trip to Santa Anita.  
Source http://www.utm.utoronto.ca/student-life/sites/files/student-
life/public/users/memmesar/UTM%20Custom%20Program%20Hando
ut.pdf 
Code DA.34 
Description XelaWho: “Cool trips. Close by”. Description of community, visit, and 
volunteer opportunities. July 2008.  
Source http://xelawho.com/?p=1067 
Code DA.35 
Description Periodismohumano: Despues de La Paz blog post. Description of Santa 
Anita and the members’ experiences of the civil war and making a new 
life. Accompanied with video. 2012. 
Source http://despuesdelapaz.periodismohumano.com/2013/03/31/guatemala-
la-vida-despues-de-las-armas/ 
Code DA.36 
Description Pellmel (personal blog). “Beautiful images from Finca Santa Anita”. 
Brief description of community with visit’s photos. March 4, 2009.  
Source http://pellmel.com/2009/03/04/beautiful-images-from-finca-santa-
anita/ 
Code DA.37 
Description Turismo Comunitario En Guatemala (University of Mariano Galvez) 
personal blog. Description of Santa Anita and how to visit. July 5, 
2012.  
Source http://turismocomunitarioguate.blogspot.com/ 
Code DA.38 
Description Velocidad Maxima public forum. Description of Santa Anita and how 
to visit.  
Source http://www.velocidadmaxima.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-
444466.html 
Code DA.39 
Description Personal blog: A tourist’s recounting of visit to Santa Anita.  
Source https://chrisandgemma.wordpress.com/2008/03/07/la-finca-santa-anita/ 
Code DA.40 
Description Personal blog: Visit to Santa Anita. July 10, 2011 
Source http://pan-am.info/?p=2295 
Code DA.41 
Description ILO: Listing of a worker union in Finca Santa Anita 
Source http://www.ilo.org/public/spanish/region/ampro/mdtsanjose/worker/sin
di/gt.htm 
Code DA.42 
Description Personal travel blog. Recounting the experience visiting Santa Anita.  
Source https://www.travelblog.org/Central-America-
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Caribbean/Guatemala/Western-Highlands/Quetzaltenango/blog-
430599.html 
Code DA.43 
Description Professional practicum, UNIVERSIDAD RAFAEL LANDIVAR 
“ESTABLECIMIENTO DE MECANISMOS ORGANIZACIONALES 
Y 
GERENCIALES A LA JUNTA DIRECTIVA DE LA ASOCIACION 
CIVIL DE 
MUJERES DEL AREA RURAL “AMARC” by Gloria Edelmira 
Barillas de Leon. Description of Santa Anita and a women’s leadership 
project.  
Source http://biblio3.url.edu.gt/Tesario/2012/04/06/Barillas-Gloria.pdf 
Code DA.44 
Description ANACAFE publication, “Caficultores son capacitados sobre el 
tratamiento de aguas residuals”. Description of training in Santa Anita. 
No date.  
Source http://www.anacafe.org/glifos/index.php?title=13NOT:NT_Caficultore
s_tratramiento_residuales 
Code DA.45 
Description York University, Canada new publication: ”Business students venture 
to Guatemala for first-hand look at coffee business” January 10, 2014. 
Description of student visit to Santa Anita.  
Source http://yfile.news.yorku.ca/2014/10/01/business-students-venture-to-
guatemala-for-first-hand-look-at-coffee-business/ 
Code DA.46 
Description De La Gente List of Projects: Description of support provided to Santa 
Anita.  
Source http://www.dlgcoffee.org/our-projects/ 
Code DA.47 
Description MinnPost news article “Will coffee prices climb with climate change?” 
Describes weather changes and heavy rain affecting Santa Anita 
harvest. September 17, 2009.  
Source http://www.minnpost.com/global-post/2009/09/will-coffee-prices-
climb-climate-change 
Code DA.48 
Description La Comisión Interinstitucional de Comercio Justo y Solidario (quasi-
Guatemalan governmental organization): Publication “Mapeo del 
comercio justo y solidario en Guatemala”. Lists Santa Anita as a FLO 
certified association, made up of 35 families and 51% women. Lists the 
institutions name as “Asociación civil 
Maya de Pequeños Productores (ACMPA)”. Nov 2007-May 2008.  
Source http://www.encadenamientosempresariales.com/portal/documents/imgl
inks/2008-09/6119/mapeo-2008.pdf 
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Code DA.49 
Description Café Campesino fair-trade coffee importer publication: “Challenges at 
Santa Anita”. Mentioned raising $10,000 for Santa Anita. Describes 
Santa Anita producers as having “tough times” and poor harvests. 
Mentioned member visiting the US and presence of a “social change 
intern” from the US who was living and volunteering in Santa Anita. 
Mentioned Hurricane Stan having a large negative effect on 
production. Mentioned the challenge of investing in coffee vs spending 
money on food for family. April 2007.   
Source http://www.fairgroundsnewsletter.com/0704/santaanita.html 
Code DA.50 
Description Big World Magazine article, “From Guerrilleros to Cafeteros”. 
Description of Santa Anita. Mentioned problem of low income, 
changing weather patterns, low coffee prices, and the debt owed by 
Santa Anita - $300,000 at 12% interest. Mentioned land being 
portioned out by lottery. No date, but article cites 13 years after 
founding = 2011.  
Source http://www.bigworldmagazine.com/from-guerilleros-to-cafeteros/# 
Code DA.51 
Description CRS Coffeelands blog: “The water (not) in your coffee”. Mentioned 
the ecological beneficio in Santa Anita. March 12, 2010 
Source http://coffeelands.crs.org/2010/03/the-water-not-in-your-coffee/ 
Code DA.52 
Description As Green As It Gets Facebook photos. December 2013. Photos show 
rust effects and production of video by APCASA members.  
Source https://www.facebook.com/asgreenasitgets/photos/a.696309790392965
.1073741861.213674481989834/696310123726265/?type=3&permPag
e=1 
Code DA.53 
Description As Green As It Gets July 2013 Newsletter: Mentions coffee rust 
affecting Santa Anita. Provides $250 microloans for banana, plantain 
production, and bee keeping. Provided 3,850 roya resistant coffee 
seedlings. Mentioned 80% crop loss in 2012-2013.  
Source http://www.asgreenasitgets.org/component/acymailing/archive/view/lis
tid-2-agaig-newsletter/mailid-37-july-2013-newsletter/tmpl-
component?Itemid=166 
Code DA.54 
Description De La Gente: Description of coffee sold/bought. Brief description of 
APCASA. 
Source http://www.dlgcoffee.org/antigua-coffee-1/ 
Code DA.55 
Description Operation Groundswell fundraising page: “Guatemala ‘Fair’ Trade 
Team. Team hopes to raise $5000 for APCASA and a community 
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development organization in another region. Funds intended for 
Summer 2015 trip. $1530 raised as of February 13, 2015.  
Source http://fundraising.operationgroundswell.com/team/guatft 
Code DA.56 
Description Operation Groundswell Fundraising report 2013: $751 donated to 
APCASA for partial construction of patio, depulping equipment, 
storage lockers, and fermentation tanks.  
Source http://www.slideshare.net/OperationGroundswell/operation-
groundswells-fundraising-report-2013 
Code DA.57 
Description Movie “Voice of a Mountain”. Movie produced in Santa Anita by 
international filmmakers. Movie depicts history of Guatemalan 
conflict, Santa Anita’s community members’ involvement, and their 
coffee production and livelihood activities. Production began in 2006. 
Released in 2008. Re-released (?) in 2014.  
Source http://www.voiceofamountain.com/ 
Code DA.58 
Description Cafe Campesino “Santa Anita”. Mentioned representing 32 families, 
about 170 people, and 28 farms were organic. All coffee was organic 
by 2003. Joined FLO register in 2001. Mentioned coffee and banana 
production. Mentioned working collectively. USDA certified organic 
by Mayacert since 2003. No publication date.  
Source http://www.cafecampesino.com/Articles.asp?ID=259 
Code DA.59 
Description Fair Trade Wire (news from the front lines of fair trade coffee): 
Producer profile: Santa Anita. Same language as DA.58. Includes an 
Update: Visited as part of CRS’ CAFE Livelihoods delegation. Tufts’ 
BUILD program. Donations and technical assistance. “Written by Cafe 
Campesino on Aug 4, 2009”.  
Source http://www.fairtradewire.com/producer-profile-santa-anita/ 
Code DA.60 
Description Example of a coffee export contract between Cooperative Coffees and 
an Ethiopian coffee cooperative.  
Source http://justcoffee.coop/files/ETS%20123.pdf 
 
